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Abstract 
 
Darius A’Zami 
 
Submitted for the degree of PhD International Relations 
 
Citizen-peasants: 
modernity, international relations and the problem of difference in 
Tanzania 
 
A running difficulty in African Studies (and beyond) is the need to reconcile 
modernity with difference, arising in attempts to account for the impact of colonialism 
as well as unequal international relations without lapsing into erasure of the manifold 
realities of African difference. Identifying the peasant vis-à-vis modernity as a salient 
instance of the problem, this thesis proffers a historical sociology of post-colonial 
Tanzania, where Julius Nyerere insisted that ‘If Marx were born in Tanzania he would 
have written the Arusha Declaration’. In saying so he was, in effect, pointing to the 
need, both programmatic and intellectual, to reconcile modernity and peasant-
difference. 
Drawing upon international relations and the framework of uneven & combined 
development in particular, modernity is theorised as a process of fission whilst the 
peasant is cast as a protean subject thereof; the promised reconciliation can be 
achieved by rendering each as interactive. Building on this framework the main body 
of the thesis proceeds, encountering and engaging with the peasant-modernity 
problem along the way, to show the historical process by which a ‘citizen-peasant’ 
social form emerged as combined development; an intellectual manoeuvre, moreover, 
that serves to conclude the reconciliation of ‘Marx’ with ‘Arusha’. 
Chapters 1 and 2 establish the terrain and Chapter 3 supplies the methodological 
framework. Thereafter Chapter 4 sets out an account of the unevenness confronting 
Tanzania in the 1960s, linking that to its international relations in general and with 
China in particular to establish a pattern of interaction that Chapter 5 builds upon, 
revealing the Arusha Declaration as the starting point of a historical process from 
which the citizen-peasant arose, which is the key to the thesis as a whole. Chapter 6 
completes the argument, pointing to the entrenchment of that form beyond its origins 
in the era of Nyerere’s ‘African Socialism’ taking the account up to the conclusion of 
the 20th century. Chapter 7 concludes, reflecting on the implications of the argument 
for the contemporary conjuncture. 
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Chapter 1: Africa, Modernity and the Problem of 
Difference 
 ‘If Marx were born in Tanzania he would have written the Arusha Declaration’ 
- Julius K. Nyerere, cited in (Mamdani 2012, p. 108). 
‘Since the rise of the sugar empire and the resultant cotton kingdom, there has been 
consistent effort to rationalize Negro slavery by omitting Africa from world 
history…Therefore I am seeking…to remind readers in this crisis of civilization, of how 
critical a part Africa has played in human history, past and present, and how 
impossible it is to forget this and rightly explain the present plight of mankind’ 
- W.E.B Du Bois, The World and Africa, [1946] (2007, p. xxxi). 
I. The World and Africa: Between Marx and Arusha 
On the 5th February 1967 the charismatic president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, 
unveiled the Arusha Declaration to the nation. It was an ambitious programme of 
democratic socialism for the country’s modernisation and a seminal moment in its 
history, crucial to its sense of national identity (Nyerere 1968, pp. 231–250). It was also 
the signal moment in an era in which Tanzania became famous around the world for 
its experiment in ujamaa1 or ‘African socialism’. A historical moment of real optimism, 
that decades later came to be seen by most as a failure, the Arusha Declaration retains 
a central place in analyses of Tanzanian society. Whilst there are a great variety of 
analyses available, there is a broad consensus that it was both foundational for national 
unity and stability as well as being a key source of economic failure (Bjerk 2010, 
Aminzade 2013a, Lofchie 2014). 
Alongside its historical significance the Declaration has generated real intellectual 
interest. It is, argued C.L.R James, ‘one of the great documents of post-World War II’ 
(1977, p. 7). Moreover, it is the central plank in Nyerere’s renown in some quarters as a 
																																																								
1 Swahili for ‘familyhood’. 
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‘philosopher-king’ (Shivji 2012, p. 103).2  What is suggested here, in the first instance, is 
that grasping its full historical significance for Tanzania necessarily also entails 
grappling with the Arusha Declaration as an intellectual problem. That problem is 
alluded to by Nyerere himself in the epigraphic statement above, insisting that Marx 
would have written the Arusha Declaration. What this amounts to is, on the one hand, 
recognition of a tension between modernity and difference; on the other hand, it is 
also an insistence on reconciling the two both intellectually and as a matter of practical 
politics. Turning now to peruse the contents of the Declaration will serve to unpack 
this proposition. 
Part One founds the Declaration in a series of abstract propositions. Beginning 
with the equality of all human beings, it proceeds to the political equality of all 
Tanzanian citizens before finishing by emphasising the importance of a ‘just return’ for 
labour and the common ownership of the major means of production and natural 
resources of the nation. At first glance, however, one might think that James was guilty 
of exaggeration in his high estimation of the Declaration. Seen through the lens of 
political philosophy, the above seems to be a familiar enough statement of 20th century 
socialism. At its core is an assertion of the primacy of politics (of equality) over 
economics, a logic that is inscribed in that sequence of propositions. Setting out from 
the political equality of all citizens it insists, on that basis, on ‘justice’ for labour and 
common ownership. In short, political equality must both condition and constrain the 
market. Accordingly, it is an evidently socialist reaction to the condition of modernity.3  
There is a strong tendency in accounts of post-colonial Tanzania to address the era 
in precisely these terms, explicable in its broad contours as state socialism (Aminzade 
2013a, Coulson 2013, Lofchie 2014). And, for the avoidance of doubt, it is simply beyond 
question that in this loose (but nevertheless instructive) sense Nyerere is speaking to 
and from that political tradition which Marx’s intellectual project bestrides. The 
difficulty is that as one presses on to the subsequent parts of the Declaration matters 
																																																								
2 Nyerere was, perhaps, appreciative of that designation. As Issa Shivji  reports, one of Nyerere’s last 
intellectual projects in his retirement from political life was translation into Swahili – Tanzania’s lingua 
franca – of Plato’s Republic (2012, p. 114). 
3 This is expanded upon in subsequent chapters, but is in its essence a Marxist reaction to modernity, 
see for instance the collection of essays on questions of democracy and capitalism by Ellen Wood (1995). 
My point for now is neither recommendation nor criticism thereof, but rather simply that this Part of 
the Declaration is oriented in the direction of a political philosophy that is premised on a social theory 
of modernity. 
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become considerably more complex in thinking through the application of these 
socialist principles to Tanzania. 
In Part Two Nyerere begins to shift his thinking away from foundational political 
philosophy toward ‘the policy of socialism’ (p.233-235). He refers to the absence of 
exploitation (the ambition to classlessness), control of key means of production by 
peasants and workers, which in turn supplies both a notion and definition of 
democracy and, finally, closes by noting that socialism is a ‘belief’ that must be 
engendered through the example of leadership. Necessarily there is a great deal of 
detailed commentary on this to follow in the general body of this thesis. The salient 
point for now is that Nyerere has, via policy discussion, offered up an important 
sociological premise: the broad and deep presence in Tanzania of peasants alongside 
workers. Indeed, in actual fact, the overwhelming preponderance of peasants vis-à-vis 
workers. 
Whilst this is a basic point, it is not banal. Nor is it a tactical Leninist ploy, a means 
of taking a revolutionary step on the pathway toward a nonetheless commonly-
conceived socialist modernity. Rather it is a difference which goes, fundamentally, to 
the nature of Nyerere’s vision of socialism. Peasant difference combines with the 
imperative of political equality for all citizens to inform a series of arguments that 
constitute by far the most substantial element of the Arusha Declaration, Part 3 (1968, 
pp. 235–248). And, reserving points about their plausibility or otherwise to later 
Chapters, it would appear that introduction of this sociological premise of difference 
generates a set of increasingly counter-intuitive proposals by reference to the 
prevailing categories of the very political philosophy with which Nyerere began: 
socialism. 
The first, and it must be said the least counter-intuitive, of these is that socialism 
must be developmental. Nyerere offers a pronounced vision of Tanzanian poverty, and 
insists that Tanzania is ‘at war’ in a fight to move to a ‘state of prosperity’. He 
continues: 
‘We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have 
been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, 
exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution…’ (p.235) 
		
4	
Obviously some sort of reference to socialism as a solution to backwardness 
(development) was common enough in this period. Yet, as he proceeds to sketch that 
revolution, more novel and intriguing material turns up. 
In deliberately folksy language, which betokens the nation-building project that 
this was, Nyerere first urges that ‘money’ must not be the primary tool of development. 
‘A poor man’, he writes, ‘does not use Money as a Weapon’. Money, sourced internally, 
can only come from taxes which is simply not sustainable. ‘[K]nowing all the things 
which could be done with more milk does not alter the fact that the cow has no more 
milk!’ (1968, p. 237). What he means is that this would depend overwhelmingly on 
surplus extraction from the peasant. Not only would it be politically inexpedient, it 
would ultimately be self-defeating since that surplus was so tenuous and limited.  
Likewise, Nyerere thought that external finance – whether aid or loans – in the 
amounts that would be required would not only imperil Tanzanian independence but 
were also unrealistic since no country is able or willing to suffice all the ‘needy 
countries in the world’. For good measure he adds that ‘there is no world government 
which can tax the prosperous nations…nor if one did exist could it raise enough 
revenue to do all that is needed in the world’ (Nyerere 1968, p. 239). In short, a peasant 
society such as Tanzania cannot (and should not) tax its way to development; and, in 
order to be independent, nor must it delude itself that the solution is external aid and 
loans.4 
Additionally, that revolution must not, as Nyerere concedes had been done in the 
past, ‘put too much emphasis on industries’. Neither the money nor technical ability 
for rapid and widespread industrialisation exist. Besides which, inviting external 
assistance would, he thought, also entail external capitalists that would interfere with 
Tanzanian socialism. For even if doing so gave ‘us all the industries we need…it would 
also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that 
without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism’ (Nyerere 1968, p. 242). In 
saying so Nyerere is adverting to a belief that historical development is, or can be, 
multi-linear; making it possible to skip capitalism and directly build socialism. 
More important still is that Nyerere proceeds from this line to direct discussion of 
the peasant and agriculture as the basis of development. In order to avoid the 
																																																								
4 Given that Tanzania went on to be a massive recipient of foreign aid and loans, a phenomenon also 
intimately linked to the crisis it experienced in the 1980s, these claims have a real ring of both irony 
and tragedy to them (Edwards 2014). This issue will emerge in chapters 5 and 6. 
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substitution of urban exploitation for prospective capitalist exploitation,5 the peasant 
must be the principle agent of development and agriculture its focus. The means by 
which this would be achieved were an injunction toward hard work – labour-intensive 
rather than capital-intensive – and the overall effect would be developmental due to 
the perceived benefits of collectivisation. Each village would feature an admixture of 
private plots and collectivised fields, that would make the selective use of inputs such 
as fertiliser and limited machinery both effective and feasible.6 
In this way Nyerere thought it would be possible for a peasant society to also be 
modern. It is an unfailingly socialist vision and contains an undeniable aspiration 
toward the condition of modernity. Nyerere talks of the use of ‘modern’ production 
methods in those collective villages, and frequently points to his anxious concern that 
Tanzania makes a space for itself in the modern world. In an abstract sense it is a 
vision of modernity as a condition of world history, that is simultaneously both an 
opportunity and a threat for all. For all that, however, it is also an insistence that 
peasant difference dictates a divergence from modernity in its ‘conventional’ form of 
capitalist industrialisation which is commonly conceived as antithetical to the peasant. 
Thus the challenge is to determine whether the apparently contradictory nature of 
Nyerere’s formulation makes sense both in analytical terms and as a political project. 
Can Nyerere’s argument that Marx would have arrived at the same formulation be 
accepted? Or, rather, do the later failures of his political programme to achieve a 
durable socialism simply reflect the deep contradictions in Nyerere’s view? These are 
questions of considerable difficulty, and do not admit of a straightforward answer. In 
this sense this thesis navigates between modernity and the problem of difference, 
ultimately suggesting that the missing link is international relations. 
Before considering how this thesis can constructively engage with Nyerere’s claim 
it is worth widening the intellectual lens. Doing so reveals the tense relation of 
modernity and difference as a more general intellectual problem. Far from flowing 
solely from the idiosyncratic choices of Nyerere, the ‘philosopher-king’, and the 
specificities of Tanzania, it is endemic. 
																																																								
5 Thus offering, long before it became a topic of mainstream concern (Bates 1983), a critique of urban 
bias. 
6 A view contained within the Arusha Declaration, but expanded upon in much greater detail later in 
1967 in a paper ‘Socialism and Rural Development’ calling for the establishment – through moral 
cajolement of the populace – of collective villages (Nyerere 1968, pp. 337–366). 
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Take, for instance, W.E.B Du Bois’ treatment of the African continent and world 
history from which the other epigraph to this chapter is drawn. Writing in 1946-7 and 
provoked by the erasures intrinsic to the view of ‘Africa’ as ahistorical, Du Bois was 
engaged in an ambitious task: the restoration of Africa to its proper place in world 
history.7 Starting The World and Africa with the epigraphic lines above, his aim was 
avowedly universalist in nature. Not only had Africa had its own particular histories, he 
sought to show that they were also historical ‘in the same sense’ as anywhere else (2007, 
p. xxxiv). What he means by this is an attempt to intellectually reconcile the 
particularity (difference) of African history with a sense of its place in universal 
(modern) world history.8 
A notion of modernity features in this passage from Du Bois in two ways. Firstly, in 
a critical sense, as the motive force for those erasures he wanted to tackle; sugar and 
cotton, the epitome of modern commodities, are seen as impelling the rationalisation 
of slavery and erasure of Africa from world history. Thus, in a line, Du Bois anticipates 
a key aspect of the critique that the subsequent post-colonial school would develop, 
that modernity is epistemologically corrupt inasmuch as it is in service of systematic 
brutality (Seth 2009). 
Yet Du Bois does not stop there. For him modernity is not just the villain of the 
piece, its second role in his work is present in his allusion to his own motivation. In 
aspiring to unveil the critical part ‘Africa’ has played in ‘human history’ he directed his 
comments to both the ‘past and present’. Whilst unhappy with the epistemological role 
universal categories such as modernity had played, rather than reject it outright he 
seeks to uncover the agency (or subjectivity) of Africans within it. As such he thought 
highly of Eric Williams’ (1944) pioneering work because it emphasised the central 
significance of slavery to capitalist-modernity. The example of slavery as a feature of 
modernity, often rejected, treated as necessarily secondary or insignificant because it 
was so different from metropolitan1 modernity – wage labour etc. - illustrates the point 
well and resembles the erasures of the peasant which the Arusha Declaration seeks to 
grapple with. Thus Du Bois’ project necessitated, at least so he thought, the 
recognition of difference as intrinsic to modernity rather than opposed to it. 
This, he recognised, would be exceedingly difficult to convincingly demonstrate. ‘I 
still labor [sic] under the difficulty’ he wrote, ‘of the persistent lack of interest in Africa 																																																								
7 Thus taking direct aim, in his words, at ‘the herd of writers of modern history who never heard of 
Africa or declare with Guernier “Seule de tous les continents l’Afrique n’a pas d’histoire!”’(2007, p. xxxii) 
8 Du Bois was also concerned to make good the erasures of Africa from pre-modern world history too.  
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so long characteristic of modern history and sociology’ since the need for ‘detailed 
researches….is not yet clear to the thinking world’ (Du Bois 2007, p. xxxi). The reason 
for that disinterest, at least in part, was that modernity had the appearance of being a 
property of the western, that is non-African, world. What he had in mind were those 
developments of the 19th century that are usually taken as being definitive of modernity: 
industrialisation, state bureaucracy and rationalisation as well as nationalism and 
socialism as related ideologies (Buzan and Lawson 2015). Thus Du Bois reflects, the 
history of the period ‘between the American Civil War and World War I supports me 
only in part and in some cases appears violently to contradict me’ (Du Bois 2007, p. 
xxxi). Given that this period not only featured those elements of modernity in 
European and North American societies but was also the apogee of colonialism in 
Africa, it can be little wonder that Du Bois writes of the appearance of violent 
contradiction. 
The basic nature of that threat of contradiction is the abiding temptation to either 
interpret any incipient African modernity as simply an external imposition of 
colonialism or to insist on distinguishing ‘Africa’ from modernity. In either case, Du 
Bois would find himself in too weak an intellectual position to contend that Africa has 
nonetheless played a critical role ‘in human history, past and present’ (2007, p. xxxi). 
Thus an acute problem emerges, which is the apparent dilemma of choosing between a 
modernity conceived as external or African difference conceived as outwith the 
conceptual boundaries of modernity. If African history was to be established as world 
history, that dilemma’s falsity would need to be established. 
Thus what Du Bois is highlighting is a more directly intellectual form of the basic 
problem this thesis is concerned with, whereas the Arusha Declaration is more political 
in nature. Section II will reveal a tension between modernity and difference that has 
troubled African Studies long since Du Bois’ work; and Chapter 2 shall observe that the 
problem extends further still, burdening a wide range of attempts to apply social 
theories of modernity to peasant societies. Thus the significance of the Arusha 
Declaration does not lie solely in discovering the pattern of Tanzanian history; 
simultaneously it entails confrontation of a general problem that maps onto the 
difficulty Nyerere puts his finger on: can Tanzania (‘Africa’) really be both modern and 
different, or must difference in some essential sense yield to, or converge on, 
modernity? Or, in his terms, would Marx really have written the Arusha Declaration?  
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The best reading of this line is that it necessarily connotes some conception of 
modernity by virtue of the reference to Marx.9 Simultaneously the reference to the 
Arusha Declaration imports a notion of fundamental difference: the conjunction of a 
premise of sociological difference (the peasant) yielding a necessarily differing form of 
modernity. The third logical element this line contains is the proposition that 
modernity and difference are nonetheless commensurable. 10  Whilst Tanzanian 
conditions produce the Arusha Declaration rather than Das Kapital,11 Marx would still 
have been able to write it. The clear implication being that he could do so without self-
contradiction. It is this third element, the preferred term here being the proposition of 
commensurability, which is where the real difficulty (and controversy) lies. 
The ambition of this thesis is not pursuit of the point in a specifically Marxian vein; 
instead it is interested in whether and how the general body of classical social theory 
might, ultimately, be cast as commensurable with difference. And it this is broad 
ambition that is increasingly adverted to. Take, for instance, Susan Buck-Morss’(2009) 
reading of Hegel and Haiti. The key, she argues, is to recognise the interactive 
connection of the two, and in that sense she focusses on the ‘and’ (Buck-Morss 2009, p. 
12). Likewise Dipesh Chakrabarty points to a similar ambition in his attempt at 
‘Provincializing Europe’ seeking to ‘situate [himself] theoretically at the juncture where 
we give up neither Marx nor “difference”’ (2000, p. 95).12 
This thesis pursues such ground via a more modest analytical scale and timeframe 
(post-colonial Tanzania rather than ‘World history’ per se) and does so in historical 
sociological rather than the grand philosophical-historical register that seeks to rework 
Hegel. Nevertheless, it similarly looks toward some notion of interactivity to mediate 
between modernity and difference, thereby discovering their commensurability. The 
source of that interactivity is international relations; as such integration of that 
																																																								
9 Invocations of Marx were common in commentaries on Tanzania at the time. Indeed, these were often 
the spirit of critique of Nyerere’s project as insufficiently radical or mistakenly divergent from Marx. As 
such Nyerere’s line is intended as a riposte to those critics. 
10 For explicit claims around the necessary universality and diversity of socialism see (Nyerere 1968, pp. 
22–23). 
11 There are various versions of Nyerere’s claim (Nyerere 1968, p. 16). One directly contrasts these two 
works: ‘if Marx had been born in Sumbawanga, he would have come up with the Arusha Declaration 
instead of Das Kapital’ (Shivji 2012, p. 108).  
12 For his concluding thoughts on the question of the commensurability, or not, of the universal and 
‘local’ and the ‘contradictory but profoundly connected tendencies’ in social thought represented by 
Marx and Heidegger (hermeneutics) see (Chakrabarty 2000, pp. 254–255). 
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perspective is proposed as being an analytical additive of unique (though not itself 
sufficient) significance. 
The contribution of this thesis, then, can be stated as follows. The Arusha 
Declaration, as observed before, stands for the centrality of the question of modernity 
and difference in its Tanzanian context. More concretely stated, the core nature of that 
difference is indicated through a sociological category: the peasant. Tracing the genesis 
and then subsequent career of the policies Arusha stood for, a concrete set of historical 
patterns are derived. Whilst the vision of socialism of the Arusha Declaration 
undoubtedly failed to take root it is a crucial link in a remarkable chain of causation 
that goes directly to the issue of modernity and difference. The emergent property of 
which is what is referred to as the citizen-peasant13 social formation; a specific hybrid 
form pointing in its very formulation to the combination of what might otherwise be 
considered modern (citizenship) and non-modern (the peasant).14 
This analysis relies on interactivity, and international relations in particular, since 
that is the analytical additive that allows sense to be made of that historical process. 
This is done through engagement with the key precepts developed by those that are 
developing a theory of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ (Rosenberg 2006, Matin 
2013a, Anievas 2014). Due to the basic fact that societies exist in ontological multiplicity 
they interact with each other. A further consequence is that interaction necessarily 
impinges upon patterns of development such that they are multi-linear. Chapter 3 will 
specify the framework by which the thesis will trace the citizen-peasant in precisely 
these terms; showing it to be an aspect of multi-linear development and, as such, a 
manifestation of the necessary commensurability of modernity and difference. Put 
another way, difference is, and must be, inscribed in universal history (Matin 2013b). 
Thereafter the remainder of the thesis (Chapters 4-7) will add empirical flesh to that 
framework to complete the claim that the citizen-peasant is a concrete historical 
illustration of the commensurability of modernity and difference via the lens of 
international relations. 																																																								
13 I note in passing that, in a very different context, Ellen Wood(1989) developed a ‘peasant-citizen’ 
category for her analysis of ancient Athenian democracy,  of which some use has been made in analysis 
of the United States in the 19th century (Post 2011, pp. 255, 264–274). 
14 The thesis as a whole is more concerned with the historical sociological bases of citizenship rather 
than as category of political philosophy. Nonetheless citizenship has its own problem of difference. ‘On 
the face of it’, says Ruth Lister, ‘to link citizenship and difference is to create an oxymoron…Janus-faced, 
citizenship operates simultaneously as a force for inclusion and exclusion both within and at the 
borders of nation states’ (1998, p. 71). 
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Before proceeding though a potential objection, around the necessity of seeking 
out a point of commensurability between modernity and difference, must be addressed. 
Why, it runs, do we need to concern ourselves with modernity at all, would it not be 
better simply to focus on identifying difference? The remainder of this Chapter 
provides an answer arguing that both African Studies in general (Section II) and more 
briefly that study of Tanzania in particular (Section III) have been caught between 
modernity and difference. Indeed, it turns out that the difficulties in those literatures 
is, to a great extent, attributable to that very impasse. As Lynn Thomas puts it, African 
Studies is still confronted by: 
‘one of the most challenging questions faced now by multiple generations of scholars: 
how to counter the pernicious and persistent positioning of Africa as outside of the 
modern while simultaneously acknowledging the historical depth, complexity, and 
difference encompassed within its social domains’ (2011, p. 733). 
II. African Studies: colonialism and inequality in international 
relations 
Some sixty years after The World and Africa’s publication, on the 26th July 2007 in 
Dakar the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, gave an instantly infamous speech that 
well illustrates the urgency of Thomas’ question. He declared that ‘[t]he tragedy of 
Africa is that the African has never really entered into history...They have never really 
launched themselves into the future’ (McGreal 2007, Cumming 2013, p. 34). Sarkozy, 
audacious in his recycling of Hegelian tropes, appears to bely the progress African 
Studies has surely made since Du Bois wrote. But, turning to that literature in this 
section, it transpires that in fact Lynn Thomas’ question remains unresolved; it 
remains unclear how Africa can be positioned as part of the modern world without 
falling prey to a denial of difference. And it is this which leaves scope for Sarkozy’s 
reading of ‘Africa’ as ahistorical. 
The core tendency of African Studies in recent decades has, quite rightly, been to 
resile from the false verities of modernisation and dependency theories. Both offered, 
in their own ways, a mirage of homogeneity. The welcome reaction thereto has been 
clear-throated insistence on African difference. Even so, the course that African Studies 
has charted has led it into troubled waters. Whilst moving from the illusions of 
homogeneity that so much thought around modernity has fostered, this advance has 
come at the cost of an analytical disjuncture between modernity and African difference. 
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There are two key thematics of this literature in which this is the case, colonialism and 
international relations. Exploring each in turn, the intellectual costs this has imposed 
are shown, thereby underlining the dividends that might flow from reconciliation of 
modernity and difference. 
One upshot of these trends has been to lapse into what will be referred to as 
narratives of success and failure. Treatments of the Arusha Declaration’s place in 
Tanzanian history are a clear instance, rendering it a series of more or less 
untheorisable historical incidents to be understood as successes or, more often, as 
failures in their own terms. 
There are two responses to the problem of difference. The first is an impulse 
toward its treatment as inferior and the second toward its assimilation, an impulse to 
recognise ‘common humanity’ but at the ‘high price of negating differences between 
self and other’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, pp. 9–10). The limitation of the turn away 
from modernisation and dependency theories, then, is that it addresses the latter but 
neglects the former. Thus, whilst not themselves reinforcing it, space is left for the 
reassertion of old tropes of ahistorical Africa in the vein of Sarkozy’s speech. 
It is for this reason that debate around modernity is a repetitive feature of African 
Studies. Frederick Cooper (2005, pp. 117–118), for instance, reflects that ‘[f]or someone 
of my generation…there is an irony to the modernity fad of the 1990s and 2000s. We 
cut our eye teeth…on modernization’ and yet debates over modernity ‘have not gone 
away’. 
Africa and Colonialism 
Debate over both the nature and consequences of colonialism have been central 
features of African Studies and, as Olúfémi Táíwò has complained, colonialism tends to 
be treated as interchangeable with modernity (2010, p. 3). Beginning with a vision of 
colonialism as the seedbed of modernity, it quickly becomes a proxy for modernity in 
general. So conceived, the centrality of colonialism in African Studies also serves to 
establish the centrality of modernity. Yet, it will be argued, the interchangeable quality 
attributed to colonialism and modernity serves to entrench a disjuncture between 
modernity and African difference. Accordingly, it is a significant example of the 
problem that both Nyerere and Du Bois grapple with. 
The establishment of colonial institutions in Africa, especially pronounced in the 
19th and early 20th centuries, has long been a central feature of African Studies. 
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Mahmood Mamdani, in what is already a classic work Citizen and subject: 
contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (1996), identifies what he calls a 
bifurcated state as the central legacy of colonialism. Basil Davidson (1992), meanwhile, 
sees the nation-state as a ‘curse’; an artificial set of institutions introduced to Africa by 
colonialism that are at the epicentre of his account of the problems of post-colonial 
Africa. Crawford Young (1994) similarly points to the state as a fundamentally colonial 
institutional innovation that goes to the very heart of African politics. In these three 
major works, and many others besides, colonialism is considered to have established 
Africa’s pattern of engagement with the external, modern world. 
To understand what these perspectives have in common, let us begin with a sketch 
of how colonialism is seen as having introduced modernity. With the entry of the 
industrialised European powers and the (very nearly) full extension of colonial power 
over the continent a pattern of engagement with the rest of the world is enforced. 
Graham Harrison provides a typical sketch, attributing to colonialism both the 
creation of ‘a national economy’ and ‘a nation-state’. Colonial incursion generates 
‘infrastructural development’ (railways etc.) and ‘the integration of African farmers 
into global markets’ through cash crops that produces a process of ‘peasantisation’. 
Meanwhile some ‘small-scale capitalists’ emerged from these agrarian processes, able 
to begin accumulating in their production of cotton, coffee and tea. Furthermore, 
working classes of a sort began to emerge in the cities as wage-labourers came to be 
employed to service that new infrastructure. The container for that ‘national economy’ 
was the ‘nation-state’, an often repressive political form15 that allowed the national 
economy to function and perpetuate the supply of primary commodities to the world 
market (Harrison 2002, pp. 4–5). 
In the hands of modernisation theory this sort of sketch allows the projection of a 
straightforward and singular trajectory of (continued) modernisation. The number and 
size of those ‘small-scale capitalists’ would continue to grow, as would wage-labour 
and all the attendant physical and social features of modernity. Any deviation 
(difference) from that projection was explicable by reference to pathological ‘tradition’. 
Modernity, as implanted by colonialism, either took hold or it did not; by the same 
token Africa was to either be modern or it was to be different. Meanwhile dependency 
theory (Rodney 1972), though strictly concerned to take difference 
(dependence/under-development etc.) more seriously, even more forcefully locates 																																																								
15 Thus the idea of the ‘overdeveloped state’(Alavi 1972) as a distinctive feature of colonialism had its 
attractions. 
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explanatory significance outside of Africa in a global structure of modernity. African 
difference is still created by - the fault of – imperial modernity. Thus in both cases 
difference is either irrelevant/pathological (modernisation) or secondary (dependency), 
and both have been roundly rejected by African Studies in recent decades. 
Now all three texts – Mamdani, Davidson and Young – all aspire to take African 
difference far more seriously than that; indeed they are part of the general turn against 
both modernisation and dependency theories in African Studies (Young 1999). Their 
attempts to account for African difference whilst accounting for the centrality of 
colonialism are both innovative and deeply instructive as to the nature and quality of 
the tension between modernity and difference. 
Mamdani’s approach to colonialism and African history has been hugely influential 
and opens up an enormous intellectual field. The impetus comes from forceful 
rejection of both modernisation and dependency as ‘history by analogy’, wherein 
analysis of Africa is done by reference to categories derived from European history 
(1996, pp. 9–11). Whilst colonialism was of the deepest significance, it must be 
understood through distinctively African categories. The specific features of African 
politics that he identifies are not timeless and immanent, owed to a deep-rooted 
specific African ‘culture’. Rather, he argues, difference was a profound aspect of 
colonial governance. 
For Mamdani the creation of (in Harrison’s terms) ‘a national economy’ did not 
entail ‘a nation-state’ in anything like the ‘European’ sense; but rather a bifurcated 
state of citizens (settlers and/or local elites) on one hand and subjects on the other. 
These are the core categories of African difference in this text. Citizenship pertains to 
the urban features of colonised societies; contrastingly, rural areas were governed 
indirectly (tribal authorities) by means of ‘custom’, in which forms of personal 
dependence (subjecthood) were the dominant political logic. The consequence of this 
bifurcation was to inscribe both questions of ethnicity and kinship into African politics 
and a deep divide between town and country. 
According to Mamdani these institutional innovations were part of the 
abandonment of imperialism’s wider ‘civilising mission’ from the mid-19th century 
onward. Liberal empire that had aspired to transform its the colonies in their own 
		
14	
European image (of modernity) turned instead toward ‘holding the line’ and 
maintaining order (Mamdani 1996, p. 50, Brown 2006, p. 141).16 
But there is a sociological aspect of this shift too. Recall the ‘African farmer’ 
producing cash crops as a fundamental feature of colonialism’s generation of African 
intercourse with the modern world. What Mamdani’s argument emphasises is that the 
key difference, subjecthood and very limited citizenship, is the means by which that 
intercourse is regulated; the peasant is governed as a subject in order to maintain the 
stability of the colony. Difference in this sense is necessary to its participation in 
modernity. Likewise, the political constitution of land ownership is central to that 
system, regulating access to land, production and distribution. 17  Moreover, as 
Catherine Boone (2014) has carefully demonstrated, the centrality of land to African 
‘political order’ stretches up to the present day. 
Thinking back to what emerged from the Arusha Declaration, Mamdani’s work 
seems to move a long way down the required road of travel. It recognises that both 
modernity and difference in general, whilst also being sensitive to the particular 
sociological premise of difference – rural relations, the peasant and so on – which was 
so fundamental for Nyerere. Mamdani pinpoints how difference is an institutional 
necessity to Africa’s colonial-modernity. He reveals in specific terms that beneath the 
homogenous veneer of the global market lies difference. Peasants, governed (or 
captured) by customary law, participated in the market on that, fundamentally 
political, basis. As such, here it was custom and kinship, not the invisible hand of ‘the 
market’, which was the essence of modernity. 
There are, of course, critics of this account. A common suggestion is that 
Mamdani’s concepts are too stark and clean and that institutional structures were 
‘more varied…more ambiguous, than the notion of the bifurcated state suggests’ 
(Ahluwalia 2001, chap. 5, Schneider 2006, p. 99). Mamdani’s elegant conceptual 
structure inevitably invites calls for more nuance and texture. But if that were the only 
problem one might be forgiven for thinking that Mamdani has already furnished us 																																																								
16 Indeed, this switch in grand imperial policy can be seen as a shift from one reaction to the problem of 
difference to the other. Whereas liberal empire aspires to homogenising immersion, the bifurcated 
state model is a vision of colonial inferiority, in which citizenship is for the few. 
17 Whereas colonial customary law in India ‘was limited to matters of personal law, in Africa it stretched 
to include land. Unlike the variety of land settlements in India, whether in favour [sic] of landlords or 
of peasant proprietors, the thrust of colonial policy in Africa was to define land as a communal and 
customary possession…procuring basic sustenance required getting customary access to communal 
land’ (Mamdani 1996, p. 50). 
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with the conceptual toolkit needed for tackling the Arusha Declaration and its 
significance even if it left room for more allowance of the messiness of actual history. 
 The real difficulty with straightforward adoption of Mamdani’s framework, 
however, is as follows. His somewhat structural conception of ‘late colonialism’ is 
intended to speak decisively to the post-colonial ‘impasse’ in which he says Africa finds 
itself, between ‘modernists’ and ‘communitarians’ (Mamdani 1996, p. 3). Yet the whole 
framework is ‘more conducive to finding out about Big Structures than Large Processes’ 
as Chris Youé puts it (2000, p. 408).18 Why, projecting from the colonial to the post-
colonial era, ‘should “inherited impediments” continue to have effects?’ (Young 1999, p. 
154). In the final analysis this is the problem adverted to above, colonialism serves as a 
proxy for modernity, dictating a set of ‘inherited impediments’. 
Closer examination of how this works analytically in the post-colonial era reveals 
the problem. As Mamdani is well aware, the newly independent post-colonial states 
were by and large intent on reform of those impediments. He accounts for this by 
sketching the approaches of ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ states (1996, pp. 25–26). 
Conservative states bridged the urban-rural divide between citizen and subject; but did 
so by embracing the ethnicity immanent to indirect rule as the organising principle of 
national politics. Clientelism, the neo-patrimonialism that is so prominent a feature of 
African Studies now (Bach and Gazibo 2012), was a clear consequence as was the real 
potential for ethnic conflict between winners and losers. 
Radical states, and Mamdani includes Tanzania in this category in Citizen and 
Subject (1996, pp. 172–177), meanwhile centralised power and ‘deemphasised’ custom 
and ethnicity in favour of national identity. But, he suggested, that required a push for 
development that ‘deepen[ed] the chasm between town and country’ (1996, p. 26). 
Even if the political tensions around ethnicity might be removed (or weakened) the 
exploitative relations between town and country, ultimately capital and peasant, were 
maintained. ‘Native authority’, in John Lonsdale’s(1997, p. 521) droll précis, ‘has come 
to town as party hack’. 
The difficulty with this insistence on the abiding nature of the inherited 
impediments of colonial-modernity in the post-colonial era is that it underplays key 
aspects of nation-building. The reform process those states entered into, consisting in 
both powerful claims to the extension of citizenship and the quest for development, 
were filled with contention and debate (Lonsdale 1997, p. 522, Cooper 2005, pp. 17–18, 																																																								
18 Obviously he is invoking (Tilly 1984) here. The point is a general one though, for similar points about 
the somewhat static nature of Mamdani’s argument see (Lonsdale 1997, p. 522, Schneider 2006, p. 113). 
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51–52). Mamdani’s approach insists that those reforms could not fundamentally alter 
the calculus; the choice was between conservative politics of ethnicity and radical 
assertion of citizenship but at the cost of authoritarian developmentalism, 
perpetuating the exploitation of country by the town. 
Many of Mamdani’s reviewers have suggested these are the sorts of difficulty 
involved in applying his reading of colonial governance to the post-colonial (Lonsdale 
1997, Cooper 2005, pp. 17–18, 51–52). Indeed, some even point specifically to Tanzania 
as a difficult case (Ahluwalia 2001, p. 104, Schneider 2006). For all the innovation of 
Mamdani’s analysis of the colonial character of African states, the supposition that that 
character is its post-colonial destiny is more dubious. Indeed it might even be the case 
that Mamdani has become more sensitive to the point, having recently taken a fresh 
look at Tanzania (Mamdani 2012, pp. 107–125). In that more recent work he seems open 
to a wider range of possibilities than the radical or conservative pathways he had 
sketched. 
The condition for the recognition of any further difference, beyond that 
engendered by the bifurcated state of citizen and subject, is an appreciation of agency. 
Yet agency, in Mamdani’s treatment of the post-colonial period, plays a circumscribed 
role. It is limited to an anti-systemic character and, even after lengthy considerations 
of resistance to those colonial patterns, Mamdani sees that colonial character as 
ultimately reasserting itself (Mamdani 1996). Even his apparent willingness to modify 
that reading in the case of Tanzania sees those reforms as emanating from the 
exceptional agency of Nyerere (Mamdani 2012, pp. 107–125). Whilst agency is not 
discounted, it stands outside of the overall structure of his theoretical framework; thus 
agency ultimately emerges as an exception that proves the rule. In the case of the anti-
systemic resistance of Citizen and Subject it makes no discernible difference, or, when 
it does make a difference as in the case of Nyerere, it is untheorisable. 
In precise terms what this means is that Mamdani’s bifurcated state reconciles 
modernity and difference only in a synchronic sense. In the period of colonial-
modernity he has managed to demonstrate, with deep insight, the commensurability 
(indeed, indispensability) of modernity and difference. However, modernity and 
difference remain deeply uneasy bedfellows diachronically speaking. As soon as one 
attempts to put the picture into motion – to move from ‘Big Structures’ to ‘Large 
Processes’ – that reconciliation begins to break down. Further difference, such as that 
in Tanzania which this thesis will characterise as the ‘citizen-peasant’, is neither 
theorisable nor an aspect of modernity. 
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In so doing Mamdani runs foul of a warning of his own. It is ‘only when abstracted 
from structural constraint’, he suggests ‘that agency appears as lacking in historical 
specificity’. Yet that diachronic disjuncture results precisely in such an abstraction, 
albeit in time rather than space. ‘At this point’, he continues ‘abstract universalism and 
intimate particularism turn out to be two sides of the same coin: both see in the 
specificity of experience nothing but its idiosyncrasy’ (Mamdani 1996, p. 11).  The very 
real danger here is that post-colonial experience, radical or conservative, begins to 
appear as little more than idiosyncratic difference. Overall, Mamdani’s framework does 
not justify subscription to Nyerere’s claim that Marx would have written the Arusha 
Declaration. The former may (or not) be the domain of a defensible social theory of 
modernity, but either way the difference of which Arusha is a referent is untheorisable 
idiosyncrasy, a once-for-all contingency. 
Nor is this difficulty confined to Mamdani, even though his approach is perhaps 
the most innovative. The basic pattern, the view that African difference resides in the 
peculiar patterns generated by the colonial state, is likewise present in the work of 
both Basil Davidson (1992) and Crawford Young (1994, 2012). 
Davidson views the colonial state in Africa as authoritarian (a point Young 
develops to an even greater extent), but more importantly as an artificial imposition ill-
suited to African societies. This imposition also subverted what would otherwise have 
been a natural pattern of socio-political development in Africa. Thus Davidson invites 
the reader to consider ‘the road not taken’ contrasting what might have been but for 
colonialism with the success of never-colonised Japan (1992, chap. 2). Thus the nature 
of modern Africa is perverse; the grafting of a modern western form (the nation-state) 
onto a different society whereby that state became increasingly monstrous, 
authoritarian and predatory toward ‘civil society’ (Davidson 1992, p. 11). 
Meanwhile, Crawford Young’s ‘vertebral thesis’ is that ‘retrospective examination 
of the African colonial state’ - epitomised as bula matari, he who crushes rocks - 
exposes ‘some of the frailties of its postcolonial successor’ (1994, p. 9). Again, the view 
is of an alien and oppressive state imposed by colonialism. For that reason, and this is 
the point of interest for current purposes, the African state must be taken as essentially 
‘free-standing’ in relation to society (Young 1994, p. 24). Both Davidson and, more 
explicitly in Young’s case, conceive of the African state as separate from civil society. 
That separation is the basis on which, in this thesis’ terms, both recognise difference by 
contrasting it to the alien nature of modernity (the state). This is an intellectual 
manoeuvre that has vast implications. 
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To explain this, it is necessary to return to Mamdani, who is troubled by the 
frequent resort to ‘civil society’ as a common refrain in African Studies. Indeed, for him, 
it is a particularly common source of ‘history by analogy’. ‘Civil society’, he says, is a 
device ‘more programmatic than analytical, more ideological than historical’. It is 
analytically flawed because, in spite of references to its artificiality, it is mistakenly 
seen as ‘a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe’ (1996, pp. 13–14). The origins of 
that formation in Europe lay in a vast and turbulent historical process (Rosenberg 1994, 
chap. 6), whereas no analogous process had taken place in these African societies. Talk 
of civil society in such an instance is no less teleological than modernisation theory. 
The danger, then, is not just that difference is lost when the categories of modernity 
are applied. Those categories themselves become inapposite. ‘Civil society’ is the end-
result of a historical process of differentiation of political and economic power, state 
and society, which results in the appearance of an ‘autonomous legal sphere to govern 
civil life’ (Mamdani 1996, pp. 13–14). 
The entire point of dividing citizen from subject that Mamdani insists on is that 
governing the peasant required something quite different from civil society. The state 
could not stand apart from society, it had to directly intervene to constitute and 
regulate society. Without any doubt this left a great deal of scope for exploitative 
relations, but it requires great vigilance to avoid illicit reliance on concepts drawn from 
‘history by analogy’. The cost of doing so is, inter alia, that it might appear that a 
theoretical toolkit is being used to advance our understanding of Africa; but in reality 
terms such ‘civil society’, and indeed ‘capitalism’, are very possibly more harmful than 
anything else. 
Whilst Mamdani’s clear-sighted critique of ‘history by analogy’ in African Studies, 
so often based on the notion that colonialism imported the categories of European 
history (modernity), is a singular contribution it also points to a further difficulty. That 
was the one which Mamdani himself ran into. For in rejecting ‘history by analogy’ one 
must still account for the historical significance of the intrusion of the modern world 
(which to a great extent African Studies has done under the label of ‘colonialism’). 
Mamdani managed to show how the ‘Big Structure’ of colonialism must integrate 
modernity with difference. Notably though, he had less success in tracing how that 
could be worked through as a matter of an ongoing historical process. And tracing the 
significance of the Arusha Declaration necessarily requires a sense of that process. 
Furthermore, if Nyerere was right (and Du Bois too) it is necessary to show that that 
process is just as theorisable as, say, the emergence of civil society in European history. 
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African Studies and International Relations 
The key stepping stone in this argument will be a notion of ‘interactivity’ that 
amounts to a reading of the causal significance of international relations to 
(African/Tanzanian) social relations in the post-colonial era. International relations, in 
the broad ‘world politics’ sense of the term, are also the second major thematic after 
colonialism in which African Studies encounters the modernity-difference problem. 
Thus, as a preliminary exercise, it is necessary to show the difficulties existing 
approaches to this very thematic encounter. Has the interactive potential of 
international relations been missed, and if so why? 
Some of the most outstanding literature in African Studies in recent decades has 
carefully scrutinised ‘Africa and the world’. Whilst diverging in many significant 
respects, they share an emphasis on the inequality of the international system vis-à-vis 
Africa (Clapham 1996, Bayart 2009).19 Clearly the notion of inequality has a great deal 
of purchase, recall for instance Du Bois’ fear that his view of African importance in 
world history might be subject to ‘violent contradiction’ (Du Bois 2007, p. xxxi). This 
part of the Chapter will argue that these notions of inequality (or unevenness) have not 
yet been deployed in a way that is systematically interactive in the required sense. 
Indeed, related to this point, there is an important sense in which these are often 
not analyses of African international relations. Whilst a robust notion of Africa’s place 
in world politics is sought, these works exhibit a sharp delineation between social 
(Africa) and international (the world) levels of analysis. Indeed, this problem is 
fundamentally related to the difficulties observed above around colonialism, modernity 
and difference in African Studies. For the disjuncture between modernity and 
difference in African Studies is also mapped onto the divide between social and 
international theory; difference becomes associated with the (African) social, 
modernity becomes associated with its external relations. 
The State in Africa: the politics of the belly (Bayart 2009) has, since its first 
publication in 1989, been amongst the most prominent texts in African Studies and is 
often taken as a strong demonstration of how Africa’s international context is the key 
to its distinctiveness. Setting out to establish the ‘historicity’ (in effect, difference) of 
Africa Bayart points to what he calls its ‘extraversion’. By this he means the specific 
cultural logic through which African politicians make use of unequal external relations 																																																								
19 A feature Mamdani regards as one (of three) core tasks for the post-colonial states, pointing to the 
necessity of ‘developing the economy in the context of unequal international relations’ (1996, p. 287).  
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to their own domestic ends. That is, concerned with the maintenance of their own 
power in societies that have limited resources domestically relative to that outside 
world, they comport themselves so as to best secure resources from the outside. 
Like Mamdani, Bayart’s canvas is vast and his reading prodigious. Furthermore, he 
similarly rejects both modernisation and dependency theories in pointed terms, 
outraged by their homogenising contortions in the name of ‘theory’. The ‘application 
to Africa’ of dependency theory, says Bayart, ‘has given rise to an increase in dogma 
and hypocrisy’; nor does he think there is much to be said for the ‘woolly universalism’ 
of modernisation (2009, p. 5).20 Rather, understood in terms of its own cultural logic, 
the African state consists of neither modernising nor comprador elites but actually 
manifests a deeply specific African ‘governmentality’. This is what he calls the ‘politics 
of the belly’, which is sustained by extraversion. In stark contrast to Davidson and 
Young the African state in Bayart’s analysis is anything but alien. 
Difference, this imaginative argument runs, is not threatened or even created by 
that powerful outside world but is in fact merely sustained by it. Accordingly 
extraversion inverts the categories of dependency as Mamdani points out (1996, p. 10). 
Whereas dependency theory emphasised structure, Bayart stresses African agency. But 
both conceive broadly similar relations between Africa and the outside, an African elite 
sustained by a more powerful outside world which it turns receives various 
commodities. Yet, Mamdani stresses, for Bayart these relations are ‘the outcome of an 
African initiative’ (1996, p. 10). 
Actually, that inversion goes further still. Alongside agency and structure, 
modernity and difference are similarly turned upside down. On the one-hand 
dependency theory posits difference (underdevelopment) as an upshot of a singular 
world-systemic market logic that is a derivative aspect of a theory of modernity 
(Rodney 1972). Difference is secondary to, indeed a product of, the workings of that 
market logic which, albeit on a world scale, is a peculiarly social logic.21 Instead Bayart 
starts with difference, making two broad claims. First, is the distinctive cultural logic. 																																																								
20 Bayart is also critical of ‘Weberian Sociology’ that has ‘proudly ignored’ the continent, pointing to the 
silences of leading figures Barrington Moore, Reinhard Bendix, Perry Anderson and Theda Skocpol on 
Africa (Bayart 2009, pp. 5, 275). Chapter 2 shall consider what such work might nonetheless offer to the 
concerns of this thesis, and finds them limited. Not due to simple ignorance or neglect of Africa, in 
actual fact we find the opposite: more or less the same problem afflicts theirs attempts to engage with 
the historical development of a range of other societies in the face of ‘modernity’. 
21 The under appreciation of something like geopolitics, and its subordination to a social logic of the 
market, is a core point advanced by Theda Skocpol(1977) in her critique of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). 
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Secondly he relies on the fact of inequality and relative material weakness. Thus the 
longue durée ‘politics of the belly’ operates on a materially richer outside world. To the 
extent that modernity, or anything else like it, enters into the analysis, it is secondary; 
incidental to explaining the happenstance of external wealth and power. 
Furthermore, in both cases there is no specific significance assigned to fact that 
African societies exist in multiplicity. Each has a foundational logic (world market or 
politics of the belly) which is founded in a presumption that society can be conceived 
in ontologically singular form. Thus in one case a social logic of modernity is prized, 
whilst reference to anything like international relations is more rhetorical than 
theoretically real. In the other, a social logic of difference is prized whilst similarly 
honouring the significance of the international more in the breach rather than 
observance. 
In Bayart’s case does this matter?22 After all the homogenising flaws of dependency 
(and modernisation) are well-known, but the actual drawback of divorcing difference 
from modernity (and the social and the international) are not. Indeed, Bayart’s own 
argument could be deployed as an objection to the project this thesis is itself engaged 
in: if modernity and other universalisms are disposed of in favour of clear focus on 
difference might African Studies not be better off for it? 
The consequences of holding modernity at arm’s length from African difference are 
arresting. For, in cleaving to difference in this manner, Bayart’s claims to ‘historicity’ 
become increasingly divorced from various features of African history. This leads 
directly to those aspects of his work that reviewers have found most troubling. One of 
these is the marked emphasis on continuity, the longue durée over all else. For Bayart 
the politics of the belly and the extraversion that sustains it has endured over centuries. 
To make out that claim he is driven to disavow the significance, as opposed to the 
reality, of various features that are undeniably a part of African history. Most 
remarkably of all this includes the coming and going of colonialism (Clapham 1994, p. 
438). He is fundamentally uninterested in the proliferation and differentiation of 
institutions, whether forms and features of the state or the market. All are dismissed as 
insignificant; careful study of any or all of them is a ‘pure waste of time’ (Bayart 2009, p. 
211) because underneath them all is the same cultural logic he begins with. 
This, his reviewers have lost no time in pointing out, is astonishing for a text 
entitled The State in Africa (Clapham 1994, p. 439, Young 1999, p. 151). Justification of 																																																								
22 Especially as notions of extraversion have been fruitful, see for example (Corkin 2013). 
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these claims is sought through what Clapham calls ‘a sleight of hand’ (1994, p. 437). 
Institutions, whether colonial or post-colonial, are deemed to be importations – 
creatures, that is, of the external sphere – and, conceived as such, cannot impinge upon 
the politics of the belly because they inhabit different theoretical logics. One is social 
the other is always and forever external. ‘In short’, Clapham continues, ‘Bayart does not 
so much contest the conventional 'externalist' view of the post-colonial African state, 
as erect an alternative model alongside it’ (1994, p. 437). 
All of which does, at least, suggest one negative conclusion. Whether starting with 
modernity (dependency) or difference (Bayart), when either perspective is forced to 
account for its other it does so through ever stricter adherence to its own preferred 
logic of explanation whether it is the world market or a form of governmentality. The 
curious thing about this is that it engenders an intellectual stalemate, each side taking 
comfort in their own strengths and obscuring their weaknesses by externalising them. 
In neither case, though, is international relations deployed in the sense that this thesis 
shall. 
There are, of course, others that resort to a more developed notion of the 
international system in African Studies. Perhaps the most notable are Christopher 
Clapham (1996, 1998) and Frederick Cooper’s (2002) ‘gatekeeper’ concept. Both point 
to the manifest inequality in Africa’s dealings with the outside world with greater 
attention to the social significance of those international relations. Tracing those 
arguments now reveals the difficulty of the task at hand. 
Clapham’s work emphasises the importance of external recognition of sovereignty 
in the post-war period. Beginning by drawing upon ideas of the quasi-state in Africa 
(Jackson 1993), Clapham suggests that the shortcomings of African states are such that 
they fail to establish themselves as full ‘Weberian’ states with a monopoly on violence 
and so on. This internal, or social, failure gives the deepest possible significance to 
external recognition that when obtained yield a host of vital advantages to the 
recognised state (Clapham 1996, pt. 2).23 
As the cold war receded Clapham considers that African politics became much 
more fluid. Far less able to exploit a bipolar cold war international scene, its internal 
weaknesses (as quasi-states) tended toward ever further dissolution of those state 
forms (Clapham 1996, pt. 3). That being so, argues Clapham, (African) states are 
relative concepts that exhibit ‘degrees of statehood’ (Clapham 1998). This is so much so 																																																								
23 Herbst (2000) makes a similar set of claims. 
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that increasingly these states are not the locus of African politics (international and 
domestic). 
Over the course of the thesis, concerns with some aspects of these claims will be 
raised. The post-war world was not as friendly to post-colonial Tanzania as this 
supposes, and certainly not automatically so. Moreover, the vision of African states as 
different from western states is one thing but understanding them as ‘failed’ Weberian 
states leaves something to be desired. First, it neglects the diversity of African politics. 
‘For every Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia, there is a Botswana, Tanzania and Kenya’ 
(Brown 2006, p. 135). That is, for every ‘failed’ state there is an African state that is 
relatively robust, stable and authoritative. Second, it veers toward another variant of 
‘history by analogy’, understanding African difference by reference to what it is not 
(‘Weberian states’). 
Third, and most importantly for now, Clapham’s logic of explanation alternates 
between social and international levels. Whilst this is surely an advance on Bayart’s 
subordination of the international to the social, it still imposes an intellectual cost. 
Setting out from the notion of African state weakness, Clapham is offering an ‘internal’ 
or ‘social’ logic for that weakness. Based on that, he proceeds in a second intellectual 
moment to conclude that external relations are therefore deeply consequential. Thus 
each logic proceeds along parallel lines, occasionally being related to each other by 
Clapham. At the African (social) level, weakness continues and increasingly results in 
economic crisis. Separate thereto is the transition from Cold to post-Cold war world 
politics. Thus, finding itself ever weaker, any given African state finds the external 
world now far less advantageous. Articulation of the reasons why this division between 
social and international dimensions is a limitation is a complex point and reserved for 
Chapters 2 and 3. For the time being it can simply be noted that this division, for better 
or worse, obtains in Clapham’s work. 
Indeed, a similar division obtains elsewhere in disciplinary IR’s approach to Africa. 
A body of insurgent critique has emerged here, deeply troubled by the very 
pronounced neglect of Africa by ‘traditional IR theory’ (Dunn and Shaw 2001, Shaw 
2001). The reason for which, they suppose, is that IR theory is inapposite to the realities 
of African difference. The accusation is that it is altogether too wedded to a Eurocentric 
idea of ‘Westphalian’ nation-states as its units of analysis. Thus it ignores regions of 
the world, such as Africa, which do not match that Westphalian image. 
The point is then developed into a suggestion that IR’s core theoretical category, 
anarchy, is itself inapplicable to Africa’s place in international politics (Shaw 2001). 
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Instead, runs this argument, hierarchy is the dominant ordering principle of African 
international politics as properly understood. Furthermore, these categories are in fact 
inverted since anarchy is understood as being the ordering principle of African 
domestic politics. The rationale is that because Africa stands at the lower ends of an 
unequal international system established by European nation-states, it is hierarchical 
from an African perspective. The end of formal colonialism does not alter this in any 
fundamental sense, tending more to substitute the IMF and World Bank for the 
colonial powers in those positions of authority. 
William Brown points out that this critique turns on a dichotomous understanding 
of anarchy and hierarchy (2006). This consists of a basic misunderstanding of what 
anarchy in IR theory is intended to encompass. If anarchy is the division of the world 
politically, the fact of unequal power does not in any way preclude it; an international 
system can be both anarchical and hierarchical so long as that hierarchy is not absolute. 
And, if it were, then it would be in no helpful sense international. Thus this critique of 
‘traditional IR’, from within the discipline, is actually a critique premised on a social 
theory; because African states and society are unlike the Westphalian image, its 
international relations must be different. 
Thus if ‘it is at the international level that the extraordinary drama of modernity 
rises up to its full height’ (Rosenberg 1996, p. 5) then Africa has no role to play in 
modernity in this sense either, other than to suffer what it must. If, as Inayatullah and 
Blaney (2003) suggest it could be, IR should be recast as the science of difference this 
critique is not a promising basis either. For it starts from a premise of social difference 
and concludes that this entails a focus on hierarchy. In Brown’s sense this leaves IR’s 
central observation with nothing to offer. Likewise, so far as social analysis goes in this 
critique, modernity and (African) difference seem as distant as ever. Once again the 
point is not to offer any particular critique of those propositions, except to say that it is 
more social than international and therefore does not operationalise the international 
as a fundamental premise in the manner this thesis recommends in subsequent 
Chapters. 
What can be said, however, is that the leading texts of African Studies (Mamdani 
and Bayart) and its core thematics (colonialism and unequal international relations) all 
exhibit a problematic understanding of modernity and difference. For the most part 
the tendency that emerges is that each exhibits a preference for one or the other. In 
reaction to the distortions of modernisation and dependency theories this has, in 
recent decades, tended in the direction of emphasis on difference. But in the absence 
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of resolution of awkward conceptions of its connection to modernity, this has 
produced notions of Africa as different in an idiosyncratic or untheorisable sense. 
African Studies: narratives of success and failure 
Whether this matters does not depend solely on one’s belief (or not) in the 
possibility of theory. For the drift to untheorisable difference has also generated what 
can be called narratives of success and failure in African Studies. In actual fact, 
approaches to the Arusha Declaration are a near classic instance of the genre.  
Crawford Young, seen earlier advancing a colonially derived analysis of the African 
state (1994), has more recently produced a text with a more pronounced emphasis on 
the post-colonial era (2012). In doing so he adopts a framework that proceeds explicitly 
in terms of success and failure, or what he calls ‘cycles of hope and disappointment’, 
which overlaps with wider discursive waves of ‘Afro-optimism’ and ‘Afro-pessimism’. 
These proceed in three cycles. The first is from ‘the euphoria of independence’ to the 
disappointments of single party rule in the late 1960s. The second from the 1970s and 
renewed optimism in state expansion and the high-water mark of developmentalism 
which then gives way to the 1980s and the failures of economic development, crisis and 
decline. The third, in the aftermath of the cold war, starts with the optimism of 
democratisation which once again gives way to a more mixed picture in the early 21st 
century (Young 2012, chap. 1). 
Plainly this narrative has considerable purchase on post-colonial African history. 
What is concerning about this is that the implication is that as each wave of optimism 
gives way to failure there is a return to the drawing board, a reassertion of a default 
position. There is a sense in which this impinges both on social theory and on the 
political programmes that are adopted in each period. In both senses projects such as 
the ‘African Socialism’ of the Arusha Declaration are seen as not just contingent, 
idiosyncratic responses to any given set of conditions but also fundamentally in the 
nature of temporary experiments. 
Upon failure in their own terms – and the cliché that all political lives end in 
failure surely hints that this is neither rare nor peculiar to Africa – erasures of 
difference become a possibility in both intellectual and programmatic terms. In this 
regard it is worth noting that amidst each of Young’s successive cycles of hope and 
disappointment one or another homogenising universal notion reasserts itself. In the 
1960s and 70s it was developmentalism; in the 1980s Robert Bates’ Markets and States 
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in Tropical Africa (1983, 2005) and the articulation of universal market rationality; 
whilst the 1990s wave of democratisation literature was deeply influenced by the 
Fukuyamist zeitgeist (Fukuyama 1992, Clapham 1993). 
By conceiving of a phenomenon such as the Arusha Declaration as a failure,24 the 
analytical categories that tend to reassert themselves are those drawn from the 
dominant strains of social theory at the time. Thus in any of Young’s three cycles one 
could identify strong strains of African Studies that approach their subject matter 
through a series of negative propositions. One variant of this common theme is the 
suggestion that Africa is ‘still not yet capitalist’ (Saul and Leys 1999). Narratives that do 
not go beyond ‘success and failure’ thereby engender recurrent cycles ‘history by 
analogy’.  
This section began with Nicolas Sarkozy’s Dakar speech of 2007. It is not 
coincidental that he sought to buttress his image of ahistorical Africa as follows: 
‘The African peasant, who for thousands of years has lived according to the seasons, 
whose life ideal was to be in harmony with nature, only knew the eternal renewal of 
time ... In this imaginary world, where everything starts over and over again, there is 
room neither for human endeavour, nor for the idea of progress’ (McGreal 2007). 
The timeless ‘African peasant’ is a timeworn trope, and one might express surprise at 
its recycling in the 21st century. But to do so risks missing an important aspect of the 
intellectual difficulty in question. To illustrate his notion of history by analogy 
Mamdani makes direct reference to Goran Hydén’s (1980) thesis that the Tanzanian 
peasantry was ‘uncaptured’. That thesis, Mamdani complains, proceeds by establishing 
the ways in which ‘Africa is not like Europe, where the peasantry was “captured” 
through wage-labour’ (Mamdani 1996, p. 13). Moreover, it is a key way in which Africa, 
for Saul and Leys, is not yet capitalist. 
Yet it is precisely this set of negative propositions that risks obscuring what it was 
the Arusha Declarati0n did vis-à-vis the peasant and therefore what its ongoing 
significance even after its formal programme had fallen away might be. Yet that is 
precisely what is often done. No less prominent an Africanist than Frederick Cooper 
has suggested that whilst the Arusha Declaration was a ‘radical alternative’, upon its 
failure Tanzania reverted to ‘being a conventional impoverished country’ (2002, p. 180). 																																																								
24 Plainly it was a failure in some very important senses, denial of which would be bizarre. My point is 
not denial of failure, so much as that recognition of failure ought not be conceived as necessarily an 
intellectually exhaustive point. 
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This pattern is noteworthy, proceeding from ‘radical alternative’ (i.e. idiosyncratic) via 
failure through return to ‘conventional impoverish[ment]’. 
It is the objective of this thesis to break out of the intellectual limitation of this 
resetting of the intellectual framework. And it has been the contention of this Chapter 
that the means to doing so are to be found in reconciliation of modernity and 
difference. That is, as Nyerere would have it, to re-read Marx and Arusha as compatible 
with one another.  
III. Modernity and the Peasant in Tanzania 
Writing an Introduction to the same collection of his essays which contained the 
Arusha Declaration, Nyerere offered the most sustained elaboration of his thoughts on 
this problem (1968, pp. 1–32). Having reiterated his Marx and Arusha claim, he offers a 
basic methodology: 
‘A really scientific socialist would therefore start his analysis of the problem of a 
particular society from the standpoint of that society. In Tanzania he would take the 
existence of some socialist values as part of his material for analysis; he would study 
the effect of the colonial era on these attitudes and on the systems of social 
organization; he would take account of the world situation as it affects Tanzania. After 
doing all that he would try to work out policies appropriate for the growth of a 
modern socialist state. And he could well finish up with the Arusha Declaration and 
the policies of ujamaa!’(Nyerere 1968, p. 17) 
On the same page he insists that the outcome of such analysis would vindicate his 
own programme for the skipping capitalism and pursuit of ‘African socialism’ instead. 
The elements of this method are threefold: 1) a set of values,25 2) the ideological and 
structural impact and legacy of colonialism and 3) ‘the world situation’. The second 
and third broadly map onto the primary concerns of African Studies observed in this 
Chapter, colonialism and the world context (international relations in the broad sense). 
Thus proceeding from (1) which Nyerere, at least, was convinced were a set of 
social values that pushed in the direction of socialism, Nyerere invokes the (2) legacy 
of colonialism, which in a sense is an invocation of the sociology of Tanzania as it 
stood at independence; and, as was observed, the peasant was a central sociological 																																																								
25 The apparent contradiction of materialist philosophy might be deliberate on Nyerere’s part. Either 
way, it is probably meant as a reference to what Nyerere regarded as ‘traditional African values’ of 
familyhood which he regarded as being open to a socialistic orientation rather than a philosophical 
provocation. 
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category in Nyerere’s analysis of Tanzania. Thus in Chapter 2 which follows, the body 
of social theory on modernity and peasant will be scrutinised for what it offers this 
attempt to re-read both Marx and Arusha. 
The most interesting point from Nyerere’s method is the close proximity of the 
sociological (2) to the international (3). What, he wondered, was the ‘affect’ of the 
‘world situation’ for Tanzania? If Nyerere’s intention was to suggest through their close 
proximity that (2) and (3) were intimately linked, Chapter 2 will build progressively 
toward further encouragement of that intuition. 
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Chapter 2: 'This report of my death was an 
exaggeration': Peasants, modernity and 
incommensurability 
"For those who savor historical irony it is indeed curious that the peasant in the 
modern era has been as much an agent of revolution as the machine, that he has come 
into his own as an effective historical actor along with the conquests of the machine. 
Nevertheless the revolutionary contribution has been very uneven..." 
Barrington Moore Jr. (Moore 1966, p. 453) 
Introduction: peasants under capital? 
Embarking upon the search for Marx and Arusha, this Chapter takes the first step, 
finding out both the content and liabilities of both modernity and peasant. Turning to 
the resources of both classical and contemporary social theory, it discovers that the 
incommensurability of each concept is inscribed in their intellectual makeup. 
Accordingly, this is not just an issue for Nyerere in Tanzania, nor still is it peculiar to 
African Studies; it is also a general problem of social theory.1 From Marx and his 
commentators (Mitrany 1951, Duggett 1975, Coulson 2014), by way of post-colonial 
theory (Chakrabarty 2000, Chatterjee 2011, chap. 10) and on through to Barrington 
Moore (1966) this problem is diagnosed with a view to its resolution in subsequent 
Chapters. 
At the outset it is intriguing to note that none of the theorists engaged with in this 
Chapter neglect to consider the relation between modernity and peasant. Indeed, all 
have devoted a great deal of scholarly effort to understanding their relation. The real 
point of interest, then, lies in uncovering why their attempts to address the issue 
nonetheless run into difficult waters. Conceiving, often inadvertently, the peasant as 																																																								
1 Indeed, the problem is more general still. Even the general peasant problem of difference examined in 
this Chapter is just an instance of a more general problem of difference (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, 
Rosenberg 2016, p. 11). 
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antithetical to modernity – each Section will get down to definitional matters – these 
approaches are confronted by a two-sided problem: either the peasant’s continued 
existence in spite of modernity or the bare fact of the intrusion of modernity in some 
meaningful sense on the peasant. 
So confronted, there is a tendency for each theorist to appeal to some kind of 
historical process in order to make sense of the problem. Stipulating that the classical 
pathway to modernity (England etc.) necessarily involved the death of the peasant as a 
sociological form, theorists of modernity are tempted to ascribe the continued survival 
of the peasant elsewhere to its being a leftover of the past during an extended 
transitional process toward modernity. Thus, runs the idea, as that transitional process 
unfolds and spreads through the world that classical pattern will recur and the peasant 
will recede and eventually perish as a social form.2 In this sense much of the weight of 
social theory has provoked both reportage and projection of the death of the peasant 
(Hobsbawm 1995, p. 289). The trouble is that such reports have long turned out – from 
Marx to Hobsbawm - to suffer from exaggeration (as opposed to simple falsity).3 
The epigraph above, drawn from Barrington Moore’s work, helps to identify the 
problem as it flows in the opposite direction, from peasant to modernity. Noting that 
the peasant has been present in the ‘modern era’, Moore adds an ‘iron[ic]’ complication. 
Not only have these reports of the death of the peasantry been exaggerations – not 
dissolving as capital created a world in its own image (Marx and Engels 1985) - the 
peasant has also been a vital agent (‘of revolution’) in the modern era. More than just a 
figure of importance in the Arusha Declaration, the peasant has been central to the 
Russian and Chinese revolutions (Moore 1966, Skocpol 1979) as well as modern India 
(Moore 1966, chap. vi, Guha 1983, Chakrabarty 2000, Chatterjee 2011, chap. 10). 
Moreover, this importance stretches up to the present. From ‘post-Socialist China’ 
(Wen 2007, Day 2013) to the vigorous La Via Campesina movement (McMichael 2006) 
the peasant is an issue that has not gone away. And, if Barrington Moore’s agency point 
is taken, the intellectual penalty of inability to approach the peasant qua social theory 
begins to seem far too high. 
																																																								
2 Philip McMichael notes, critically, that ‘the absence of peasantries in the First World is a key register 
for development theory’ (2012, p. 8). 
3 Mark Twain's phrase (Fishkin 1996, p. 134) has been appropriated for this Chapter’s title because the 
impulse to exaggerate is central to the problem. It is not wrong to suppose that modernity has 
impacted upon the peasant in profound and often transformative ways; nor vice versa, as we shall see. 
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 Indeed some go so far as to posit the peasant as the crucial difference in world 
politics: ‘the disappearance of the peasantry in capitalist Europe’, notes Partha 
Chatterjee, as opposed to ‘the continued reproduction...of a peasantry under the rule of 
capital in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America’ is ‘the crux of Chakrabarty’s 
distinction between History 1 and History 2’ (Chatterjee 2013, pp. 74–75, Chakrabarty 
2000). However, in saying so Chatterjee’s usage also points in the direction of the 
problem. Although the peasant is deemed to be the vital difference, it is captured as ‘a 
peasantry under the rule of capital’. Yet what, in theoretical terms, does it consist of 
and entail to speak of the peasant under capital (or modernity)? This Chapter explains 
that this far from clear, still less are such claims intuitive. By reason of this theoretical 
uncertainty, perhaps, Barrington Moore felt impelled to refer to the peasant’s agency 
under modernity as an ‘irony’. 
Primarily concerned with diagnosis of the problem, this Chapter proceeds in 
Section I to unpack ‘modernity’ (or, for Chatterjee and many others, ‘capital’) to reveal 
why those that begin from this concept find themselves in difficulty upon trying to 
draw the peasant into their accounts. Section II reverses gaze, considering attempts to 
begin with ‘the peasant’ that then progress toward ‘modernity’. It finds that the 
problem cuts in both directions, whether one sets out from ‘modernity’ or the ‘peasant’, 
the ever present danger is a backsliding into exaggerations or untheorised perceptions 
of historical ‘irony’.4 Finally it shall be possible to draw these threads together in the 
Conclusion to point toward the need re-read these concepts as interactive, the method 
for doing so then being offered in Chapter 3. 
I. Diagnosis: the incommensurability of modernity with the 
peasant 
Modernity was the principal interest of classical social theory (Sayer 1991, Giddens 
2001) and, whilst in some quarters it is seen as deeply problematic, it continues to be a 
central category for a great deal of more contemporary scholarship (Giddens 1991, 
Wagner 2012). This includes historical sociology, both inside disciplinary IR and 
beyond (Rosenberg 1994, Delanty and Isin 2003, Teschke 2003, Buzan and Lawson 
2015). In spite, or perhaps because, of the concept’s popularity there is little consensus 
around its content. All the more reason, then, for its critics to insist that modernity is 																																																								
4 In this paragraph both ‘modernity’ and ‘peasant’ in quotation marks to indicate that the content of 
both of these concepts is, in an important sense, up for grabs. This is not done elsewhere in the thesis 
simply because it would be wearisomely repetitive. 
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far better understood as an intellectual construct or discourse than a theory (Cooper 
2005, chap. 5).  
Critics aside for the moment, there are two key elements of consensus amongst 
those that see modernity as an analytical tool or theory. First, that modernity is 
constituted by some set of social institutions, such as capitalism. These institutions, 
howsoever understood, are seen as fundamentally differentiating, say, the last 200 
years from all preceding human history. A second broad point of consensus is that a 
fundamental quality of modernity is that it is an expansive and dynamic social form. 
Moving from consensus to the field of dissent reveals more still of the concept’s 
content. A great deal of debate revolves around the attempt to populate modernity 
with a particular set of social institutions that can explain its distinctive and dynamic 
nature. The basic candidates for inclusion amongst these social facts are indicated by 
Buzan and Lawson’s ‘tripartite configuration’: ‘industrialization, the rational state and 
ideologies of progress’ (2015, pp. 3–7). Controversy is aroused principally over whether 
modernity is an upshot of the interplay of all three (and/or others too) or, instead, 
flows from a single dominant social institution. One of the most enduring debates in 
social theory is constituted in this way. For Marx ‘capital’ is the singular form of 
modernity and the key to understanding its wider institutional matrices such as that 
three-way configuration. Weber’s approach, meanwhile, was deeply marked by his 
insistence on multi-causality. 
That debate is especially relevant because it seems to point to a clear short cut 
through the peasant-difference problem. If modernity is truly multi-causal, ought it 
not be perfectly compatible with peasant difference on a case-by-case basis from the 
outset? If this is so the peasant-modernity problem is no more than empirical, and this 
thesis can and should simply proceed straight to facts of the Tanzanian case. To 
understand why this problem has a prior, theoretical, dimension, further digging into 
treatments of modernity is called for. 
This will reveal a further point of near-consensus, even between a Marxist and a 
Weberian approach to modernity which is at the epicentre of the difficulty. Even the 
broad tripartite institutional configuration above is constructed in such a way that it is 
not compatible with the peasantry. This is because a vision of wage-labour and capital 
as a social logic of reproduction is shared; what is in dispute is whether such a vision is 
sufficient or merely necessary. Either way, this Section progressively reveals, this 
forecloses the multi-causal possibility because the peasantry is conceived as 
incommensurable with that logic of reproduction. 
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Capitalism, and Marx’s approach thereto, is the foremost singular conception of 
modernity. The most powerful version of which is derived from his later work 
identifying the emergence of a particular set of social relations, containing a logic of 
reproduction, as the core of modernity (1974, 1990).5 Where labour and ownership of 
the means of production are separated, such that both labourer and (capitalist) owner 
must achieve their reproduction (through securing wages and labour respectively) via 
exchange relations, those relations uniquely constitute dependence on ‘the market’ at a 
societal scale. 
On that basis, too, stands what has been called the ‘separation of politics from 
economics’ (Wood 1981). For it is only when this condition has emerged that surplus 
extraction is possible without the (immediate and direct) necessity of political coercion. 
Accordingly, the political equality of putatively modern citizens stands on the basis of 
their economic inequality. Civil society, in this sense, is vital to modernity but it stands 
on these particular relations. Similarly, the dynamism of modernity in Marx’s view 
flows from these relations too. That is, dependence on the market constitutes both the 
generality of commodity production and its (apparently) ineluctable dynamism 
(Brenner 1977, Wood 1981, Rosenberg 1994). Thus industrialism is treated as a product 
of the dynamism these relations create. Similarly, modern politics, both the domestic 
politics of citizenship as well as international politics in the modern forms of 
sovereignty and anarchy, emanate from the peculiar separation of politics and 
economics those relations engender. Finally, that there is a connection, howsoever 
exactly construed, between these claims and ‘ideologies of progress’ is clear enough. 
This view is most strongly associated with so-called ‘Political Marxism’, sometimes 
paid the somewhat backhanded compliment of being so ‘rigorous’ or ‘platonic’ an 
approach to capitalist-modernity that a gap between theory and empirical reality arises 
(Anievas and Allinson 2010, p. 201). This is not, however, (only) a rarefied local dispute 
within Marxism. As anticipated above, attachment to the view that modernity is rooted 
in the social relations of wage-labour and capital is both widespread and in current use 
(Wagner 2012, p. 83, Buzan and Lawson 2015, pp. 151–152). Furthermore, whilst it will 
become clear that this gap between ‘theory’ and ‘empirical reality’ especially afflicts 
approaches to the peasantry vis-à-vis modernity, bridging that gap is difficult for 
seemingly good theoretical reasons. 
																																																								
5 For fuller exposition of the following points, see (Brenner 1977, Sayer 1991) whilst careful 
considerations of its implications for IR are also available (Rosenberg 1994, Teschke 2003). 
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Take Anthony Giddens, for instance, as representative of a multi-causal 
perspective. Whilst explicitly advancing a multi-causal view he advances a remarkably 
similar claim around wage-labour and capital (1991, pp. 56–57) to Marx (Rosenberg 
2000, pp. 116–117). His multi-causal purpose is, of course, a significant difference; but it 
does not detract from the centrality to his argument of that same logic. 
A further point should be made about this. Leaving out this social logic of 
reproduction threatens serious deleterious consequences for social theory. Witness a 
notable alternative approach, what has been described (polemically) as the ‘Smithian’ 
view (Brenner 1977). This features market logic at its core: capitalist-modernity is 
conceived as the natural unfolding of the logic of the division of labour where 
production is geared toward profit. This view is not just associated with Adam Smith 
(1982); early Marx(1965, 1985) bore its hallmarks, as do the ‘neo-Smithian’ frameworks 
of dependency and world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1974). 
The problem with this view is that it presumes the market as a social institution, 
erecting it as a timeless feature of human society but for the presence of obstacles in 
the way of the expression of commercial human nature. Modernity, in this sense, is no 
more than an upshot of the removal of said obstacles at some point in history. The 
consequence is that core institutional features (the market) and effects (dynamism) of 
modernity are taken for granted rather than explained. Without a clear-sighted 
theorisation of the social logic of reproduction, the intellectual virtues of modernity 
fall away. 
‘The only definite dynamics of Wallerstein’s world capitalist system’ points out 
Theda Skocpol ‘are market processes’ (1977, p. 1078). The upshot of these presumptions 
around the market is arresting, since what emerges ‘is a vacant and homogeneous 
totality created by eliminating differences instead of articulating them’ (Laclau 1977, p. 
45). Aside from its other flaws, collapsing all difference into homogeneity hardly seems 
apt to resolve any incommensurability of modernity and peasant. 
Polemic from either side apart (Brenner 1977, Blaut 1994), there is a reason why 
this debate persists nonetheless. Simply put, if the sociological picture of modernity 
that rests on the relation of wage-labour and capital is maintained, the potential 
difficulty it will have in encountering difference (from that central logic) is clear. The 
basic fact of unevenness across human societies, in this case that peasant societies exist 
in some places even alongside any society that is modern in this sense, means at a 
minimum that ‘[m]odernity is not a structure but a process’ (Teschke 2003, p. 41). 
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Yet there is a significant difficulty in shifting toward a mode of analysis that is 
sensitive to process. Indeed, identifying this difficulty points to the basis for the 
intellectual popularity of ‘Smithian’ approaches in the 20th century in spite of its flaws, 
whether in liberal or Wallerstein’s more critical vein. For the very ‘vacancy’ in the 
Smithian conception of the market allows it to be filled with any sociological content, 
virtually at will. Accordingly, all forms of labour – be it slave, peasant, proletariat and 
infinite hybrid variations thereof - can be integrated into the model. If that is the 
attraction, one should also add that it has been fruitful too, especially for those 
engaged in the study of the Third World. To give just one recent example, Giovanni 
Arrighi (2007) has offered a rich approach to the rise of China by building on precisely 
this vein of thought, locating Adam Smith in Beijing.  
It is this openness of the Smithian model that, for all its deep theoretical problems, 
the strict sociological claims for modernity, for all its other virtues, struggles to match. 
This can be understood by examining what happens when the strict version of 
modernity is applied to a diverse (uneven) world; that is, when the analysis shifts from 
structure to process. Rosenberg, for instance, posits precisely this view of the social 
reproductive logic of modernity as a central problématique for IR (1994, chap. 5). 
Proceeding to the final chapter (1994, chap. 6) he seeks to develop a historical 
understanding. But in so doing he encounters significant friction; and the continued 
existence of the peasant and other forms of labour that have not been separated from 
the means of production is central to the difficulty. 
‘Capitalism, once in existence, has a logic which can be captured by abstract 
theory’, proposes Brewer, ‘but its origins are a once-for-all process that must be 
explained in terms of specific historical circumstances’ (1990, p. 36). At first, one might 
conclude that Brewer’s view threatens to impose a view of pre-capitalist history as 
entirely untheorisable, a realm of ‘once-for-all process’ in contrast to capitalism that 
bears an ‘abstract logic’ that is amenable to theory. In fact, the danger is wider. It also 
appears to rule out theorisation of difference that this ‘abstract theory’ of capitalism 
subsequently encounters. Upon an intellectual encounter with peasant difference, say, 
there is a real risk that it is treated as no less an untheorisable ‘specific historical 
circumstance’ as pre-capitalist history might be. And this, it will be argued, is what 
happens as the account of modernity that Rosenberg offers shifts toward accounting 
for difference amidst the process of modernity’s spread. 
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In a paragraph concerned with empirical sensitivity to difference in dealing with 
the ‘primitive accumulation’ that is supposed to produce wage-labour and capital, he 
writes:  
‘What can [his emphasis] be said, however, is that since for most of history most 
humans have been peasants in possession of the means of subsistence, the emergence 
and spread of capitalist society must [my emphasis] be brought about by a historical 
process of expropriation which reconstitutes them as propertyless individuals 
compelled to sell their labour’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 160).  
This is more than mere specification of what must happen if capitalist society is to exist 
somewhere (‘emergence’). It is also a claim about the fundamental condition for 
capitalist-modernity to ‘spread’. Whilst it is noted that its spread was ‘uneven’ (1994, p. 
161) the approach to that unevenness falls into the trap that Brewer’s logic encapsulates. 
For, whilst the actual history of the spread of modernity is messy in the sense that it 
encounters unevenness, it does not impinge on the theorisation of modernity as that 
core logic of reproduction. Difference, including peasant difference, is thereby 
subordinated to, or marginalised from, the ‘abstract theory’ of capitalist-modernity. 
Observe how this plays out in the account of the 19th and 20th centuries that follows. 
It starts with a review of data from the 19th century ‘explosion’ of modernity as a social 
form, both within Europe and spreading beyond it. The dispossession of European 
peasants, the migratory spread that gave rise to and the subjection of peasants 
elsewhere through colonialism are all placed at the heart of the account (Rosenberg 
1994, pp. 162–169). Thus far something like Mamdani’s innovative account of the 
profound difference involved in that ‘subjection’ of the (African) peasantry observed in 
Chapter 1 has not been precluded by the argument. 
It suggests that whilst 19th century imperialism sometimes involved the attempt to 
implant private property in a direct reproduction of wage-labour and capital relations, 
it also sometimes opted ‘at least to reorientate production in order to integrate it 
directly or indirectly’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 167) in the market. That ‘indirect’ category 
certainly allows recognition of Mamdani’s analysis, for instance. But so far as the 
deployment of theory goes it is the achievement of integration, rather than its 
accomplishment through a more diverse set of social relations, that is of interest. 
Peasant difference, or unevenness, is perilously close to being hived off as a ‘once-for-
all’ historical detail in the process of modernity’s spread. 
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Proceeding to the ‘results’ (Rosenberg 1994, pp. 169–172) derived from that ‘data’ 
brings the problem further into view, especially as the narrative proceeds into the 20th 
century. Attendant on the movement between centuries is the shift from British 
imperialism to US hegemony, a period that is seen as witnessing the fulfilment of the 
‘Empire of Civil Society’, which is further supposed to derive from the core social logic 
of reproduction. Whereas the British era consisted in formal and informal imperialism, 
which allowed some room for the peasant as ‘once-for-all’ indirect feature of modernity, 
the US era exhibits a pure(r) system of informal imperialism as sovereignty in the 20th 
century. 
Thus in contrast to the admixture of British imperialism (including ‘semi-free’ 
labour), ‘[t]he internationalization of American production has depended for the most 
part [my emphasis] on the availability of free labour forces and private property rights 
upheld by alien state authorities’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 171). Even if ‘for the most part’ is 
accepted for the sake of argument,6 where difference still obtains it is outwith the 
theory. This time, however, the qualifications associated with the British era are gone; 
the peasant has dropped out of sight. 
If that supposed disappearance were to feature as an explicit element of the theory, 
the entire theorisation of modernity would begin to seem less stable. Not only would 
an account need to be provided for how, in theoretical terms, the integration of ‘semi-
free’ labour worked, it would also need to show how the theory demonstrates a 
tendency to extend dispossession. But the theory itself consists of a social logic of 
reproduction that flows from dispossession, it does not itself theorise that 
dispossession. That process, in its original form, was a part of Brewer’s ‘once-for-all’ 
character of non-capitalist history. 
The difficulty this imposes is captured by Benno Teschke (2003, pp. 40–41) in 
remarking that Rosenberg’s ‘thesis overplays the explanatory power of capitalism, 
leaving the complex historical co-development (but not co-genesis) of capitalism, state, 
and states-system underexplored’. The greatest virtue of Marx’s theory of modernity –
the unique social relations of wage-labour and capital – begins to seem as though it is 
simultaneously its greatest flaw. The internal logic of social reproduction has real 
explanatory power, but cannot admit difference into its logic. It seems, drawing out the 
implication of Teschke, that resort must be made to extra-theoretical matters to make 																																																								
6 If the claim is read as strictly pertaining to ‘the West’ it is a more self-evident claim than if intended 
to be more encompassing. In the former case, though, it suggests a more limited scope for the 
explanatory power of modernity. 
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the theory work. Rethinking this, without reproducing the flaws of Smithian 
approaches, ‘must not only register its chronological unevenness, but also start from 
the premise that this course was geopolitically mediated’. That is, difference and the 
reality of geopolitics (political multiplicity) must be central explanatory features. The 
spread of modernity cannot be just an ‘economic process’ (a logic of reproduction 
based on the operation of wage-labour and capital) but also ‘a political and, a fortiori, 
geopolitical process’ (Teschke 2003, pp. 264–265).7 
This provides a major clue for progressing with the problem. Pending working out 
where that clue (and others to follow) leads, for now the problem of 
incommensurability of modernity with peasant difference has come into view. 
Modernity, seen as consisting of (Marx) or based on (multi-causal, e.g. Giddens) a 
social logic of reproduction, encounters the peasant as its theoretical other. Consider 
Buzan and Lawson’s (2015) ‘tripartite configuration’ of modernity that included 
‘industrialisation’. Supposing that the ‘commercialisation of agriculture’ is a condition 
of both the first and second Industrial Revolution they also reiterate the centrality of 
wage-labour and capital to that commercialisation. Indeed, the other elements of their 
tripartite configuration - the rational state and ideologies of progress - both 
incorporate that social relation one way or another as a premise. This is particularly so 
through placing reliance on the separation of politics and economics, and the 
analytical categories of state and market, to develop their analysis (Buzan and Lawson 
2015, pp. 147–165).8 
Whilst there have been many attempts to account for modernity’s spread amidst 
unevenness (difference), it comes at what for now appears to be a severe cost, critical 
weakening of the claims and explanatory scope of social theory. For, conceived as a 
logic of reproduction, it persistently encounters its (peasant) other as untheorisable. 
Whilst some clue as to the way forward has been noted (e.g. Teschke), it is far from 
clear that it is even possible to incorporate further elements with the fundamental 
logic at its heart. 																																																								
7 ‘More often than not’, remarks Teschke, ‘it was heavy artillery that battered down pre-capitalist walls’ 
as opposed to the metaphorical artillery of commodity prices (2003, p. 265). Curiously, for a remarkably 
similar point from a writer that sets out from an explicitly Smithian position see: (Arrighi 2007, p. 77). 
8 In the realm of International Political Economy ‘states and markets’ is a foundational conception, and 
an ‘undefended dualism’ (Watson 2005, p. 13) which is best understood in terms of those modern social 
relations (Rosenberg 1994, p. 132). Once again, though, the great virtue of the position is also its 
limitation, veering toward the erasure of peasant-difference, at least from the domain of theory. 	
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II. Diagnosis: the incommensurability of the peasant with 
modernity 
The full extent of the (apparent) intractability of the problem emerges out of the 
second diagnostic stage. In this Section social theorists that attribute very real 
significance to the peasant are examined; curiously, they still find themselves in 
difficulty, deploying conceptions of the peasant that are incommensurable with 
modernity in theoretically significant ways. As such, the problem of 
incommensurability is established as cutting both ways, from modernity to peasant 
and vice versa. 
In the discussion of modernity above a broad definition of ‘peasant’ has already 
been intimated, which can be stated expressly here as the ‘unity of labour and property’ 
(Mamdani 1996, pp. 204–205). Owning (some) means of production and applying their 
own labour to it, the peasant cannot be a wage-labourer (or capitalist) in the sense of 
market dependency that was so vital to the theorisation of modernity. A peasant might 
well participate in market relations, but so long as the ‘unity of labour and property’ 
holds they are not dependent on that participation for their reproduction.9 None of this 
is to say that such a definition adequately captures the historical identity and agency of 
any particular group – much as the same can be said for the ‘working-class’ (Thompson 
1991) – but it will, nonetheless, lead to the nub of the problem with modernity. 
In this Section various treatments of the peasant are considered, starting with a set 
of debates with a more Marxist flavour between Lenin and Chayanov (Bernstein 
2009).10 This debate most starkly illustrates the incommensurability at hand, with 
Lenin mobilising a view of modernity and Chayanov gaining real intellectual traction 
by pointing to the liabilities that flow from its incommensurability with the peasant. 
Encountering difficulties of his own though, Chayanov is likewise propelled toward his 
own set of exaggerations in an attempt to shore up his intellectual position. 
Thereafter two further treatments of the peasant are considered, first the Subaltern 
Studies group (Chatterjee 2011) that tries to develop a theorisation of the relation 																																																								
9 There are significant variables involved throughout this definition. Ownership or control of means of 
production can vary in both quality and quantity; more or less of the peasant household’s labour might 
be applied, indeed it might also be mixed with the labour of others. These variables matter a great deal, 
but so long the basic unity of labour and property holds they cannot be dependent on the market. And 
the point, of course, is that this appears to directly rule out the social logic of reproduction of 
modernity discussed in Section I. 
10 A Soviet agrarian economist, deeply interested in the peasantry and highly critical of large-scale 
farming, a position that would ultimately lead to his execution during the Stalinist era. 
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between modernity and peasant. Yet in doing so they nonetheless still run up against 
the fundamental difficulty of the incommensurability of each, qua social logic of 
reproduction. The second, and final, body of work is that of Barrington Moore (1966) 
and his student, Theda Skocpol (1973, 1979). Even though it is an immensely rich body 
of work, this runs into much the same problem. That said, it also provides a clear clue 
toward its resolution; which is that social logics of reproduction (wage-labour and 
capital, peasant) must be supplemented, in some theoretically coherent way, with a 
theorisation of their interaction across an international dimension. 
The so-called ‘Agrarian Question’ (Kautsky 1988a, 1988b) which preoccupied many 
Marxists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, provides the context for a debate between 
Lenin and Chayanov (Lenin 1960, Chayanov 1986). So well-recognised is their work 
that each is still seen as constitutive of an intellectual tradition, and the debate 
between them continues right up to the present day (McMichael 1997, 2014a, Bernstein 
2006, 2014). 
Lenin, interested in transitions to capitalist-modernity, sought to identify how the 
peasantry might transform into a modern form in that sense. Dividing the peasantry 
into three analytical categories of ‘rich’, ‘middle’ and ‘poor’, he claimed the peasantry 
would be increasingly divided along these lines as both differing ownership of the 
means of production and differing outcomes of market participation accreted. So much 
so that these categories would eventually give way to the poorer peasants having to 
rely on wage-labour to reproduce themselves and richer ones employing that labour 
rather than their own. Whilst he allowed for a portion of the ‘middle’ peasantry 
continuing with ‘simple reproduction’ qua peasant, he was convinced that this pattern 
would necessarily take hold and secure the transition to capitalist-modernity (Lenin 
1960, Bernstein 2009). 
There is one decisive difficulty with Lenin’s position, however, which is that the 
logic he deploys depends upon market forces conceived as exogenous to the peasant 
society he has in mind. Peasants participate in the market for reasons that are not 
internal to Lenin’s model. Appeal might be made to one of two justifications for this 
exogeneity. The first is that it is human nature to enter into market (exchange) 
relations, and therefore it need not be a specific feature of any model. Second, that 
those market forces are in a more literal sense exogenous, impacting the peasant 
society from the outside (e.g. urban areas or industrialised countries), across 
unevenness. 
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Alexander V. Chayanov enters this intellectual field by both pinpointing and 
exploiting the difficulty that this theoretical exogeneity poses for Lenin. Without 
having to deny market participation, he repeatedly presses the basic point alluded to 
above. Peasants are constituted by a fundamentally different social logic of 
reproduction because of the unity of labour and property, which in no way fosters 
dependency on the market. Absenting such dependency, Lenin’s model of 
differentiation that gradually converges on classes of rural capitalists and labourers is 
on far shakier, and certainly less theoretical, ground. Instead peasant households,11 says 
Chayanov, make decisions about production (utilisation of their own land and labour) 
that emphasise their demographic life-cycles and the weighing-up of the benefits of 
consumption against the sheer drudgery of self-exploitation. According to this logic 
any surplus beyond the requirements of subsistence might be marketed, but this is 
subject to choice, one choice being to simply reduce production (Chayanov 1986, 
Shanin 2009, Bernstein 2009). 
Chayanov, no less than theorists of modernity discussed in Section I, posits an 
internally consistent logic of social reproduction. The difficulty for Lenin is that he 
cannot show that Chayanov’s logic must give way to the logic of capitalist-modernity 
based on that logic of reproduction alone nor can he introduce alternative logics of 
explanation without weakening his intellectual position. Even if it is allowed, for the 
sake of argument, that capitalist-modernity is more productive12 this will still not 
sustain Lenin’s argument in the face of their incommensurability. 
Much like the discussion in Section I, in order to have an impact the raw assertion 
of unevenness between capitalist and peasant society would need to be re-introduced 
as an element of the theory itself. In the absence of any theoretical means to break the 
deadlock, both Lenin and Chayanov can be reasonably accused of resort to 
exaggeration of the extent to which their respective social logics hold water. Lenin 
insisted that the Russian countryside was converging on capitalism, whilst Chayanov 
																																																								
11 Thinking in terms of peasant households can, of course, conceal that the most exploitative relations 
in such societies can be intra-family. 
12 Chayanov disputes this too, arguing that peasant agriculture is more efficient than large-scale 
capitalist farming. Whereas Lenin, and the weight official Soviet thinking, drew the opposite 
conclusion. Comparative efficiency debates along these lines also continue to rage in contemporary 
debates (Sender and Johnston 2004, Mueller 2011, p. 29, van der Ploeg 2014) but are not of direct 
concern here. Rather, one objective of the thesis is to show instead that the need for a more dynamic or 
interactive conception of 'peasants' as combining with aspects of 'modernity' is a more helpful 
intellectual strategy than comparing two separate models. 
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insisted that the putatively modern, outside world had not impinged on peasant 
society in any fundamental way. It was, in this sense, pristine. 
The contemporary debate that has been inherited from Lenin and Chayanov 
persists in this deadlock. Differentiation, along Leninist lines, remains a common 
approach (Bernstein 2001, Mueller 2011) whilst others persist in treatments of peasants 
as a radically different and separate 'mode of production' (Hydén 1980). 13 
Unsurprisingly, though, dissatisfaction with the exaggerations (of convergence or 
pristineness) that follow has impelled participants in these renewed debates to seek a 
way out. One notable attempt has been to advance categories that purport to capture 
hybridity. Insisting that theory must address ‘actually existing capitalism’, it has been 
suggested that the commitment to the centrality of capital-labour can be maintained 
by recasting peasants as ‘semi-proletarians’ or ‘worker-peasants’ (Bernstein 1990, 2004, 
p. 202, 2006, p. 456). 
Prima facie, compound words such as these appear apt to resolve the problem, 
specifically pointing toward some kind of combination of peasant and capitalist logics 
of reproduction. Indeed, this thesis will go on to offer a compound of its own, the 
citizen-peasant, as a means of re-reading Marx and Arusha. Unfortunately, though, 
Bernstein’s terms do not actually combine these logics, serving more to obscure than 
resolve difference. There is no analytical or theoretical sense in which his ‘worker-
peasants’ evince any trace of the logic Chayanov had pointed to. Rather they are 
workers, in terms of the logic they are subject to, and have only been re-labelled. 
The upshot of which is persistence in problematic exaggeration. He says, for 
instance, that these ‘worker-peasants’ are subsumed by the deep logic of the ‘agrarian 
question of labour’ that is only ‘manifested in struggles for land [my emphases]’ 
(Bernstein 2004, p. 202). Yet there is no theoretical means to actually explain the 
centrality of land to these struggles. As McMichael points out, ‘[i]f one asks why labour 
would struggle for land, rather than adequate employment, the limits of this 
formulation become clear’ (2006, p. 477). This does not mean that there are not 
substantial portions of humanity that do both earn wages and have an interest in land; 
the point is that the challenge of theorising such hybridity is so great because as the 
two social logics do not fit together (or subordinate the other) in any straightforward 
and satisfactory way. 
																																																								
13 And both have been directly applied to the study of post-colonial Tanzania (Hydén 1980, Mueller 
2011). 
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One of the most sustained, and innovative, approaches to this issue is Philip 
McMichael's study of the 'La Via Campesina' [The Peasant Way] social movement. 
Setting out from a position that is sympathetic to the peasant in political terms, and 
sceptical of the soundness of social theories of modernity, he goes a long way toward 
recognition of both peasant difference and keen awareness of the impact of modernity 
(or capitalism, or globalisation) (McMichael 2006, 2008). He criticises the notion that 
capitalism is a world-historical condition that dictates ‘a path-dependent resolution of 
social forces into the capital-labour relation, and/or that “peasants” are a historical 
anachronism, as scale is necessary to survive in the market or realize the potential of 
“social labour”' (McMichael 2006, p. 475). 
Whilst resistance to notions of path-dependence in this sense are close to the 
ambition of this thesis, there are some limitations to McMichael’s work as it currently 
stands, at least for the purposes of this thesis. First, since McMichael is interested in a 
contemporary social movement, his claims are mostly confined to the contemporary 
conjuncture and an appeal to the distinctiveness of both the era and La Via Campesina 
as a social movement. This temporal limitation is unfortunate, if nothing else because 
his critics use it to suggest that it cannot impinge on wider historical and theoretical 
arguments around the impact of modernity on the peasant. Indeed, runs that 
suggestion, work such as McMichael’s ultimately pursues the ‘resistance’ of the 
peasantry into a theoretical dead-end (Bernstein 2014). 
This limitation is not only due to the choice to focus on a contemporary social 
movement, it is also partly methodological. If there is a governing theoretical 
framework to his work it is his prior work on ‘food regimes’ which is broadly 
comparable to a World-System logic (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, McMichael 
2009). Thus it seems that his reading of La Via Campesina fits into that wider 
framework as a conjunctural possibility that arises from resistance to, and the 
possibility for change of, the latest (‘corporate’) food regime. If so, the argument is 
subject to similar criticism of ‘Smithian’ views encountered in Section I. Peasant 
difference is able to participate in the framework because it is disinterested in 
sociological forms (worker, peasant etc.) regarding all as market participants and 
potential resistors. 
The challenge, in his terms, is to achieve a ‘[d]e-centering’ that ‘uncouples 
modernity from its abstracted Eurocentric claims, reformulating it as an unfinished, 
differentiated, and contradictory project, open to new possibilities’ (McMichael 2010, p. 
10). This suggests a notion of hybridity, but does not establish the theoretical means to 
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find and sustain it. Thus, whilst in full agreement with the suggestion, it should be 
added that it shall not be possible without theorisation of those unfinished, 
differentiated and contradictory elements and their relationship to the peasant. 
Furthermore, if the only theoretical toolkit left for this attempt is the broadly ‘Smithian’ 
set, then the debate is likely to persist in unconvincing premises of a timeless market 
and valorisation of resistance versus Bernstein’s partial but impeccably sociological 
logic (of modernity) in ‘worker-peasants’. 
The difficulty involved in moving toward hybridity as a resolution of 
incommensurability is rendered more explicit still by reference to the second set of 
literature in this Section: Subaltern Studies. It has focussed on Indian history, and the 
sociological figure of the peasant, with a deep interest in vindicating difference in 
intellectual and political terms. Its key figures that evince specific, sociological interest 
in the peasant most clearly are Ranajit Guha (1983),14 Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and 
Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2011, chap. 10); the latter of whom shows especial interest in 
developing a relevant notion of hybridity. Nevertheless, this body of work likewise 
reproduces notions of modernity (they tend to prefer ‘capital’) and peasant as 
incommensurable, seeking refuge in extra-theoretical fixes (including Chatterjee’s 
intimation of hybridity) to the problem. 
Chakrabarty’s project hinges on his distinction between ‘History 1’, which stands 
for capital's ‘being’ or ‘structural logic’, and ‘History 2’, capital's ‘becoming’. The former 
contains the social theoretical commitments of Marx to the wage-labour-capital 
relations; the latter category is Chakrabarty’s attempt to import difference, especially in 
the form of concrete (peasant etc.) rather than free-labour. Whilst capital attempts to 
subjugate History 2, it in turn resists. Whilst there is theoretical room for peasant 
difference here, it is aptly referred to as the peasant ‘under the rule of capital’ 
(Chatterjee 2013, pp. 74–75). History 2 is reactive (resistant) to History 1. Capital's 
‘histories are History 1 constitutively but unevenly modified by...History 2s’ and 
therefore capital ‘cannot escape the politics of the diverse ways of being human...the 
restless and inescapable politics of historical difference to which global capital 
consigns us’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 70). 
The problem with this is that, upon scrutiny, ‘capital’ is not actually modified by 
History 2 resistance. The reputed ‘modifi[cations]’ generated by peasant resistance 
amount to little more than what Mamdani referred to as ‘idiosyncrasy’ (1996, p.11). 																																																								
14 Guha's (1983, Chakrabarty 2000, pp. 11–16) seminal work was prompted, in part, by critical reaction to 
treatments of peasant movements as ‘pre-political’ (Hobsbawm 1959, p. 2, 1973).  
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Capital is not so much modified as forced to concede a realm of marginal peasant 
difference. Or, in other words, a peasant conservation zone. As Matin argues, this body 
of work is ‘insouciant to the differentiated components of its heterogeneous 
constitution’ in which ‘[m]argins are heard and seen without ever ceasing to be 
margins’ (2013b, p. 364). 
This logic in operation, its limitations and the reason it matters can all be 
identified by turning from Chakrabarty’s more abstract treatment to Chatterjee’s 
treatment of peasant questions ‘today’ (2011, chap. 10).15 His starting point is that there 
has been a fundamental change in post-colonial India since the foundational work of 
Subaltern Studies (1982). This change entails revisiting ‘the position of the peasantry’ 
because ‘forms of capitalist industrial growth now under way in India will make room 
for the preservation of the peasantry, but under completely altered conditions’ 
(Chatterjee 2011, pp. 208–209). The prime mover in this logic is ‘capitalist industrial 
growth’ (History 1) which just so happens to ‘make room’ for the preservation of 
peasant difference. The causal flow is primarily from modernity to peasant; it is not the 
peasant (History 2) that has played any theoretically necessary role in establishing this 
change. As such History 1 has not, in fact, been ‘unevenly modified’ (Chakrabarty 2000, 
p. 70) or impacted causally by reason of ‘its heterogeneous constitution’ (Matin 2013b, 
p. 364). 
Part of those ‘altered conditions’ are peasantries ‘under conditions of electoral 
democracy’. These consist of the ever-increasing penetration of features that seem to 
come within the ambit of modernity in a broad sense. State services are extended into 
rural areas, an advance made possible by industrialisation, but are based on ‘political 
exchange’.16 Meanwhile agrarian reforms that have removed landlords from 'the village' 
have been achieved, in significant part, by the power of the modern state. He also 
refers to other factors, such as urban migration which fits a similar pattern. The 
curious thing is that, as a matter of theory, all of these things have happened within 
the ambit of History 1. Capitalist growth both makes these changes possible, and 
proceeds according to its own logic (of reproduction). Indeed, whilst reference is made 
to peasant resistance in its History 2 sense, what really brings these changes about is 
																																																								
15 An aspect of his broader project around ‘political modernity’ and ‘the politics of the governed’ 
(Chatterjee 2004). 
16 Specifically political exchange is a form that will be deeply significant in the analysis of Tanzania over 
chapters 4-7 too. I will develop the term ‘political market’ in an attempt to capture this. 
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the intersection of the logic of capitalist-modernity with a set of ‘global norms’ for 
democracy (Chatterjee 2011, pp. 208–209). 
All of this, says Chatterjee, is capable of arresting tendencies in History 1 toward 
dispossession of the peasant. Yet, even if one is entirely convinced of their empirical 
content, these claims are unavoidably extra-theoretical. ‘Democracy’, ‘global norms’ 
and History 1 do all the intellectual work in explaining how it is that the Indian peasant 
can continue to exist on the margins (Chatterjee 2011, pp. 212–213). Whilst all this 
generates a second domain of ‘political society’ and ‘non-corporate capital’ alongside 
the categories of classical modernity (civil society and capital “proper”), they are 
separate from each other; indeed, the former categories are secondary to the latter too. 
Peasant and modernity are incommensurable as ever; and that incommensurability is 
only obscured from view by introducing the peasant at the end of a logical sequence of 
explanation in which it plays no substantial part. It is, in theoretical terms, simply a 
coincidence that the prevailing winds of modernity (capital plus ‘global norms’) are 
favourable to the peasant. 
What has been observed so far is a deep incommensurability between modernity 
and peasant, best exemplified by the debate between Lenin and Chayanov. There is 
widespread dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, yet it is an abiding state of affairs 
since discussions of peasant difference vis-à-vis modernity remain rooted in the clash 
of two, necessarily incommensurable social logics of reproduction. Turning to 
Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol, the third and final body of literature this 
Section is concerned with, reveals much the same problem but also the clearest 
indication yet of the way forward. 
Recall the epigraphic statement from Barrington Moore at the outset of this 
Chapter. Clearly intent on registering the significance of the peasant in the ‘modern era’ 
he closely juxtaposes ‘the peasant’ as an ‘effective historical actor along with the 
conquests of the machine’ (Moore 1966, p. 453). However, his view of peasants ‘along 
with’ modernity [‘the machine’, industrialisation and so on], conceals what careful 
examination will reveal is yet another instance of incommensurability. Each actually 
inhabits a fundamentally different theoretical framework. One is political, in which the 
peasant is (potentially) important as agent of political revolution in producing 
communist polities (i.e. the Russian and Chinese Revolutions). The other, in which 
Moore expresses less formal interest but is actually fundamental to his thought, is what 
he regarded as the endpoint of political modernisation: modern, industrial society 
proper (Moore 1966). 
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Theda Skocpol (1973, pp. 4–9) has been able to detect three key variables in 
Moore’s (1966, pt. 3) attempt at a coherent theorisation of three forms of political 
modernisation, democracy, fascism and communism. These are (1) the bourgeois 
impulse, (2) whether agriculture is labour-repressive or market-oriented and, finally, (3) 
the revolutionary potential of the peasantry.  (1) is an attempt to capture the degree of 
urban-based commercial society that a case exhibits, (2) whether agricultural surplus is 
extracted through political coercion or market mechanisms whilst (3) is sufficiently 
self-explanatory for now. 
Examination of the operation of these variables begins to reveal the problem. 
Taken in conjunction (1) and (2) seems to be a reiteration of the core features of 
modernity discovered in Section I. Where the (urban) bourgeois impulse is strong and 
agriculture proceeds on a market basis, including and especially reliance on a labour 
market, Moore is providing us with no less classical a sketch of modernity than Marx 
himself. Where (2) is the market form, this is especially so. Labour has been separated 
from the means of production and is now constituted as wage-labour, whilst owners 
must equally employ labour through economic (the market) means rather than 
politically coercive ones (this being the other side of this binary variable).17 Peasant 
revolutionary potential, (3), meanwhile is almost an index of the absence of modernity 
in that same sense. Where both the bourgeois impulse and marketization of 
agriculture is absent or limited, their revolutionary potential is high (Moore 1966, pt. 3). 
Simplifying matters, it can be said that Moore comes very close to suggesting that 
only where a society is not yet modern, its peasants might very well exhibit agency in 
terms of revolutionary potential. Indeed, he seems susceptible to the view that 
peasants cannot be part of modernity in any sense. Where a peasant revolution 
succeeds, he writes:  
‘peasants have provided the dynamite to bring down the old building. To the 
subsequent work of reconstruction they have brought nothing; instead they have been 
– even in France – its first victims’ (Moore 1966, p. 480). 
It does appear Moore was strongly inclined to regard the peasant as necessarily apart 
from modern industrial society in all cases, including where it had been vital to 
bringing around its pre-conditions. 																																																								
17 Moore seems to have thought that where urban commercial society (1) had arisen alongside a 
politically coercive regime in the countryside (rather than market) the outcome would be more likely 
to be fascist (Moore 1966, chap. 8). 
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Thus, all things taken together, Moore’s reference in that epigraphic statement to 
peasants as actors of the ‘modern era’ is actually reference to two sharply delineated 
theoretical frameworks. Modernity in one sense might be immanent in a society 
(bourgeois impulse and market-driven agriculture) in which case peasant agency is 
ruled out. In the second framework, where capitalist-modernity does not (yet) exist, 
the peasant can be vital in paving the way for modernity. But as soon as peasants have 
dynamited the old, modernity returns to the stage to victimise and replace them. 
Nevertheless, there is a further interesting feature to Moore’s work, and the 
epigraphic statement in particular. Given the logical underpinnings of his work, the 
only reason Moore can get away with his suggestion that the peasant has been an actor 
of the ‘modern era’ is because of the coincidence in time of modern societies18 with 
peasant societies. In fact, his remarks that this coincidence is both a ‘historical irony’ 
and ‘curious’ goes to the very heart of a dilemma in Moore’s work which Theda Skocpol 
identifies. And, in turn, unpacking that dilemma yields another vital clue of the 
whereabouts of the path out of the incommensurability problem this Chapter has 
surveyed. 
This is found in Skocpol’s (1973, pp. 28–30) suggestion that there is a tension 
between ‘intra-societal’ and ‘inter-societal’ approaches in Moore’s work, whilst she is in 
no doubt that the intersocietal must be preferable. Her argument is that Moore (1966, 
pp. 413–414) seems to struggle in choosing between conceiving his patterned political 
forms (democracy, fascism and communism) as either ‘alternative routes’ or ‘successive 
historical stages’. That is: whether these are simply alternatives, the selection of which 
is dependent simply on what the internal conditions of that society happens to be, or, 
in the alternative, does one society taking a particular route impact the course of 
history in another? Skocpol (1973, pp. 31–32) seizes upon that indecision to reinforce 
her preference for an ‘inter-societal’ argument, which is important, but in doing so she 
also risks obscuring the theoretical difficulty that explains Moore’s hesitation. 
How so? Moore might well have preferred the view that these political forms had a 
‘determinate relation to each other’ and that the ‘methods of modernization...in one 
country change the dimensions of the problem for the next’ (Moore 1966, pp. 413–414). 
The difficulty, however, resides in giving theoretical expression to the phrase 
‘dimensions of the problem’. It is straightforward enough to argue that each country, 
confronted by the severe inequalities in power that modernity gives rise to, is likely to 																																																								
18 In the classical sense to which he more or less subscribes. 
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attempt incorporation of modernity into their own social relations. But if one wishes to 
consider the possibility of a shift in the dimensions of the problem, one needs to be 
prepared to reconsider the content of modernity itself.  
This is a difficulty that cannot be overcome simply by shifting from an intra- to 
inter-societal gear. And this is best demonstrated by Skocpol’s own attempt to address 
the issue. It might be possible to re-read fascism and communism as ‘attempts to 
maintain substantive national political sovereignty’ in the face of a world ‘dominated 
by the earlier “Bourgeois” (economic and/or political) modernizers’ (Skocpol 1973, p. 
32). But the parentheses here serve to gloss over the difficulty. ‘Bourgeois’ 
modernisation, she suggests, might be ‘economic and/or political’. Yet the forms she 
proposes as ‘successive stages’ (fascism and communism) are only the political forms 
which arise on the basis of the original bourgeois separation of politics from economics. 
This limitation is evidenced by Skocpol’s use of the formulation ‘politics in 
command’ (1973, p. 32). It seems to amount to a notion that ‘the state’ can extend 
control over otherwise unchanged institutions of modernity (separation of labour and 
means of production and all that goes with it).19 That manoeuvre seemed to be 
sustainable in Moore’s original schema because he had deliberately glossed over socio-
economic modernity by treating it as a variable (bourgeois impulse etc.) but not 
scrutinising it further. Indeed this what she called ‘the phantom of Social Origins’ 
(Skocpol 1973, p. 12). 
Moving beyond this ‘politics in command’ formulation, then, imperils the whole 
project; and Skocpol is well aware that ‘Social Origin's entire structure of assumptions 
and sequence-explanations collapses’ upon doing so (1973, p. 33). However, this is not 
only (as she thought) due to the addition of her ‘inter-societal’ perspective. Whilst that 
would require rethinking many of Moore’s arguments, it would also entail direct 
consideration of the peasant as a social institution in the round. That is, not just as an 
agent that may or may not react politically to ‘phantom’ economic processes; but also 
as social beings somehow (and uncertainty here is precisely the point) embedded in 
those ‘economic’ processes. Even if that process was one of dispossession of the 
peasant, transitional in the classical sense to modernity, explanation of this would have 
to be integral to the theory. 																																																								
19 In this regard there is a more than passing resemblance between these formulations and the 
‘developmental state’ as conceived for East Asia (Woo-Cumings 1999, Gray 2014) and increasingly 
referred to as a possibility in both Africa in general (Mkandawire 2004) and Tanzania in particular 
(Aminzade 2013a). 
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And much as was witnessed in Section I, the social logic of reproduction in ideas of 
modernity (Moore’s included), cannot do so. In short, at the same time as integrating 
an inter-societal perspective Moore would also have had to directly confront the 
incommensurability of the peasant with modernity. 
Conclusion: the need for interactivity 
In conclusion, following Skocpol in considering a move to an inter-societal 
perspective might be the key to resolving this incommensurability. But to actually 
address the issue of incommensurability this must be able to account for the peasant as 
a social element amidst those ‘successive stages’. That is, if an inter-societal perspective 
is to perform the labour required of it, then it must be able to uncover how these two 
(very) different social logics of reproduction interact with one another. Or, put another 
way, what does it mean in theoretical terms to refer (as Chatterjee does) to peasants 
under the rule of capital? 
Taking one final cue from Moore in this pursuit once again, the epigraph above 
trails off with a vital clue. The revolutionary contribution of the peasantry was, he says, 
‘very uneven’ (Moore 1966, p. 453). Whilst Moore seems to have regarded that 
unevenness as a descriptive feature of his historical irony, much as Lenin and others 
treated unevenness, the next Chapter shows that unevenness taken in conjunction 
with an inter-societal perspective is at the heart of the methodological fix to the 
problem of incommensurability this thesis will deploy to re-read Marx and Arusha.  
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Chapter 3: The interactive method: Uneven and 
Combined Development and the reconciliation 
of modernity and difference 
Introduction: re-reading the ‘and’ in Marx and Arusha 
This Chapter establishes the method deployed in the thesis to resolve the 
incommensurability of modernity and peasant qua social logics of reproduction; 
thereby, at last, establishing the means for re-reading of Marx and Arusha. A few clues 
for its resolution have been picked up in the course of diagnosing that problem. 
First, and actually the essence of the problem itself, is difference. Second, various 
signals in the direction of hybridity have been noted. In attempting to account for 
peasants that subsist in some sense alongside modernity compound terms, such as 
Henry Bernstein’s ‘worker-peasants’, have been offered as a notion of hybridity that 
might iron out the difficulties encountered (Bernstein 1990, 2004, p. 202, 2006, p. 456). 
Whilst it was suggested that these attempts fail to hit the target, the reason was that 
the hybridity was more rhetorical than real in social theoretical terms. The third clue, 
meanwhile, lies in the suggestion that modernity1 must be captured as a process 
because of difference (Teschke 2003, pp. 264–265). Fourthly, and finally, various 
scatted clues were also detected that ‘the international’ dimension was somehow 
fundamental to the issue. From the original salience of colonialism and international 
relations in African Studies, all the way through to the suggestions in Barrington 
Moore and Theda Skocpol’s work, the call that social theory should be ‘inter-societal’ 
became ever stronger. 
This Chapter shows that these clues all find coherent reflection in one theoretical 
framework, Uneven and Combined Development (“U&CD”). Originating in the work of 
Leon Trotsky (2008, pp. 3–12) his ideas have been systematically organised, and 
perhaps to some extent reorganised, in the past decade or so (Rosenberg 2006, Matin 
2013b, Anievas 2014, Makki 2015). Its broad thrust can be stated as follows. Whilst 
U&CD is conceived as a social theory, difference (clue 1) is not an embarrassment to it; 																																																								
1 Moreover, there is no real reason not to say the same of the peasant, even if it seems less urgent for 
now. 
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indeed, it is its fundamental premise (Rosenberg 2016, p. 11 and 15). Furthermore, an 
indispensable aspect of that premise of difference is that it is also seen as (a matter of 
social theory) generative of an international dimension (clue 4) to social life. If 
difference and ‘the international’ are so conjoined, then it is little wonder that the 
discussion has been recurrently thrust up against international features in its 
exploration of the problem in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Noticing difference and the international, of course, is neither unique nor itself 
constitutive of a theory. Indeed, both have been repeatedly noticed by many of the 
thinkers examined thus far. What gives U&CD its particular value is that it proceeds 
from this premise to further posit that because difference so obtains human 
development (that is, history as process) (clue 3) is combined. This not only specifically 
focuses on hybridity (clue 2), it unveils a methodology for deriving it from a specific 
theorisation (of the general body of these clues). For this reason, the Chapter argues 
that U&CD offers a method that is capable of generating a sustainable theorisation of 
peasant-difference amidst modernity as an instance of combined development. 
The essence of that method is its interactivity. By operationalising its premises – 
unevenness, combination and development – a series of causal mechanisms are derived. 
When these are applied it becomes possible to not just bridge the two social logics of 
reproduction in question, but to actually reconfigure the sense of how that 
reproduction works. In particular, its object is to trace how their interaction forms part 
of their logic(s) of reproduction. It is on that basis that a concrete and theorisable basis 
for hybridity emerges. 
Interactivity that founds a notion of hybridity in this sense can be seen as 
discovery of the fundamental content and consequence of the ‘and’ in Marx and Arusha. 
For, in uncovering the way in they had always been interactive with one another, the 
fundamental problem turns out to have been the widely held but mistaken view that 
one could be conceived without the other at all. 
Section I discusses U&CD in abstract theoretical terms. Unpacking the content and 
significance of its foundational premises, it proceeds to discuss the causal mechanisms 
that the current literature recognises: including a ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘privilege 
of backwardness’ and ‘substitutionism’ (Trotsky 2008, pp. 3–12, Rosenberg 2013a, 2013b). 
An important debate around U&CD has arisen amongst its advocates, some insisting it 
should be primarily understood as a feature of modernity (capitalism) (Allinson and 
Anievas 2009, Anievas and Allinson 2010) and others that view it as a ‘transhistorical’ 
abstraction that stretches beyond modernity (Rosenberg 2006, 2009, Matin 2007). 
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Section I offers some comments on that debate, pointing out how it impinges in an 
important way on the prospective methodological fix the Chapter offers to the 
incommensurability problem. This is especially so because it has an important bearing 
on how the causal mechanisms of U&CD are understood. 
Thereafter Section II brings that abstract discussion back together with explicit 
consideration of modernity and peasantry. It shows how U&CD brings those 
conceptions together into an interactive whole, proceeding to sketch how that 
amounts to a method for sketching a historical sociological resolution of their 
incommensurability in the Tanzanian case. In doing so it also illustrates the key steps 
of argumentation in this thesis. 
In that pursuit Section II expounds the key concepts that the thesis develops and 
deploys. Flowing from the re-reading of modernity and peasant as interactive, these are 
an articulation of modernity as, inter alia, a process of (concept 1) fission.2 On that 
basis the peasant can be conceived as a feature of that process of fission; in particular it 
can be recast as an agent of that process so long as it is also recognised as itself 
mutable. In consequence, the peasant in such circumstances should be understood as a 
(2) protean subject of (fissile) modernity. Reiterating a point about the causal 
mechanisms of U&CD from Section I, (3) substitutionism in a deliberately broad sense 
can be deployed as a mechanism for capturing this process, proceeding to show the 
concrete social-institutional consequences of this process in Tanzania. These are the 
emergence of what will be called (4) the political market as a social logic of 
reproduction that takes within its ambit interactivity. Finally, upon that basis, the 
ultimate hybrid form of ‘peasant’ and ‘modernity’ which the thesis offers as a re-
reading of Marx and Arusha can be specified: (5) the citizen-peasant. 
Finally, on the basis of these two Sections, the Chapter concludes with one final 
overview of the steps in the overall argument. This time it serves to show the particular 
empirical work each of the subsequent Chapters undertakes in order that the argument 
can ultimately be completed. 
I. Uneven and Combined Development as the intellectual source 
of interactivity 																																																								
2 This is an analogy to nuclear physics and its notions of ‘fission’ and ‘fusion’. To a great extent 
conceptualisations of modernity are in the nature of ‘fusion’, thus ‘fission’ is offered as a corrective but 
not an alternative. None of the argument that will follow is intended to suggest that modernity does 
not also consist of ‘fusion’, some thoughts on which are offered in conclusion in Chapter 7. 
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Trotsky begins with an oft-quoted line, ‘[u]nevenness’, he says, is ‘the most general 
law of the historic process’ (2008, p. 5). Whilst objection to the suggestion that it is a 
‘law’ is sometimes taken, it is actually so straightforward an observation that the 
greater intellectual jeopardy is its appearance of banality. The point of unevenness is 
that the social world is always (‘law’) diverse (Rosenberg 2006, pp. 313–319, Anievas 
2014, pp. 43–45); ‘complexity is the point’, says Justin Rosenberg, ‘not as patternless 
jumble, but an inner differentiation of parts, across many dimensions, but within an 
ontological whole’ (2006, p. 316). Secondly, an additional feature of fundamental 
importance is that ‘inner differentiation of parts’ also means difference in the sense of 
multiplicity: ‘unevenness contains an ontological premise of more-than-one’ 
(Rosenberg 2006, p. 318). 
 Unevenness, in the sense of difference, could be said to be obvious to anyone. 
Exploring unevenness to further reveal multiplicity is somewhat more novel; but then 
again, none of the writers consulted in Chapters 1 and 2 would have needed to be 
informed that either difference obtains in the general sense, nor in the particular sense 
that it does so inter-societally.3 The real distinction between U&CD and other usages of 
unevenness, including those observed in Chapter 2, is that in U&CD it is an initial 
premise of a theoretical whole rather than simply a description of how things are. 
Thus Trotsky’s ‘principal innovation’ (Anievas 2014, p. 41) lies in the addition of 
combined development to unevenness; indeed this is what renders the whole framework 
interactive in the requisite sense. ‘Development…is not only differentiated: it is also, 
consequently and intrinsically, interactive’ (Rosenberg 2006, p. 319). This is so because 
it is a consequence of multiplicity that any society must be able, in one way or another, 
to manage its relations with other societies. Therefore, multiplicity ‘is everywhere 
expressed in a condition of inter-societal coexistence’; moreover, when expressed as a 
proposition of social theory, the vital significance of combined development becomes 
explicit: 
‘the conditions of reproduction which define the concrete existence of any given 
society are not limited to the “internal” structures of social relations which formed the 
starting point of Classical Social Theory. They always include, by virtue of the bare fact 																																																								
3 Sometimes referred to as ‘the international’, but either way can be thought of as ‘that dimension of 
social reality which arises specifically from the existence within it of more than one society’ (Rosenberg 
2006, p. 308). To avoid the confusion of anachronistic slippage around the international, this Chapter 
uses ‘inter-societal’ unless the context specifically allows ‘international’ (i.e. an impeccably modern 
context). 
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of inter-societal coexistence, those external conditions which are the object of 
diplomatic management’ (Rosenberg 2006, p. 320). 
Matters have moved quickly, such that a stock check is already in order. From the 
initial premise of difference and multiplicity (unevenness), and the threat of banality, 
the logical sequence has moved with speed to what will become the reconfiguration of 
social theory that is required. The modification in question goes to the heart of social 
theory, proposing that ‘conditions of reproduction’ – which were the essence of notions 
of modernity, peasant and their incommensurability – cannot be “internal” alone. They 
must also, and simultaneously, account for the imposition of ‘inter-societal coexistence’ 
on how that social reproduction is done. 
There are three ways in which combination must be registered to draw out the 
significance of all this. The first is that any society is ‘causally integrated with a wider 
social field of interacting patterns of development’; this means that events – say, the 
collapse of an empire – will have causal consequences elsewhere, rippling out to its 
neighbours and beyond. Second of all, this extends beyond events to ‘structures of 
social, material and cultural life’. Thus events such as collapse of an empire could very 
well impinge on social institutions, such as trade, and social classes such as those 
especially attuned to war in deeply significant ways (Rosenberg 2006, p. 321 and 324). 
The third and final sense of combination is also the most vital, since U&CD’s 
operationalisation of hybridity revolves around this innovation. Social formations are 
‘hybrid[s], a changing amalgam of pre-existent “internal” structures of social life with 
“external” socio-political and cultural influences’. Combination is not something 
external that impinges on a society because there can be no ‘pre-combination’ society, 
instead they are always and everywhere hybrid in nature. This does not mean that all 
categorical labels must be abandoned, but it does mean that in deploying them they 
must be understood as necessarily a product of combined development. Thus, Justin 
Rosenberg further argues, one has ‘to abandon at the deepest theoretical level any 
notion of the constitution of society as analytically prior to its interaction with other 
societies’ (2006, p. 325). 
Completing the logic, this impinges on how ‘development’ can be conceived too.  
All societies are hybrid, thus the logic that captures the direction of their change over 
time (development) is necessarily interrelated with those of other societies. ‘[T]he 
results of one instance of social development enter into the conditions of another’ 
(Rosenberg 2006, p. 326). In another sense, development is both interactive and itself 
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consists of (is produced by and productive of) difference. Even more simply, 
development is and must be interactively multiple. 
What this amounts to is a theoretically-rationalised mandate to reconceptualise 
social theories of reproduction based on the successive logic of uneven and combined 
development to capture the interactivity which embraces hybridity (the third and final 
form of combination). The promise of U&CD, then, is resolution of incommensurable 
social logics of reproduction on this basis; so long, that is, as concrete patterns of 
interaction can be traced. The question now, of course, is: what is the method for 
doing so? 
The causal mechanisms of U&CD – whip of external necessity, privilege of 
backwardness and substitutionism (Trotsky 2008, pp. 4–5, Rosenberg 2013b, pp. 195–
197) – are, of course, built on those abstractions covered above. As such the eventual 
outcome of the argument that follows is that the conjunction of core abstractions (U, C 
and D, as it were) with these causal mechanisms can be deployed to the ends of this 
thesis. To get there, however, a more extensive ground-clearing exercise is called for 
than might be expected. 
‘Under the whip of external necessity’, said Trotsky, a ‘backward culture is 
compelled to make leaps’ (2008, p. 5). The specific feature of this first mechanism is 
the fact and nature of this compulsion. It is geopolitical, inasmuch as that compulsion 
depends on a multiplicity of societies, exerting pressure on one another. Crucially, this 
obtains across different – uneven – societies, such that a ‘backward’ (less powerful) 
society experiences those pressures more acutely and must respond to that stimulus. 
The second mechanism, the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, directs attention 
to those responses. These responses will not be in the nature of repeating the other, 
more powerful society’s, pattern of development. Rather it can draw on elements of 
that development, importing them, without having to retrace the long historical 
process which originally produced them. Therein lies the ‘privilege’ in all this, since it 
allows ‘skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. Savages throw away their bows 
and arrows for rifles all at once, without travelling the road which lay between these 
two weapons in the past’ (Trotsky 2008, p. 4). 
Crucially, though, this ‘would be no straightforward acceleration of an ultimately 
unidirectional developmental process’ (Rosenberg 2013b, p. 196). That is, U&CD is not a 
theory of accelerated transition toward eventual convergence on a single capitalist-
modernity. Yet the ‘privilege of backwardness’ mechanism might, if interpreted strictly 
and in isolation, appear to imply precisely such a view of transition. Stages are skipped, 
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and societies move from lower technologies to higher. That this is not so, as far the 
explicit mechanisms go, is best revealed in Trotsky’s work by his third and final 
mechanism. 
He introduces this by first qualifying the former ‘possibility of skipping’ which is 
‘by no means absolute’. The reason being that it is ‘determined in the long run by the 
economic and cultural capacities of the [‘backward’] country’; that is to say that the 
operation of the mechanism is conditioned by the social nature of its object. Leaving 
aside the vaguely internalist quality of his language here, which would be a misreading 
given the thrust of Trotsky’s work, it is this qualification which propels him to the next 
point. These ‘achievements borrowed from outside’ can, he says with regret, be 
‘debase[d]’. The ‘introduction of certain elements of Western technique and training, 
above all military and industrial, under Peter I, led to a strengthening of serfdom as the 
fundamental form of labor [sic] organization [my emphasis]’ and therefore ‘a 
strengthening of tsarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country’ 
(Trotsky 2008, pp. 4–5). 
This is what has been called ‘a socio-political “curse of backwardness”’ whereby 
‘the directive role in industrialization would necessarily fall instead to “archaic” 
political groups’. Whilst this ‘third mechanism is a compound of the other two’ – whip 
and privilege – ‘it issues in a quite different class of effects’ which is neither geopolitical 
compulsion nor developmental (skipping stages). Rather it ‘ramif[ies] social structure’. 
Referred to as ‘substitution’, because tsarism stepped in to play a role in 
industrialisation performed by the capitalist class in classical pathways, the effect was 
to ‘radically differentiate[s] the socio-political structure’ (Rosenberg 2013b, pp. 196–197). 
Real care is called for in unpacking this third mechanism. For it is pregnant with 
the most significant aspect of U&CD, at least for the purposes of this thesis, which is a 
theorisation of hybridity that will eventually resolve the incommensurability problem. 
No longer can there be any mistake that what is under consideration is simply an 
acceleration in the extension of a uni-linear pattern of capitalist-modernity. This 
mechanism leads to direct interest in differentiation of socio-political structure by 
reference to the interaction of different societies. 
The requirement for care, however, flows from how this general possibility, 
immanent in U&CD’s logic, is expressed as a specific mechanism. For its general 
quality is imperilled by a temptation to present its operation in binary terms that arise 
from the circumstances of the specific use to which Trotsky was putting it. These 
include the terminology of ‘curse’ as opposed to ‘privilege’, and the notion of regressive 
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social classes (tsarism, serfdom) being reinforced as opposed to ‘skipping’ forward. But 
in terms of its ultimate logic of combination, especially hybridity, there is really no 
reason why an outcome (radical differentiation) must fall into one or the other binary. 
Nor still need the case be so straightforward that a comparison (tsarism versus 
capitalist class) exhausts the analytical possibilities. 
Indeed, Justin Rosenberg notes, as he transitions from ‘privilege of backwardness’ 
to ‘substitution’, that: 
‘the technical products of development [can] unfold new possibilities when transferred 
from their original setting into a new one’ (Rosenberg 2013b, p. 196) 
This is much closer to an expression of the broad possibilities of hybridity U&CD 
discloses. Substitution, as it appears in Trotsky’s exposition and subsequent 
commentary, is a non-exhaustive expression of that broad possibility. In Russia, he 
thought, the introduction of industry, had resulted in strengthening the hand of 
tsarism and its basis in serfdom because it had substituted itself for a capitalist class in 
so introducing industrialisation; and he regarded that as negative, which is hardly a 
controversial judgment. Nonetheless, a better understanding of what it means as a 
theoretical proposition is as a mechanism that serves to ‘ramify social structure’. 
Rather than necessarily being reinforcement of a society’s specific socio-political 
structure (tsarism, say) -  it is the reinforcement of its general logic of social 
reproduction. This may, or may not,4 involve changes so radically differentiating that 
new categorisations must be developed for the purposes of analysis. Either way though, 
the core point is the shifting quality and content of the logic of reproduction the effect 
of which is social ramification. 
On this argument, there is no reason in the basic logic of U&CD to exclude the 
broader possibility by inadvertently narrowing down the field due to Trotsky’s 
particular application of it. Indeed that is not what is intended by Trotsky either, who 
amidst his discussion of these mechanisms insists that the ‘laws of history have 
nothing in common with a pedantic schematism’ (Trotsky 2008, p. 5). Nevertheless, 
what follows from this is that care is taken to maintain the link between theoretical 
premises – unevenness, combination and development – and the specific mechanisms 
invoked. Taken out of their original context the mechanisms Trotsky speaks of might 
on their own obscure the potential of U&CD. 																																																								
4 Trotsky’s particular example falls into the may not category. 
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Thus, whilst in the context of the wider U&CD literature it is somewhat 
idiosyncratic, the term ‘substitution’ shall be used in this deliberately more general 
sense. Not only conceiving the specific possibility that a class will substitute for the 
role of another class and thereby also sustain itself, but that the substitution of various 
social artefacts of the development of one society in another will have profound effects 
on the logic of reproduction such that it can be reasonably regarded as a radically 
differentiated hybrid form. 
Another point that flows from this, then, is to recognise that the mechanisms 
Trotsky specifically articulates are not just a straightforward reflection of the general 
abstractions of U&CD. They are also a product of their application to the analysis of a 
specific historical conjuncture. This brings the discussion directly to the debate over 
whether U&CD is primarily (or wholly (Ashman 2009)) a phenomenon of capitalism or 
transhistorical. The former argument (Allinson and Anievas 2009, Anievas and 
Nisancioglu 2013, pp. 100–101) is on strong textual ground, inasmuch as Trotsky was 
focussed specifically on capitalist-modernity and the sociology of industrialisation in 
Russia (Rosenberg 2006, p. 319, Anievas 2014, p. 51). On the other hand, and as has 
been suggested, the fundamental logic of U&CD rather suggests that the transhistorical 
position is the stronger. 
This matters slightly less if one is prepared to modify the specific understandings 
of the causal mechanisms in the manner suggested. Nevertheless, objection might be 
taken to that suggestion on the basis of this debate around capitalism’s relationship to 
U&CD. For this reason, engagement with that discussion cannot be further put off. 
Consider one of the foremost proponents of the view that U&CD is best seen as a 
‘methodological fix’ to Marx’s historical materialism because it is primarily a feature of 
capitalism (Anievas 2014, p. 53). Conceding that U&CD can be ‘a truly transhistorical 
phenomenon’ he nonetheless insists that: 
its distinct causal determinations, articulated and expressed through intersocietal 
competition, are in every instance historically specific to and variable across any given 
mode of production. Only under the specific sociohistorical conditions of generalized 
commodity production of the kind found in the capitalist epoch do these 
determinations take on their full scope and intensity. In the absence of these 
conditions, the instances and qualitative forms of uneven and combined development 
will tend to be context-specific’ (Anievas 2014, p. 53). 
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The invocation of ‘distinct causal determinations’ is significant, alluding to those three 
mechanisms discussed thus far as Trotsky understood them. In this view they are 
distinct, moreover, to capitalism as a mode of production by virtue of its ‘rules of 
reproduction’ (Brenner 2005, pp. 7–8, Anievas 2014, p. 54). Modernity, understood as 
capitalist, and theorised as an emergent property of the wage-labour-capital relation, 
begins to come into view once again. Finally, in the absence of capitalism, he says 
U&CD tends to be ‘context-specific’. 
On the contrary, capitalism is better understood itself as context-specific 
instantiation of U&CD, not the other way around. Consider how the claim that 
privileges capitalism proceeds: 
‘After capitalism emerges somewhere, the self-expanding and totalizing nature of 
capital locks all against all in the battle to cheapen commodity production through a 
historically unprecedented development of the productive forces…the ruling classes of 
all other modes of production must submit to it or face peripheralization’ (Anievas 
2014, p. 55). 
First, capitalism (modernity) emerges as prime mover (after it ‘emerges somewhere’) 
that dramatically heightens competitive pressure in world politics. Second, presumably 
conscious of the Smithian liabilities of detaching his proposition that this ‘generalize[s] 
commodity production’, he relates this to difference (‘the ruling classes of all other 
modes of production’) in an attempt to keep the proposition within the proper bounds 
of social theorization. 
 Yet it is precisely here that the logic threatens (and it is put no higher than that) 
to veer away from U&CD as expressed in this Section. For the consequence is said to be 
that different societies must either ‘submit’ or ‘face peripheralization’. Submission is a 
broad category and can safely take within its ambit Trotsky’s sketch of Russia, in which 
the Tsar submitted to the need to industrialise but (because of U&CD processes) in a 
way that was generative of heterogeneity. 
That, as Anievas recognises, cannot be the only logical possibility. Nor is it the only 
historically observable one. These possibilities are conceived as an alternative to 
submission, ‘peripheralization’. The implication is that ‘submission’ must be the 
preferable option; but as a theoretical proposition within U&CD it is not clear exactly 
why this must be so. First of all, ‘peripheralization’ is not the same thing as ‘loss of 
independence’. Therefore, and secondly, it is not clear why that should be an option to 
be avoided according to any rationale that U&CD can properly recognise. 
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If that is so, then the third upshot is even more troubling than it otherwise would 
be. If the causal mechanisms obtain properly only with capitalism, and are only 
interactive with difference in the event of ‘submission’ to generalised commodity 
production and industrialisation, then any ‘peripheries’ seem to be excluded from the 
ambit of the theory (or methodological fix). This is because the causal mechanisms so 
construed cannot have purchase. Where ‘peripheralization’ obtains it appears to be 
untheorisable because ‘the whip of external necessity’ has not performed its compelling 
function in subjecting said society to ‘generalized commodity production’. There might 
be technological and social institutional transfer that resembles the privilege of 
backwardness; likewise, that might well also eventuate in hybridity in a manner that 
mirrors substitution (in the deliberately, if idiosyncratically broad sense advanced 
here). But in neither case are they theorisable phenomena if these causal mechanisms 
flow, as Anievas argues, from what is effectively a capitalism that is ‘analytically prior’ 
to the processes of U&CD. 
Instead it is a consequence of the transhistoric logic of U&CD, and the argument of 
this Section, that capitalism must be seen as another ‘context-specific’ instantiation of 
U&CD even if it is a tremendously significant one at that. If so, then capitalism must be 
registered as being ‘co-eval’ 5  with any societies to which “it” can be traced as 
interacting with. 
All this can be evaded. If one recognises that ‘the fact of geopolitical multiplicity 
extends historically beyond any individual form of society’ with distinctive causal 
effects then they cannot be derived ‘from the particularities of any given mode of 
production, or even…of each and all of them considered individual and serially’ 
(Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008, p. 87). This does not mean that the mode of 
production (although more permissive terms like “logic” or “rules of reproduction” are 
preferable) should be dispensed with as an analytical form. On the contrary, the logic 
of reproduction must be captured because the abstractions of U&CD cannot in 
themselves ‘furnish the particularities of any given society’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg 
2008, p. 88). But it does entail that U&CD cannot be U&CD-“proper” if the logic of 
explanation begins with an a priori ‘pre-combination’ (and therefore ‘internalist’) logic 
																																																								
5 ‘Analytically prior’ and ‘coeval’ (Rosenberg 2006, p. 325 and 326) are both terms encountered above, to 
argue for the theoretical impossibility of conceiving the ‘societal’ without the ‘inter-societal’. 
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of reproduction. And that is the nature of capitalism in Anievas’ (and others’) 
treatment of U&CD.6 
 None of this, to indulge in one final clarification, means the term ‘capitalism’ must 
be disposed of in order to “do” U&CD. What it does mean is that in order to extend (or 
maintain) U&CD’s relevance for ‘peripheral’ and/or peasant societies which are 
incommensurable with the strict logic of the capitalist mode of production then 
matters should proceed in a ‘context-specific’ manner. That is, the premises of U&CD 
and its mechanisms must now be considered with direct reference to the specific 
historical context of Tanzania and the intellectual context of peasant-modernity 
incommensurability. 
II. Application of the method: modernity as fission and the 
citizen-peasant 
The specific concepts deployed by this thesis begin to emerge upon return to the 
broad understanding of Tanzania, Marx and Arusha and peasant and modernity 
derived from Chapters 1 and 2. Proceeding through that discussion these concepts 
emerge from the application of U&CD and are, in logical sequence: 
1. Modernity is (in substantial part) a process of fission; 
2. The peasant is a mutable element of that process, as such it is a protean 
subject of modernity; 
3. The broad notion of substitutionism from Section I is reiterated and its 
application to Tanzania discussed; 
4. The ramified social logic of reproduction that emerges from that process is 
specified as the political market; 
5. On the basis of (4) the citizen-peasant emerges as the theorised, but also 
concrete form of, hybridity in Tanzania that vindicates the re-reading of 
Marx and Arusha proposed by the thesis. 
The starting point then is to identify the relevant pattern of unevenness, including 
that which relates directly to an ‘inter-societal’7 dimension. Once again this is, in its 
essence, the problem of peasant difference vis-à-vis “western modernity” or, if one 																																																								
6 For completeness, it can also be added that this remains the case even with the addition of a narrative 
of the origins of capitalism if it nonetheless reasserts a logic of pre-combination as it then proceeds 
from that point of capitalism’s origins. 
7 Because the context for this discussion is now the 20th century ‘the international’ is also viable 
terminology. 
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prefers, capitalism.8 On one side stands a logic of reproduction that stems from capital-
labour relations, and on the other the peasantry’s unity of labour and property whose 
logic of reproduction is so different, as exemplified by Chayanov (Chayanov 1986, 
Bernstein 2009). Referring for simplicity’s to sake the former as modernity-A, it can be 
further stipulated that within its ambit is (if nothing else, the genesis of) industrialism 
and that its productive power is vastly greater than the Tanzanian peasant society 
which is the analytical base point. 
That this pattern obtains across political multiplicity in the 19th and 20th centuries 
is obvious, save that for a substantial portion of this time Tanzania was, along with so 
much of the rest of the globe, a colony of modernity-A societies. 9  The fact of 
colonialism does not trouble this account for two reasons. First, colonialism in a sense 
underlines the gap in productive power (unevenness in general). Second, multiplicity 
obtained before colonialism in a relevant sense, and more importantly still it has been 
continuous ever since the point of independence, which is the period the thesis is 
concerned with.10 All of which is to say that pressure of a geopolitical on Tanzania as a 
peasant society can be anticipated. 
Unsurprisingly, then, unevenness can be established straightforwardly enough. 
Proceeding to the role combined development plays, matters become a little more 
involved. The three dimensions of combination (interdependence at the level of events, 
structures and, finally, hybridity) requires vigilance for the historico-logical possibility 
of elements of modernity-A being subject to transfer to the peasant society (Tanzania). 
A priori, any social artefact associated with modernity-A could, in principle, transfer. 
This raises the first and most basic concept. The possibility of transfer of some 
aspects of modernity as a feature of the logic of U&CD looks rather like a process of 
fission. This is an analogy drawn from nuclear physics, in which a form of 
transmutation consists of an atom that may undergo a process in which constituent 
elements can split off. This in no way presupposes that its former state was incoherent 																																																								
8 This is not to necessarily endorse the view that in some pertinent sense capitalism can be understood 
in a ‘Eurocentric’ sense. Instead, the intention is to show that the subsequent approach does not depend 
on the success of a 'non-Eurocentric' account of capitalism’s origins (Hobson 2004, 2011, Anievas and 
Nisancioglu 2013). 
9 Germany from the late-19th to early 20th centuries, when it became a British Mandate in the aftermath 
of WWI until independence. In point of fact, this pertains to mainland Tanzania, then known as 
Tanganyika which became Tanzania upon unification with the islands of Zanzibar, which had been a 
British colony throughout, shortly after independence. 
10 Which is not to say that a U&CD analysis could not take within its ambit the colonial period as well. 
But that complication does not arise here. 
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(the original atom), but neither does it require that the new product reproduces the 
qualities of its former state. Indeed, its qualities may be radically different.11 All of 
which is to say that some technological and social features of modernity-A might 
transfer through U&CD processes without the capital-labour relation also being 
reproduced. 
Following closely on the heels of fissile modernity is the notion that, again only as 
a logical possibility for now, the peasant social form experiencing the effects of that 
fission might be an active agent in the process of combined development that ensues.12 
If allowance is made that some fission is sufficient to mandate the term modernity, 
then it must also be said that it has become conceivable for the peasant to participate 
in it. Taking that thought forward, it can be reasonably anticipated that the peasant 
could well both itself be changed and be an agent of change in that process. In 
consequence it can be said that the peasant is thereby (potentially) a protean subject of 
modernity. Out of all this arises the possibility of multiple types of modernity, that is, 
modernity-B.13 
None of the foregoing establishes a theoretically informed methodology for 
surpassing the incommensurability of peasant and modernity. Doing so means 
returning to the mechanism(s) that might reveal processes of combined development 
in action. The previous Section outlined a deliberately broadened notion of 
substitution, taking within its ambit the geopolitically driven transfer (substitution) of 
social artefacts that resulted in the reinforcement of the social structure. That 
reinforcement was argued to be the general logic of reproduction, and that same 
definition can be taken forward here. 
How any such processes might work is a matter of empirical argument, and that 
will only emerge in detail as the forthcoming Chapters proceed. Postponing their 
specification for now, something can nonetheless be said about the nature of the 
transmuted logic of reproduction that emerges out of that process of substitution. The 
term deployed in this thesis for this is the political market. 
The inspiration for this term comes from a work on Tanzanian socialism which 
advances a sophisticated version of modernisation theory to develop a reading of 																																																								
11 In contrast, a process of fusion can be thought of as the addition of new elements to an original 
starting point. 
12 As opposed to a local elite being the only identifiable “domestic” agent. 
13 Because it is based on the notion of interactivity drawn from U&CD, it is therefore very different from 
the ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002) literature which proceeds on the basis of separate 
and different cultures reaching their own accommodations with the challenge of modernity. 
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Tanzania and its ‘uncaptured peasantry’ (Hydén 1980).14 In a brief comment, he refers 
to policies in Tanzania which ‘in the wake of the Arusha Declaration [were] to replace 
the capitalist market with the political market-place as the principal forum for 
interaction with the peasants’ [my emphases] (Hydén 1980, p. 131). The thrust of this 
argument was supposed to establish how distinct this institution (the political market) 
was from the capitalist market, because the peasant was uncaptured and non-
dependent on the market. This, Hydén was sure, was antithetical to development and 
the achievement of modernity, and disastrous in that sense. 
Taking the thought in a quite different direction to suggests that this was the 
essence of the emergent logic of reproduction, two elements of the political market are 
identified. The first, which is broadly in line with Hydén’s meaning but put to a 
different purpose, is that politically equal citizens in Tanzania were able to make 
effective claims on the state for the provision of various social goods. Thus, even to the 
extent one might have been able to identify any incipient process of dispossession of 
the peasant, that was fundamentally subverted by a competitive and ultimately 
victorious logic of political equality. 
Crucially, the state’s ability to actually make significant provision along these lines 
depended on the geopolitically driven transfer of key social and technological transfers 
to Tanzania (crucially, a substantial element of which were actually from Maoist 
China). Simply put, without these transfers, the productive capacity of Tanzania as a 
‘peasant society’ could not have made even remotely similar provision. At least not, 
that is, on the basis of political equality. Whilst it might have been possible to make 
selective provision to certain areas and ethnic groups, that would have been 
antithetical to the establishment of political equality. And that equality was crucial to 
the process under consideration. Of most significance in that regard was that its basis 
in political equality was essential to forestall both geopolitical pressures and domestic 
instability. 
On the other hand, the second, equally important, dimension to the political 
market goes beyond Hydén’s original notion. This is ‘developmental’ in a relatively 
straightforward sense. In the absence of being ‘captured’ in the market-dependent 
sense, the operation of the political market in the first sense (state provision) induced 
the Tanzanian peasant to nevertheless enter into, and intensify, a set of reproductive 
behaviours that went beyond subsistence. That state provision not only boosted 																																																								
14 Curiously, this was a text that Mamdani took particular objection to, dismissing the ‘uncaptured 
peasant’ as the epitome of ‘history by analogy’ (Mamdani 1996, pp. 12–13). 
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productivity in terms of physical capacity, it also encouraged it since enhanced state 
provision had increased the infrastructure available to actually market any surplus and 
the commodities available throughout the countryside that could in turn be purchased 
by the peasantry. Thus with the addition of the second sense of the political market is 
that this was a logic of reproduction which was expansionary but without market 
dependence; indeed, it contrasts that notion of dependence with these exchange 
relations in the political market which are closer to the notion of market as opportunity. 
It was in these regards that the U&CD-processes identified in the thesis are 
explicable through what has been called substitution. The theoretically explicable 
introduction of various social artefacts, were both substituted into peasant social 
relations and in turn allowed the peasant itself to substitute for ‘commercial’ classes 
and politically-active citizens elsewhere.15 Through this dual-aspect substitutionism the 
ultimate result was as anticipated: strengthening of the general social logic of 
reproduction. The peasant was both physically better able to produce, and embedded 
in a set of social relations that likewise encouraged production to an appreciable extent. 
The upshot was a more durable set of social relations and a more durable socio-
political structure atop them. 
That said, it is necessary to add that the extent of that expansion was very limited; 
as the forthcoming Chapters will make clear, these relations in no way yielded 
abundant production. The political market as understood here must not be 
romanticised in this (or any other) sense. The point, however, is not to pass comment 
on its success or failure in these terms alone. For whatever else it did or did not achieve, 
it did emerge as a durable logic of reproduction and, as such, a viable analytic category 
of significance for the incommensurability problem. 
As anticipated, whilst it can be said that the social structure was reinforced in a 
general sense, its effect was simultaneously in the nature of radical differentiation. 
Finally, then, the political market’ reproductive logic also founds the ultimate 
sociological claim for peasant-modern hybridity. This is encapsulated as the citizen-
peasant. Citizenship connotes the centrality of political equality, whilst peasant 
indicates that in a meaningful sense the core characteristic of the peasantry has been 
maintained: the unity of labour and property. That said, citizenship reaches deep into 
the constitution of both the labour and property because political equality was so vital 																																																								
15 Thus, ultimately, this second element of substitution is significantly closer to Trotsky’s original usage. 
It is for this reason that the term is retained, in spite of the risk of idiosyncrasy, rather than attempting 
to generate novel nomenclature. 
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to its new, reinforced logic of reproduction. Thus citizenship fundamentally qualifies, 
and differentiates, peasant-ness. 
Meanwhile peasant-ness qualifies citizenship in a vital way too. For this is not 
citizenship in the sense of civil society, standing on the separation of politics and 
economics that is characteristic of capitalist-modernity. This is because these citizens, 
as peasants, are not separated from their means of production. One consequence of 
this is that ‘market forces’ in a Tanzanian context do not have the same impersonal, 
apolitical nature to the same extent that is associated with capitalist-modernity. This 
has deep and abiding influence on the content, tenor and trajectory of Tanzanian 
politics. A central element thereto is that citizen-peasants, poor farmers living in 
relatively remote villages, have through various entrenched political processes real 
means to advance claims to ownership over strategic assets and decisions of the 
nation.16 
The identification of the citizen-peasant as the product of a theorisable process 
through U&CD allows the enjoyment of two intellectual dividends. In so doing the 
“facts on the ground” in Tanzania can be more easily drawn into a coherent whole. In 
particular, it steers clears of the pitfalls of either deeming Tanzania/African/peasant 
difference as mere ‘idiosyncrasy’ or an index of its ‘backwardness’ and ‘failure’. Second, 
building on the first, it becomes possible to integrate post-colonial Tanzania with 
broader world historical or historical sociological readings which have necessarily had 
to confront the difficulties around peasant societies in the modern world. This includes 
grand theoretical work like Barrington Moore’s (1966) but also extends, for example, to 
analyses of the “rise of China” in which the role of the peasant in modern China has 
attracted so much attention (Day 2013).17 Thus in this mooted reconciliation of Marx 
and Arusha, the project also contributes to Du Bois’ aspiration: to read African 
histories as histories that were both particular and part of world history nonetheless. 
Conclusion: the re-reading sketched 
																																																								
16 There is a danger of over-claiming here. The suggestion is not that ‘market forces’ have none of the 
connotations they do in the sense anticipated by theories around the ‘separation of politics and 
economics’. Chapters 6 and 7 will reflect on this issue at greater length. 
17 Another example would be the East Asian developmental states (Woo-Cumings 1999), such as Taiwan 
(Gray 2011, 2014, Amsden 1985), in which land reform has been a deeply significant feature. 
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Reinhard Bendix, in his famous article on ‘tradition and modernity’ (1967), points 
to some of the possibilities which the argument under consideration draw attention to. 
Beginning with a rehearsal of the core sociological notion of modernity he wrote: 
‘The permanent separation of workers from their ties to the land obviously facilitates 
the growth of class consciousness and of political organization in Marx's sense of the 
word...[whereas] continuation of these ties may result either in a weak commitment to 
industry (and hence weak group solidarity)’  
But, he continued, if in the alternative such ties remained in place that eventuality 
could have important and no less modern results, including: 
‘the emergence of segmental peasant-worker alliances in urban and national politics. 
Where this latter alternative exists, one can begin to appreciate how important it is to 
consider such phenomena in their own right, rather than treat them as transitions that 
are expected to disappear with increasing modernization. We do not know after all 
what forms modernization might take where separation between town and 
countryside fails to occur, at least for a considerable period of time’ (Bendix 1967, pp. 
341–2). 
The abstract analysis presented here, and to a great extent the empirical fleshing 
out that proceeds in the following chapters, is related to the possibility that Bendix 
anticipates. Whilst the context of the citizen-peasant features even less involvement of 
industry than in Bendix’s notion in a societal sense, the logic of U&CD which the 
argument follows depends on industry elsewhere. 
The project also reconnects theory with peasant agency. ‘[P]easant mobilization 
within and against the neoliberal project, on a world scale, is politically engaged in a 
way, and for a cause’ that Philip McMichael (2008, p. 207) argues is ‘rendered 
unthinkable by classical social theory’. Whilst that claim is supported by Chapter 2, the 
argument of this Chapter has been that it can nonetheless be rendered thinkable by 
the theoretical innovation that is U&CD. In this sense, although via a markedly 
different approach methodologically speaking, it is an argument that will hopefully 
prove to be complementary to those that look ‘to shift epistemological gears and 
examine the peasant movement through its own discursive practices’ (McMichael 2008, 
p. 207).  
The remainder of the thesis follows the framework set out in this Chapter, 
deploying and developing the concepts which it has identified. Chapter 4 begins at the 
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point of Tanzanian independence, sketching its place in an uneven world historical 
context and the peculiar pattern of international interaction that engendered. Most 
significant of all were the relations established between Tanzania and Maoist China, 
neatly encapsulated by Nyerere as relations of ‘unequal equals’. These were of deep 
significance because they were an additional element of interaction across unevenness, 
with distinctive causal effects from more familiar patterns of unevenness of the west 
vis-à-vis Tanzania. Indeed, relations with China were significant in the further sense 
that they also served to impel changes in Tanzanian’s relations with the west. 
This prepares the ground for Chapter 5, which proceeds to examine ‘African 
Socialism’ and the Arusha programme that was a response to these patterns of 
unevenness. Out of this programmatic response a historical process took hold; and 
with it the central claims of the thesis begin to emerge. It identifies that the patterns of 
unevenness and geopolitics examined in Chapter 4 had the substitutional nature 
Chapter 3 has anticipated. As that process is played out the most crucial features of the 
thesis emerge in full across Chapter 5: the political market and the citizen-peasant.  
Chapter 6 continues to trace that combined form into the neo-liberal era, showing 
how the citizen-peasant was an entrenched and durable feature of Tanzanian 
modernity beyond its originating context. It further argues that this form was neither 
eliminated by a fresh onslaught of neoliberalism, nor was it just a residue of either 
‘tradition’ or bygone socialism. Rather the citizen-peasant was continuing in its career 
as a protean subject of modernity, there even being some early signs that the logic of 
the political market was extending out beyond the village to encompass a more 
nationwide, strategic dimension. With this the mooted reconciliation of Marx and 
Arusha is complete, the citizen-peasant is recognised as having been central to 
Tanzanian social relations and its place in the world up to the conclusion of the 20th 
century. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with reflection on the implications of the argument. It 
proceeds with consideration of the arguments bearing on understandings of the 
contemporary conjuncture as ‘globalisation’ or ‘liberal order’. Thereafter it concludes 
with a set of methodological reflections. 
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Chapter 4: Unevenness, state formation and 
survival in Tanzania, 1961-1967 
‘We have survived’ 
 Julius K. Nyerere, describing his greatest achievement (Shivji 1995, pp. 158–9). 
‘The friendship between Tanzania and the People's Republic of China is a friendship 
between most unequal equals. Perhaps for that reason some other nations of the world 
find it hard to understand’ 
- Julius K. Nyerere, 21 June 1968 (Nyerere 1973, p. 40). 
Introduction 
This Chapter begins the process of applying the interactive methodology to post-
colonial Tanzania. Providing a broad narrative of the first years of independence, 1961-
1967, a series of crises are analysed. What this reveals are three planes of unevenness 
that impinged on Tanzania in this period. Each plays a foundational role to the 
overarching analysis the thesis subsequently develops, the causal significance of each 
building progressively over the course of the Chapter. 
The first two planes of unevenness are largely anticipated by African Studies, and 
are reflected in two of the major themes of Chapter 1. The first is the unevenness 
flowing from the heritage of colonial-modernity visible in Tanzania’s social structure. 
The second, building on the first, is the inequality of the international system as 
confronted by Tanzania in the 1960s. Taken together, these two planes show that the 
conditions in which post-colonial Tanzania found itself were so disobliging that ‘failure’ 
seemed likely from the outset. 
The severe difficulties these patterns engendered are examined by particular 
reference to the resistance that the Nyerere government faced in the years before the 
Arusha Declaration. A signal moment of which was the Army Mutiny of 1964. So severe 
was both the general condition, and the Mutiny in particular, that Nyerere would 
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repeatedly refer to mere survival as his greatest achievement. 1  Furthermore this 
achievement, and its apparent improbability, yields a recurrent temptation to analyse 
Tanzania (and often Nyerere too) in romantic terms, an intellectual condition Ali 
Mazrui (1997) diagnosed as ‘Tanzaphilia’. 
The promised reconciliation of Marx and Arusha ultimately offers a theoretically 
sensitive escape route from said ‘Tanzaphilia’ and, turning to the second epigraph to 
the Chapter, a preliminary resource for doing so is found in the third plane of 
unevenness. Looking to a particular pattern in Tanzanian international relations that 
began to emerge in this era, those between it and Maoist China, its consequences are 
considered. This was undoubtedly a form of unevenness, referred to by Nyerere as a 
‘friendship between most unequal equals’. In a sense, then, the third plane of 
unevenness is in fact an aspect of the second; that is, these relations of unequal equals 
were just another set of diplomatic relations. 
But in another sense they would be so deeply consequential that it is worth 
underlining their distinctiveness by designating it as a third feature of unevenness. 
Their central importance is due to the key role they play in understanding the process 
of substitution Chapter 5 will focus on. Nevertheless, there was a more immediate 
impact which is covered in this Chapter; for the early consequence of relations with 
Maoist China was to alleviate the various crises confronted by Nyerere’s government 
long enough to provide a sort of “breathing space” that allowed Nyerere to embark on 
the Arusha Declaration programme. 
 Matters proceed in two Sections. Section I examines what is referred to as the 
state-nation building problem, a problem that was particularly exacerbated by the first 
plane of unevenness, the heritage of colonial-modernity. This specifies how the 
Tanzanian state was beset by a lack of capacity to deal with the problems that its 
colonial heritage imposed. In the face of these problems, Nyerere’s ‘survival’ does 
indeed seem surprising. More surprising still, it turns out that not only did the 
government survive but the 1960s are now interpreted as being the key to Tanzania’s 
subsequent renown as stable and peaceful, with a robust but non-ethnic, non-sectarian 
sense of national identity (Bjerk 2015, Hunter 2015). In short, the problems inherent in 
this plane of unevenness seem, somehow, to have been overcome. 																																																								
1 This first epigraph should be broadly construed. There is a sense in which every sovereign state in 
Africa has ‘survived’ in the sense that the loss of formal sovereignty since decolonization has not been a 
substantial feature of African politics. However, survival in the broader sense - of the state, ruling party, 
Nyerere himself and his political programme - was, as this Chapter uncovers, very much in doubt. 
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Section II turns more directly to unevenness across an international dimension. It 
begins by setting out the international relations of Tanzania with “the west”. Whereas 
it had been imagined that these would be benevolent in a developmental sense, 
thereby alleviating some of the difficulties encountered in Section I, this was not to be. 
Indeed, this plane of unevenness was, in fact, a further dimension of that original 
problem. 
This begins to yield the key point of the Chapter. Both the colonial heritage and 
international inequality planes of unevenness are best understood as features of one 
broad pattern of unevenness. Each are aspects of the infelicities involved in Tanzanian 
integration into the modern world; the general pattern of unevenness, then, is that 
between modern world2 and Tanzania. And that unevenness mirrors, to an extent, the 
intellectual problem of incommensurability between peasant society and modernity.  
Finally, then, the same Section turns toward relations with China. Before 
proceeding, it is worth adverting to a limitation in the extent of this Chapter’s 
argument. Rather like contemporary interest in ‘China in Africa’ (Brautigam 2009, 
Shinn and Eisenman 2012, A’Zami 2015), ‘Maoist China’s’ relations with Africa attracted 
considerable, often anxious, scrutiny in the 1960s and 70s (Cooley 1965, Ogunsanwo 
1974, Hutchinson 1975). Moreover, Tanzania’s relations with China were amongst the 
most prominent of all, both then (Bailey 1973, 1976, Yu 1975) and now (Baregu 2008, 
Kamata 2013). 
Yet these were understood as notable developments only in terms of geopolitics or, 
often for propagandistic purposes, as a passing feature of Cold War politics. Whilst this 
Chapter will make the basic “breathing space” point alluded to above, pushing beyond 
these perceptions and on to the real causal significance of Sino-Tanzanian relations 
requires something further. They must be placed in the context of the overarching 
process of combined development in Tanzania. This intellectual labour, and the 
epicentre of the empirical part of the thesis, is the task of Chapter 5. 
I. State-nation building: capacity and survival 
Recent literature has focussed on what Mahmood Mamdani (2012, p. 108) calls 
‘Nyerere's seminal achievement: creating an inclusive citizenship and building a 
nation-state’ (Aminzade 2003, 2013a, 2013b, Pallotti 2009, Bjerk 2010, 2015, Mamdani 
2012, pp. 106–25, Hunter 2015). Not only is the notion the basis of what eventually 																																																								
2 This is a broad, indicative designation and not intended in a technical sense. 
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becomes a political ‘success’ versus economic (Arusha’s developmental programme) 
‘failure’ narrative (Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333, 2014b), it is an achievement that is all 
the more remarkable for having emerged in a newly independent country marked by 
all the features of colonial-modernity. 
Chapter 1 noted in Mamdani’s idea of the bifurcation of citizen and subject (1996). 
In particular, this consisted of a hierarchically multi-racial – black, Asian and white – 
order where the privileges of citizenship were variously linked to racial identity and 
urban dwelling. Meanwhile the majority were, in accordance with Mamdani’s general 
sketch, governed as subjects via indirect rule (the Native Authority) and no less multi-
ethnic (with over 100 tribes) a political order than other comparable African countries. 
Alongside this Tanzania exhibited plenty of linguistic diversity and, at the point of 
independence, no cohesive shared national identity.  
Given this the pronounced shift in scholarship on Tanzania away from taking the 
nation-state for granted, and most especially opposed to its treatment as a 
straightforward facsimile of ‘classic’ western, 19th century nationalism, is both welcome 
and necessary (Bjerk 2015, Hunter 2015). For instance, as Aminzade (2013a, pp. 6–7) 
points out, a defining feature of Tanzanian nationalism was that it was built on the 
constraint rather than mobilisation of ethnicity. 
That said, their unpacking of the historical contingency and difference in 
Tanzanian nationalism, primarily through mobilising a discursive methodology (Bjerk 
2015, Hunter 2015), has its limitations. Firstly, the occasional implication that 
Tanzanian nationalism was a discursive achievement of the 1960s underestimates quite 
how drawn out a process its achievement was. Indeed, an upshot of this thesis’ 
argument is that this achievement rests primarily on the citizen-peasant form which 
emerges in the 1970s (Chapter 5). 
Second, these processes cannot be entirely apprehended by discursive 
methodologies. At every step along the way the policies that led to this political 
success were deeply contested, perhaps even especially so before the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967. Whilst much of that contention was itself of a discursive nature, it 
was also contended in a deeply material sense too. One major instance of this, to be 
examined in detail, is the Army Mutiny of 1964. Not only does the Mutiny highlight the 
existential threat that existed, it also points to the state’s very limited capacity that was 
material as well as ideational. To underline this, it is worth recognising that to resolve 
the mutiny Nyerere had to call on the British for assistance. Deeply compounding his 
humiliation in having to do so, the Mutiny that came close to toppling Nyerere was 
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briskly resolved, ultimately with little fuss, by a force of a mere 60 British marines 
equipped with a helicopter (Clapham 1998, p. 147). Few things highlight the very 
limited material capacities of the Tanzania as this, but it also brings into clear view the 
unevenness involved in all this: an existential threat to Tanzania was extremely minor 
in the face of British power. 
Developing this point, this section now proceeds to sketch the powerful segments 
of society opposed to the Nyerere government’s programme and the form Tanzanian 
nationalism would eventually take. Specifying the incapacity problem (state weakness 
plus powerful resistance) reveals it as a manifestation of the uneven heritage of 
colonialism. 
The uneven heritage of colonialism 
Nyerere was fond of pointing out that at the end of colonial rule, ‘there were 2 
trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited’ (Bunting 1999, 
Kamuzora 2010, p. 102). He was doing more than pointing to the limitations of 
colonialism and the need for development. In addition, and in characteristically 
homespun fashion, he was pointing to the deep unevenness that characterised 
Tanzania’s place in the world in 1961. 
‘2 engineers and 12 doctors’ is also suggestive of Tanzania’s very limited enjoyment 
of the status symbols of modernity more generally. Its situation can be reviewed as 
follows. With little or no industry to speak of, a bureaucracy that was both limited in 
capacity and staffed in its upper echelons by British workers that would leave within a 
few years, a particularly weak and under-resourced military and security force and, 
finally, overwhelmingly populated by subsistence farmers/peasants that produced a 
modest surplus at best (Aminzade 2013a, chap. 2).3 Nyerere and the Tanzanian elite – 
nor anyone else – could hardly doubt their unfavourable position at the hard, uneven 
end of modernity. 
Up to this point in time Tanzania’s place in colonial-modernity lay in its provision 
of a handful of ‘cash-crops’. A significant minority of its peasant-farmers were engaged 
in non-subsistence production along these lines, producing coffee, cotton and tea. Far 
less common, meanwhile, were a handful of sizeable sisal and tobacco plantations 
producing on a more capital-intensive basis (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 31–37). Such limited 																																																								
3 This was anything but a situation of an "overdeveloped" postcolonial state in Alavi's sense (1972, Leys 
1976, p. 42). 
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infrastructure as was constructed in the colonial era flowed almost entirely to those 
areas that produced those crops. 
Central to the nationalistic programme of Nyerere’s TANU party was strict 
adherence to the principle of formal equality amongst all Tanzanians. (The language of 
citizenship is not, in this most basic sense, a Eurocentric misreading.) Fundamental to 
understanding that programme is recognition that it amounts to an aspiration to 
reform the political inequality of citizen and subject that was at the heart of colonial 
governance. That pattern of governance was, as observed in Chapter 1 and by Mamdani 
himself, functional to the operation of colonial modernity. And, in embarking on this 
programme, the government would soon find that they had provoked a series of 
contentious reactions over the proper place of ‘race’ and ‘tribe’ (Mamdani 2012, p. 109). 
The argument that follows develops the proposition that much of that contestation 
was a feature of unevenness. 
The reason that ‘race’ proved so contentious was the very pronounced pressure for 
‘Africanisation’ policies. In essence these were demands for race-based affirmative 
action, hopes for which had been aroused by many independence advocates that had 
based their arguments on reversing colonial racial hierarchies. Moreover, in the early 
years of independence those racial hierarchies remained very visible. Many civil 
servants were white (British), as was almost every single senior army officer. 
Meanwhile Asians were a major commercial presence, owning and operating many key 
enterprises at the intersection between the colonial cash-cropping system and the 
world market. Thus Africanisation was very popular amongst urban Tanzanians, seen 
as an opportunity to take over these positions of privilege; unsurprisingly, the pressure 
they exerted on the Nyerere government to pursue this path was tremendous 
(Mamdani 2012, pp. 109–124). 
So much so, in fact, that at least some gestures toward Africanisation proved 
necessary under Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa in 1962 (Pratt 1976, pp. 124–126). 
President Nyerere, on the other hand, remained implacably opposed to compromise on 
the issue of formal equality, least of all in racial terms. Whilst readily accepting that 
racial composition had, necessarily, to move toward proportionality he refused to do so 
in any way that compromised the equality of every Tanzanian citizen. TANU became 
increasingly associated with Nyerere’s personal stance in the course of the 1960s, whilst 
the opposition ANC (African National Congress) sought to exploit that by ever more 
firmly linking itself to Africanisation. Not coincidentally the ANC, along with 
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significant Trades Union support, were subsequently linked (but not in straightforward 
ways) with the 1964 Mutiny (Mamdani 2012, p. 110). 
Before arriving at the Mutiny, and to complete the point around the general 
unevenness inherited from colonial-modernity, the structural basis of those 
oppositional forces’ power stands to be identified. If the first obstacle to formal 
equality was the temptation amongst some to try and assume positions of privilege 
(citizenship for some) in the guise of Africanisation, there is a second too. This was the 
other side of Mamdani’s binary, subject, a category that takes in ethnicity (tribe), 
Native Authority and indirect rule. Indelibly linked with the colonial project of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, it was the difference that achieved the integration of colonial 
Tanzania with the “outside” world of modernity. That is, constituting the majority of 
the populace as subjects in this sense facilitated both governance in general and the 
procurement of cash crops in particular; and, moreover, this was done without the 
reproduction of the relations of capitalist-modernity. 
It was atop this structural, political inequality that the privilege of citizenship sat. 
Underlying Nyerere’s passionate opposition to any formal inequality, aside from 
particular distaste for racialised thought, was the firm conviction that reform of 
colonial governance had to stretch to the relations between citizen and subject. Indeed 
the extension of citizenship across the country, rural and urban, is the core of ‘Arusha’ 
(Mamdani 2012, pp. 119–123). 
It was this conviction, as the Mutiny episode demonstrates, that goes to the heart 
of contention in this period. It evidences (relatively) powerful urban classes that 
sought primarily to take over those privileged, racialised positions of power within the 
structure of citizen and subject; a point Nyerere sought to make with regularity in 
these years (Nyerere 1967). Indeed, it was the heart of his concern in the Arusha 
Declaration around models that might “develop” urban areas at the cost of the peasant 
as discovered in Chapter 1. 
The Mutiny as unevenness 
The 1964 Mutiny has, fortunately, been recognised as a key event and received 
extended treatment by several writers as such (Bienen 1967, chap. XI, Pratt 1976, pp. 
178–9, Parsons 2003, Barany 2012, pp. 286–90). What can be derived from this body of 
work in particular is that even the limited machinery of power available to the post-
colonial state - its military - was deeply unreliable because of the way the colonial 
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heritage of Tanzania influenced its politics in the direction of a contest for privilege. 
This was especially pronounced by 1964 given that the new Nyerere government had 
repeatedly made clear that it would frustrate the desire for Africanisation. 
The Army was formed of those colonial units that happened to have been stationed 
in colonial Tanganyika, whereas British colonial forces as a whole had been organised 
on a larger East African basis. Thus independent Kenya inherited the headquarters, 
better-equipped units and most of the logistical support. Tanzania, meanwhile, was left 
with a total of 1,000 poorly equipped personnel, led by British officers since (virtually) 
no Africans had been trained to officer level. So bad was the reputation of the 
Tanganyika Rifles that it soon became known as ‘a refuge for up-country illiterates’ 
(Barany 2012, p. 285). 
Nevertheless, its personnel had clear expectations of advancement upon 
independence. And frustration began to grow with the prolonged reliance on British 
officers to the disgruntlement not only of the Army itself but also many Nationalist 
voices in public discourse  (Yu 1975, p. 99). ‘In other words’, points out Barany, ‘native 
soldiers could wonder with good reason whether they were serving in the army of their 
own sovereign state’ (2012, p. 285). It can be added that they were likely also wondering 
what that meant for their own prospects. 
The picture had changed somewhat by time of the Mutiny in 1964. Although the 
Army remained modest, it had increased to roughly 2,000 soldiers (Bienen 1967, p. 363). 
And it was this force which would now prove itself to be a major challenge to Nyerere 
and his government. Modelled still on the British ideal, this was supposed to be an 
apolitical army with promotions based on merit and some black African officers had 
begun to be promoted (Bienen 1967, p. 363). 
The Mutiny began with wage complaints and quickly grew into a demand for rapid 
acceleration in the substitution of Tanzanian for British officers. Although, on the 
balance of evidence, the mutiny was not intended to be a full-blown coup, the threat it 
posed nonetheless surely highlights the state’s chronic weakness. For it had no 
immediate alternative support base to turn to. With Nyerere in hiding, the mutineers 
resolved to seize the radio and police stations, airports, railways and the State House. 
Events were moving so rapidly that, having begun on a Sunday night (19th January 
1964), by the Monday morning Dar es Salaam was under their control. With Nyerere 
already in hiding, ‘[r]umors were rife, one of which was that the TANU government 
had fallen’ (Bienen 1967, p. 366). 
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This was not an isolated episode. The wage complaint component of the Mutineers’ 
demands aroused both the interest and pronounced sympathy of the urban labour 
movement, to the extent that a General Strike was rumoured to be planned in support 
of the Mutineers (Bienen 1967, chap. IX). In addition, and compounding the sense of 
chaos, looting had broken out in Dar es Salaam with a pronouncedly racial component, 
targeting Asian areas and businesses. Finally, mutiny also spread to the only other 
Army barracks in the country, Tabora, which stood at the centre of the country and 
through which all the major rail links ran, connecting cash crop producing regions 
with the port of Dar es Salaam (Bienen 1967, p. 366).  
Not only had urban society expressed its dissatisfaction in clear terms, the state’s 
links to the countryside, such as they were, had been broken too. Nyerere’s control 
over both aspects of governance as bequeathed by colonial-modernity teetered on the 
brink. Urban-citizens were actively discontented, and the hollowness of professions to 
exert control and reform rural society had been made clear. Even though TANU 
continued to rule outside Dar es Salaam (Bienen 1967, p. 380), it was not able rule it as 
a coherent whole with urban interests in a state of advanced discontent. 
There is a danger of over-extending the point here. Even at the peak of the 
opposition to Nyerere, this was not a fully organised opposition intent on seizing 
power. Nonetheless their power, and the danger it posed, was derived from structurally 
located strength that accrued through urban-citizenship. As noted above, whilst the 
immediate danger was eventually relieved by British intervention, the structural 
difficulties they highlighted had not gone away. Who, then, in January 1964 would have 
bet on Nyerere staying in power, much less instituting a radical reform programme 
along the lines of Arusha three years later?  
Yet, soon after the Mutiny the government embarked upon a series of 
authoritarian reforms. The Army was dismissed en masse and fundamentally 
reorganised. In particular, it was directly politicised and membership of TANU became 
an expectation of armed force personnel. The clear design of the scheme, which 
succeeded, was to allow Nyerere to exercise direct control over the Army and 
command its loyalty. He would later describe the Mutiny as an opportunity that 
‘enabled us to build an army from scratch. Many institutions we have inherited, but the 
army is something we built ourselves’ (Barany 2012, p. 286). Alongside this, trades 
unions were brought under state control and some 200 of the movement’s leaders were 
arrested. The following year a one-party state was established in 1965, which would last 
until the 1990s. Indeed, TANU (renamed CCM, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Party of the 
		
79	
Revolution in the 1970s) has governed Tanzania continuously from independence to 
the present day. 
These reforms are the first major institutional step of Nyerere’s greatest 
achievement, survival. With the achievement of single party rule, the taming of the 
Army and trades unions there would be no further close calls for Nyerere. Even with all 
the trials and tribulations experienced in Tanzania in the decades to come, no crisis 
ever led to the sort of chaos of January 1964; and Nyerere himself remained in power 
until 1985. For the moment the rapid achievement of stability in the aftermath of the 
Mutiny until the Arusha Declaration is a historical moment of “breathing space”. 
Relieved for a time of the pressures that made 1964 so difficult, this was crucial to allow 
the subsequent emergence of the Arusha programme. Turning to the second plane of 
unevenness, the expressly international dimension, Section II shall begin thinking 
through where the ability to complete these reforms and achieve that “breathing space” 
came from. 
For now, though, what does this sketch of the Mutiny reveal about the first plane 
of unevenness? It emphasises the power, at the time, of urban sections of society. The 
predominant interests of which were in increased wages, urban investment and 
occupying positions of privilege previously occupied by colonial elites. If not directly 
antithetical to reform of the bifurcation of citizen and subject, it was far from a priority.  
Much of the strength of these groups flowed from the absence of an alternative 
power base for Nyerere at the time. The rural population was not just weakened by the 
inequality inscribed into the political system of colonial-modernity, they were also 
physically remote from the urban centre of power. Only the chief cash-crop producing 
regions enjoyed substantial infrastructural connections to Dar es Salaam, and even 
those had been shown to be vulnerable in the event of strife. Infrastructure aside, this 
was a rural population that was mostly scattered throughout the countryside, and non-
cash crop regions’ population were living in single homesteads or small hamlets rather 
than anything as large as a village (Berry 1970, Mascarenhas 1979). In effect these 
features meant that ‘a relatively unmobilised peasantry’ (Arrighi and Saul 1968, p. 166) 
was overdetermined.  
Thus the field of political action was more or less clear for urban interests to 
predominate. Yet demands for increased privileges, such as wages, could not be 
satisfied except through increased surplus extraction from the peasantry and/or 
development; a point that is central to the Arusha Declaration. Not only would such a 
policy have entailed sticking to the bifurcated state, since that was the available basis 
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for surplus extraction from subjects, it was simply not possible given to further extend 
surplus extraction from such a small base, and for this reason Nyerere had set his face 
against it.4 
From a certain vantage point much of the foregoing has the appearance of being 
properly understood as combined development rather than unevenness.5 And in an 
important sense that is true; the bifurcated state, after all, could be taken as an 
example par excellence of combined development. Nevertheless, it has been discussed 
under the rubric of unevenness for a simple reason. What underlay the bifurcated state 
is a pattern of unevenness between capitalist-modernity and Tanzania, the essence of 
which was great power differential. That power differential remained obvious enough, 
witness the ease with which the British resolved the Mutiny. The particular nature of 
that pattern of unevenness was: modern industrial societies with major advantages in 
respect of power and agrarian-peasant society with the (sole/primary) interest to the 
former their ability to provide cash crops. That pattern was fundamental to the genesis 
of the bifurcated state and can be read as productive of combined development; but 
unevenness in this sense also remained very much in place, as Section II will discuss. 
II. ‘The Loss of Innocence’: International relations as the crucial 
plane of unevenness 
Pressing on to Tanzanian international relations in the 1960s as the second plane 
of unevenness, the sense in which it amounts to continuity in the basic pattern of 
unevenness of colonial modernity progressively emerges. The entire (uneven) structure 
on which urban privilege rested, which caused the difficulties outlined in Section I, was 
a colonial division of labour. Tanzania had been geared toward a role in that division of 
labour in colonial times as an expression, or consequence, of unevenness. And in the 
1960s many critical thinkers were convinced that remained the case, and for the most 
part they had a good case to make. Hence the real popularity of dependency and 
world-system theory in this period, especially in places like Tanzania where one of the 																																																								
4 These points are largely missed by the literature of the 1970s that saw the Tanzanian state as a class 
actor (Shivji 1976, Freyhold 1977, 1979, Mueller 1981, 1980, Raikes 1975, 1978, Saul 1979, pt. II). The 
dominant framework then was to view that state itself as attempting to optimise surplus extraction for 
itself. In effect, it was seen as having a very similar interest to urban interests as understood in this 
Chapter. 
5 Then again, if it is correct that there can never be a pre-combination society, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
then this is always true. Even so, the logic of U&CD analysis still begins with unevenness and proceeds 
to combination; existing combined forms can be re-registered as an aspect of unevenness for the 
analytical purposes, and that is the case here. 
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leading theorists of dependency in an African context was based for many years 
(Rodney 1972). 
Reading this unevenness as nonetheless obtaining across specifically international 
unevenness, the ground for erecting a U&CD analysis will further emerge. The 1960s 
were an era which Cranford Pratt, a Canadian academic but also a close personal friend 
of Nyerere, called ‘the loss of innocence’ (1976, chap. 6). In widening the analytical lens 
to include ‘the international’ as a key feature of unevenness, the significance of that 
loss emerges. In particular, it was discovered that independence would not enable 
Tanzania to successfully make demands on western nations for assistance to overcome 
the developmental gap. Unevenness would not melt away with sovereignty; far from it, 
in some senses it would amplify the problems associated with it. 
This section starts by setting out the naïve optimism of the early years of 
independence. Grand plans for development were produced, confident that ‘nature’ 
was, at long last, the only (remaining) enemy with the passing of colonialism. ‘From 
now on’, said Nyerere on independence, ‘we are fighting not man but nature’. Citing 
this, John Iliffe (1979, p. 576) notes disarmingly, ‘[b]ut it was more complicated than 
that’. Indeed, it was; the core argument advanced here is that this was the innocence 
that Nyerere and those around him would quickly have to shed. Rather than remove 
politics from the field of action, the realities of political multiplicity meant he had 
much more to worry about than ‘nature’ alone.6 
This imposed two major concerns. One was hostile, powerful neighbours: 
Apartheid South Africa, the Portuguese in Mozambique and white minority-ruled 
Rhodesia. The second was disobliging, at best, western powers; they would not 
generously fund those grand development plans as had been hoped. In both respects 
these were specifically internationally generated, or geopolitical problems, rendered so 
serious by the power differential between those various countries and Tanzania. But as 
it is unpacked, this second plane of unevenness reflection of the single, shared 
unevenness likewise becomes visible. 
Later in this Section, Nyerere’s discovery of another aspect of his international 
situation is followed. Casting around, with no small amount of desperation, for 
																																																								
6 All this evokes, of course, the theoretical claim advanced in chapter 2 around the limitations of social 
theory that focuses on reproduction which is in its essence a question of ‘man’s’ confrontation with 
‘nature’, see likewise Giovanni Arrighi’s (2007, p. 265) commentary on this broad point, suggesting that 
Marx could vindicate his theory ‘concerning the connection between the productive forces and social 
relations…only if he redefined the productive forces to include the production of protection’. 
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assistance in the face of the problems he had, the significance of the Bandung moment 
and incipient Third Worldism (Wright 1956, Tan and Acharya 2008, Lee 2010). In 
particular, Nyerere would discover in China and the friendship of unequal equals 
invaluable assistance. 
Early Independence and the 'loss of innocence' 
Underlying the frustration of development plans was the relative disinterest of the 
modern-industrialised world – both the West and Soviet Union - in Tanzania. It did 
not produce or extract any industrially important materials, its role in the colonial 
division of labour had been provision of cash crops. These crops were widely produced 
around the world and not especially valuable. Moreover, Tanzania's near neighbour, 
Kenya, was far more attractive to (Western) capital. ‘Kenya was more attractive’ it has 
been pointed out,  ‘given her “open door” policy and more developed infrastructure’ 
(Shaw and Msabaha 1981, p. 40). Disinterest in Tanzania also extended to a lack of 
strategic importance. Not only was Kenya seen as a more reliable partner to 
‘international imperialism’ in the East African region (Shivji 1976, p. 34); the region 
itself was not a site of serious Cold War contention in the 1960s. 
Amidst this disinterest, Tanzania entered the post-colonial stage hoping to procure 
capital transfers to a developmental end; it is for this reason that ‘loss of innocence’ 
epitomises the period. Lacking ‘the “traditional” variables of power’ such as ‘industrial 
base, strategic minerals, and military power’ (Shaw and Msabaha 1981, p. 70), the first 
Five Year plan was entirely dependent on its expectation of very substantial capital 
assistance from the western world. Amid increasingly contentious international 
politics, the western world soon proved its relative disinterest and unwillingness to 
fund those development projects. Moreover, soon enough a series of international 
crises would ensue between 1964-67 that expressed the contradictions of Tanzania’s 
position. 
The first Five Year plan’s assumption was that 78% of its (already ambitious) 
development budget would be financed externally by the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the great powers of the Cold War world (World Bank 1961). To say that this ‘failed 
to materialize’ is an understatement, whilst some limited support primarily through 
the World Bank was achieved, it was a small fraction of the amount sought (Yu 1975, 
pp. 83–5, Mushi 1981). The Soviet Union likewise offered very little capital assistance to 
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Tanzania and even then on even less favourable terms (Pratt 1976, pp. 159–60, Pallotti 
2009, p. 75). 
The international crises that would follow this disappointment exhibit a pattern. 
Each crisis, considered below, involved western powers using offers of (actually rather 
limited) aid as leverage over Tanzania; in turn, Nyerere would insist on rebuffing those 
threats. By the mid-1960s Tanzania would find itself at odds with the UK, West 
Germany and, to a lesser extent, the USA. 
A further aspect of these crises were that they were sometimes provoked by the 
presence of those colonial and white minority regimes. These powers both opposed 
Tanzania, and in turn Tanzania had adopted a strong anti-colonial anti-racist stance. It 
supported independence movements where possible, including allowing the use of its 
territory to guerrillas, co-ordinating international support and regularly reiterating the 
case for the full decolonisation of Africa in international for a (Pratt 1976, p. 152). 
To a great extent this stance was about establishing Tanzania's internal and 
external legitimacy (Pallotti 2009, p. 82). In the absence of serious development 
assistance, Nyerere saw crises with major powers as an opportunity to assert Tanzanian 
sovereignty. Likewise, a strong anti-colonial stance played a key role in both domestic 
legitimacy and enhanced Tanzanian standing in the wider Third World. 
But principled anti-colonialism was also a reflection of security concerns. 
Independence was still recent, and there was no compelling reason to be complacent. 
Aside from the instability and weakness seen in Section I, those colonial neighbours 
were an aggressive presence. They also underlined the racial component of 
international politics. Not only were aggressive, racist colonial powers on Tanzania’s 
doorstep, Tanzania’s recent history suggested that the racial equality independence 
made possible ought not to be taken for granted. In the last few years leading to the 
independence of Tanzania the British had attempted to found an East African 
Federation in place of the individual states of East Africa. That Federation, by design, 
would have been politically dominated by powerful white-settlers in Kenya (Pratt 1976, 
chap. 2). All things considered, in 1963, Nyerere was driven to publicly declare his 
concern about the prospects of ‘a second scramble for Africa’ (which he also thought 
‘the Socialist countries seemed to be committing’) (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 135). 7 
																																																								
7 This does not contradict the claim that Tanzania was neglected by the industrial world as such, for 
several reasons. Firstly, this was a perception of Nyerere and the Tanzanian elite more generally, which 
perhaps somewhat overestimated the importance of Tanzania to any such scramble. Second, and most 
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In sum, the positions Nyerere adopts in the crises considered below are not only a 
reflection of principled anti-racism and anti-colonialism. They were also a reflection of 
geopolitical threat, partly real and immediate, partly imagined or forecast. Whilst 
security threats do not necessarily seem particularly pronounced, they were 
nonetheless real and, more importantly, they should be seen in the context of the 
vulnerability Section I emphasised. 
Thus when Nyerere pointed to the presence of 60,000 Portuguese troops in 
neighbouring Mozambique, Dar es Salaam being within the range of South African 
bombers and the threat of the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, each time 
he was invoking the threat imposed by the severe unevenness of the international 
political scene that confronted him. At one point there was a Portuguese plan to raid 
and destabilise Tanzania (Newitt 1995, p. 531, MacQueen 1997, p. 47) conceived by the 
colonial authorities that was only vetoed by Lisbon. MacQueen speculates that the 
only reason it was vetoed was due to Tanzania's international connections and prestige 
(1997, p. 62 en. 89). Geopolitics was a considerable concern, and it is a misreading to 
see Tanzanian policy as ‘almost entirely’ dictated by internal factors (Parsons 2003, p. 
181). 
These various threads of international unevenness can be drawn together in 
considering two episodes of crisis. Relations with Britain, the former colonial power, 
had become increasingly strained by 1965. Not only had the British not provided 
anything like the development assistance the First Five Year plan had anticipated, it 
had not taken a strong line against the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
white-minority Rhodesia (Pratt 1976, pp. 147–52, Pallotti 2009). Thus, only one year 
after the Mutiny, Tanzania broke off its relations with Britain, prompted by the British 
government's refusal to strongly oppose Rhodesia. Responding swiftly, the British 
suspended a loan of £7.5 million further stating its intention to bring other 
commitments to a halt. In a single moment Tanzania's main bilateral partnership, and 
most significant source of capital (excepting the World Bank) at the time, threatened 
to collapse entirely. 
So much so that Whitehall was confident that Tanzania would soon back down, for 
allowing the situation to fester would be ‘disastrous’. In the event they were to be 
disappointed, with relations not restored until 1968. This episode demonstrates a 
surprising ability and willingness on Tanzania’s part to vindicate its own sovereignty 																																																																																																																																																																		
important, the neglect claim is relative not absolute. The point is not the absence of Western interest, 
so much as that it was so limited that it yielded little to no leverage for Tanzania. 
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and independent foreign policy. Pallotti (2009) makes the vital point that the 
motivation in this episode was the construction and legitimation of Tanzania as a 
sovereign post-colonial nation. A key reason for this, as Pallotti (2009, p. 75) also 
recognises, was the sudden entry of China to the scene. It made clear that it was willing 
to step into Britain’s shoes and offered guarantees to meet Britain’s commitments to 
Tanzania. 
This is an early hint of the ‘unequal equals’ point, but before drawing out its 
significance there are further episodes that further illustrate unevenness. There was a 
similar episode involving West Germany, which withdrew its military aid after it 
interpreted Tanzania allowing a diplomatic presence of East Germany as a breach of 
the Halstein doctrine.8 Tanzania, again looking to assert its independence, responded 
by ending all aid relations with West Germany (Pratt 1976, pp. 139–41). Finally, in a 
slightly bizarre episode, relations with the US were briefly, but severely, strained in this 
period too. Following intervention in the Congo, and fuelled by the chaos of the 
Mutiny, rumours of a US sponsored plot to murder Nyerere and seize the government 
in 1964 took hold. They were taken seriously by the government and Nyerere 
personally until the US proved to his satisfaction that it was a hoax (Pratt 1976, pp. 142–
7). Slightly bizarre though it was, it does nonetheless reflect both the heightened 
dissatisfaction with the western world, in the face of the manifold inequality and 
indifference it exhibited and the active sense of threat in which the Tanzanian state 
operated. 
What can be said is that Tanzania faced an active geopolitical environment of 
threat from colonial-neighbours and powerful Western nations with limited interest 
and Tanzania and willingness to use leverage over it. Not only did this frustrate its 
early development plans, this reflects a continuation in the underlying pattern of 
unevenness throughout this chapter: powerful, industrial modernity as opposed to 
agrarian Tanzania.  
China as ‘unequal equal’: the distinction and the difference 
Yet amidst the unevenness discovered thus far, its third plane has begun to emerge: 
between Tanzania and Maoist China. Propelled by the problems modern-agrarian 
																																																								
8 The case was complex, an upshot of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the latter having 
recognised East Germany, which the Tanzanian government sought to compromise by allowing only a 
consular presence for East Germany on those islands. 
		
86	
unevenness was imposing on him, Nyerere turned to China. Tracing that discovery 
reveals that dimension of unevenness as an intellectual resource. 
This is so in two important senses. First there is deep unevenness (‘unequal’) 
between China and Tanzania. China is characterised as a power with industry, that is 
to say modern in some vital sense, but also significantly different from powers such as 
Britain inasmuch as it was also in many agrarian and poor. Second, China had far more 
interest in Tanzania than those other powers. Thus China’s combination of industry 
and agrarianism and its apparent interest in Tanzania made for a crucial difference. 
Whilst Chapter 5 will deal with its consequences in full, for now the emphasis lies in 
establishing that for all its distinctiveness Sino-Tanzanian relations were nonetheless 
an aspect of unevenness. 
China’s priority was alleviating its isolation (Gittings 1974, p. 260), and in 
particular regaining its UN membership and the permanent seat on the Security 
Council from the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Spence 1990, p. 628, Hutchinson 1975, p. 
251). For this reason, Tanzania was an opportunity to be embraced, in particular a 
chance to break its isolation by buttressing its claim to membership of a Third World 
movement. Tanzania, meanwhile, was able to procure some vital ‘fruits’ of modernity, 
this is the beginning of the process of substitution referred to in Chapter 3. 
But they were accurately described as relations of unequals (uneven). It was China 
that had incorporated elements of industrialism in its social form which Tanzania had 
not; moreover, China was vast in scale and population. Whilst that unevenness was 
qualified, as unequal equals, connoting both the principle of sovereignty and notions of 
Third Worldism, the inequality between them is plain. ‘Perhaps’, Nyerere told his 
Chinese hosts as per the epigraph to this chapter, ‘for that reason some other nations 
of the world find it hard to understand’. 
In this period China was threatened by US power and its containment policy 
(Hutchinson 1975, p. 3). China had an ‘American problem’ and to counter this it sought 
‘to win friends and seek allies among Third World states’, of which Tanzania was a 
prominent example (Yu 1975, p. 2). These relations would ultimately been seen as a 
major demonstration of China's claim to be primus inter pares amongst Third World 
countries (Yu 1975, pp. 43–4, Chan 2013). The centrality of concern for ‘the security of 
the state of China’ and ‘the continued authority of the Communist party’ (Hutchinson 
1975, p. 3) likewise serves to underline that confident interpretations, most evident in 
the contemporary literature (Cooley 1965), that Maoist China was an 'ideologically 
driven' actor in Africa risks missing the point. Not only do these relations with China 
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make sense as an aspect of Chinese foreign policy pursued since the Bandung 
Conference by Zhou Enlai (Keith 2009, pp. 24–7); the search for friends was also 
impelled by the Sino-Soviet split that shortly preceded Sino-Tanzanian relations. 
Naturally this is a complex and difficult subject. The point is not to enter into a 
detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy, beyond noting that there very much was 
something in it for China. Misunderstanding, Hutchison (1975, p. 278) argues, ‘about 
the friendship between Tanzania and China arises, I think, because the benefits to 
China are intangible whereas those to Tanzania are tangible [my emphases]...the 
'friendship' of Tanzania is precisely “what's in it for China”’. Moreover, it was a 
successful strategy. In respect of its core aim, membership of the UN, China would go 
on to regain its membership in 1971 and achieve a rapprochement of sorts with the US 
by 1972.  This ‘remarkable moment in diplomatic history’ (Spence 1990, p. 633) marked 
the decisive end of attempts at the encirclement of China. If what has been called ‘the 
diplomatic success story of the century’ (Gittings 1974, p. 260) was deeply complex, 
relations such as these with Tanzania were at least an element thereto. Mao Zedong 
himself was given to attributing a great deal of credit to African nations, declaring that 
‘it is our African brothers who carried us into the United Nations’ (Wang et al. 1999, p. 
1715). 
Meanwhile it was China’s industrial power, and vast scope, which both enabled it 
be “poor” but also generous toward Tanzania. Thus Tanzania was able to enjoy various 
‘tangible benefits’ which are fundamental to the process of substitution in Chapter 5. 
But that process obtains across the unevenness of China as a type of industrial power 
and Tanzania as, for practical purposes, non-industrial. This is the key to this particular 
unevenness. But it also obtains in the general context of unevenness. That is, it is both 
an instance of international unevenness (Section II) and an instance of the gap 
between Tanzania and industrial societies (Section I and II). Thus third plane of 
unevenness is also a distinctive aspect of the general unevenness confronted by 
Tanzania. 
Unequal equals: the nature of Sino-Tanzanian interaction 
This completes the key work of the Chapter, specifying the three dimensions of 
unevenness; all of which ultimately specify the contours of the general unevenness of 
modernity. The Section can now conclude by providing an analysis of the nature of 
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Sino-Tanzanian interaction, which creates the intellectual bridge to establishing the 
actual process of substitution discovered in Chapter 5. 
Beginning in earnest in the mid 1960s, ‘Tanzania developed one of the closest and 
most consistent relationships of all African countries with the PRC’ (Shinn and 
Eisenman 2012, p. 259). Both parties, moreover, were eager to draw attention to it. 
Whilst Nyerere described the relationship in terms of unequal equals, the Chinese 
were if anything even more eager to highlight it. The ‘friendly relations and 
cooperation between China and Tanzania’, Ji Pengfei the Chinese Foreign Minister 
claimed, are ‘a fine example of international relations of a new type’ (Peking Review 
1972, p. 22). Even allowing for the exaggerations of politicians’ public statements, 
neither was wrong to point to distinctiveness. 
Whilst many observers regarded this 'new type' of relations as explicable in (nearly) 
exclusively ideological terms – ‘Red China's African offensive’ (Cooley 1965) or Mao and 
Nyerere as sorts of ideological 'cousins', one the ‘Soldier Revolutionary’ the other the 
‘Teacher Revolutionary’ (Hydén 1967) – this was no ideologically driven attempt on 
Tanzania’s part to reproduce China in East Africa, nor the provision of a sort of Maoist 
‘dogmatic prescription of armed revolution’ (Cooley 1965, p. 3). 
Instead the ‘link between China and Africa has always...been nationalism and not 
ideology…[the Chinese] gospel has been nationalism, not Communism’ (Snow 1988, pp. 
318–9). Occasional moments of revolutionary fervour aside, the Chinese sought to 
further entrench national sovereignty as a norm of international politics; this, and the 
material support that came with it, was what Nyerere welcomed so warmly. He was 
otherwise markedly different from Mao in so many respects, a devout Catholic and 
determined to denigrate class struggle, as a strategy; instead he was in favour of 
nation-building that was fundamentally inclusive, even in its coercive moments. Both 
parties entered these relations with clear-eyed focus on what they stood to gain. 
The most comprehensive account of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s 
and 70s remains Yu's China's African policy: a study of Tanzania (1975) though it can be 
supplemented with numerous others (Bailey 1973, 1976, Ogunsanwo 1974, pp. 134–141, 
197–213, Hall and Peyman 1976). The core message of this scholarship is insistence on 
taking ‘unequal equals’ seriously as a description of the relationship. That said Yu 
presents a reading of that differs somewhat from that in this Chapter. Although there 
were ‘great disparities’ in terms of wealth, power, population and so on, he regards 
them as ‘irrelevant [my emphasis] to the equality that governed their interactions’ (1975, 
p. 30). 
		
89	
Thus Yu’s treatment of 'unequal' besides 'equals' simply serves to juxtapose the 
concepts, serving to emphasise the novelty of a relationship of equality. Not only is this 
intellectually dangerous, since sovereign equality was hardly unknown.9 It also poses 
the risk of missing the causal significance of unevenness (industry on one side of the 
relationship). To reiterate the point, it was this unevenness that gave China the 
capacity to act in the way that proved so significant.  
Various powers were willing to provide Tanzania with what might be called social 
artefacts of modernity. Alongside China stood Britain, Israel, West Germany, Nigeria 
and Canada that all agreed to provide various, significant forms of military assistance 
in the years after the mutiny (Yu 1975, p. 100). In part, resort to a wide range of 
partners was an attempt to appear as ‘balanced’ as possible in foreign policy on 
Nyerere’s part (Legum 1964, Pratt 1976, pp. 165–6, Parsons 2003, pp. 167–8). That aside 
though, much of this other assistance was small relative to Chinese aid. Israeli and 
West German provisions for aid ‘were relatively minor sources of military aid’ (Parsons 
2003, p. 167). Indeed in the German case it would come to naught owing to the 
diplomatic problems discussed above (Yu 1975, p. 103, Parsons 2003, p. 167). Similarly, 
the British dragged their feet over a request for £1.25 million for training an air wing, 
which ran into similar difficulties (Parsons 2003, p. 166). Finally Canadian assistance 
was more reliable and substantial (Parsons 2003, pp. 167–8), reported as being worth 
$15million in 1967 and comprising the construction of a military academy, both pilot 
and infantry training and, finally, supplying 8 noncombat aircraft (Yu 1975, p. 104). 
The contrast with Chinese provision is more pronounced than its resemblance. 
Losing no time, and within months of Tanzania calling for military aid, China began to 
provide training and supplies, with 6,000 tonnes of arms and trainers arriving by 
September 1964. In the following years significant military hardware arrived, all free of 
charge (Ogunsanwo 1974, pp. 138–9),10 including tanks and fighter jets. By the early 
1970s Tanzania had a functioning air force and navy alongside a far larger (11,000) and 
better equipped army, that was reasonably well-paid (Parsons 2003, p. 185) since 
military budgets had also been assisted by aid. Already by 1969 Nyerere was declaring 
that ‘most’ of Tanzania’s military support came from China and around this time 
Canadian assistance also ended (Yu 1975, pp. 97–8, Pratt 1976, p. 165). 
																																																								
9 But the extension of a norm of sovereign equality to Tanzania, and to relations between Tanzania and 
China, is of significance. 
10 Mao Zedong reportedly saying at the time that ‘we can be arms suppliers, not dealers’. 
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Estimation of the total value of Chinese aid is difficult, and vary from $30 million 
(Yu 1975, p. 105) to $42million (Parsons 2003, p. 167). Either way these were amounts 
that were beyond the reach of the Tanzanian state by any other means, to say nothing 
of the difficulty in sourcing the hardware from western suppliers. It is not an 
exaggeration, then, to suggest that Chinese assistance was a necessary condition for 
the strengthening of the Tanzanian military and the significant buttressing of TANU 
that went with the military reforms seen Section I. 
Again, this can be seen as an early instance of combined development. One of the 
‘traditional variables of power’ that Tanzania lacked was its military, which was not 
only backward but also actively rebellious. Nyerere’s canny reforms, facilitated by 
Chinese material assistance, fundamentally reconfigured the position not only 
mollifying the military but actively bringing it under direct political control. Consider 
the following simplistic, but nonetheless instructive, thought-experiment. But for 
Chinese provision Nyerere’s likely choice was between paying for a better equipped, 
better paid army through ‘development’. This would have run up against the problems 
anticipated in the Arusha Declaration, as an agrarian society this could not be afforded 
whilst development assistance from the west would clearly remain inadequate. The 
choice, but for Chinese assistance, would have been between either attempting greater 
surplus extraction from the peasant or risking further serious strife in the army; neither 
option would have contributed to the stability for which Tanzania has subsequently 
become renowned. 
As it happened, with the support of that ‘unequal equal’ Nyerere was able to carve 
out real breathing space. Furthermore the politicisation of the army (Yu 1975, p. 100, 
Parsons 2003, p. 168, Barany 2012, pp. 287–90) was to further enhance the standing of 
TANU in society. ‘After the mutiny’, writes Bienen (1967, p. 381), ‘entrance into TANU 
became...the sine qua non for being part of the nation’. Finally, whilst there were a 
handful of coup plots  - 1969, 1972 and 1982 - in the future, they were remarkable for 
their poor planning and lack of wider support either in the army or from society at 
large (Parsons 2003, p. 184, Barany 2012, p. 290). Civilian control, but also in the hands 
of TANU and Nyerere himself, neutralised it as a potential alternative power base, 
unlike in Ghana (Barany 2012, pp. 290–5, 299) or Uganda (Parsons 2003, p. 26).11 
																																																								
11 Kenya, meanwhile, overcame similar problems and mutiny the same year, through extensive British 
support, which it was unwilling to do for Tanzania (Parsons 2003, p. 169). This had the effect, though, 
of leaving in place an army along British lines, 'apolitical' and professionalised. 
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A further aspect of “breathing space” was the strengthening of the state’s standing 
vis-a-vis the powerful urban elements of society. In an important sense it was the 
mollification and extension of control of the army that was crucial in this regard too. 
Without being able to ally itself with the army, urban discontent had a far lower 
chance of threatening Nyerere’s position in the near-term. 
Nonetheless, there is a wider aspect to Chinese aid relations than military 
assistance that is worth bringing out, because it is a trend that is most fully expressed 
in a project considered in Chapter 5 and central to the process of substitution that it 
articulates. China quickly and readily filled the financial gap left in the wake of those 
diplomatic tensions with Britain and West Germany (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 197, Bailey 
1975, pp. 42–3, Yu 1975, pp. 83, 103–4, Pallotti 2009, p. 75). Particularly illustrative is the 
dispute with Britain. Upon Britain freezing a loan of £7.5million China, which had 
agreed a £10million loan in 1964 at the time of agreeing military aid, offered an 
additional £2million loan and £1million grant (Pallotti 2009, p. 75). 
By 1971, of the existing capital assistance loans to Tanzania that amounted to a 
total of $436 million, 56% came from China, 15% the World Bank, 10% Swedish and a 
total of 8% and 5% from the USA and USSR respectively (Yu 1975, p. 75). Whilst much 
of this aid was due to the TAZARA project (the central transfer in the process of 
substitution to be discussed in Chapter 5), this project does not account for the 
entirety of the sum (Yu 1975, chap. 4). 
As the disappointments of the strategy of capital-intensive, western-financed 
development became apparent, Nyerere was deeply impressed by China’s own 
development strategy when he visited in 1965 (Hutchinson 1975, p. 95). Pointing to 
what he supposed was a basic similarity, since both countries had ‘scarce foreign 
capital and labour in excess of other factors of production’ (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 140) he 
resolved that a labour-focussed model was preferable in Tanzania too. Not only would 
this be influential in his own thinking, impacting on his formulations in the Arusha 
Declaration up to a point, Nyerere also resolved to seek Chinese assistance in 
promoting more labour-intensive industry in Tanzania. 
In an experiment that turned out to be of limited significance, and still less 
successful, Chinese technical and financial assistance was provided for labour-intensive 
industrial development projects. The most prominent of these was the Friendship 
Textile Mill, opened in 1968 in Dar es Salaam. At the time this was the largest 
industrial development in East Africa (Yu 1975, pp. 80–2) that employed, at full 
capacity, 2,800 workers and 200 administrative staff (Yu 1975, p. 81). The labour-
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intensiveness of this project is illustrated by contrasting it with the Mwanza Textile 
Mill, built with French aid, and opened in 1969. The Friendship Mill used 2.5 times 
more labour per tonne of output than the Mwanza Mill, and only 40% of the capital 
and at a lower cost per unit of production (Rweyemamu 1973, p. 124, Yu 1975, p. 156, 
Coulson 2013, p. 330). 
Both mills would prove to be commercial failures, Mwanza in particular not 
surviving long. The Friendship Mill, meanwhile, lingers on but has hardly been a 
roaring success, mirroring the wider abortive industrialisation of Tanzania. Its 
significance for this chapter, though, is that these projects also contributed to the 
wider mollification of urban society by generating both jobs and ancillary commercial 
possibilities. In this sense aid relations, especially those with China,12 assisted in the 
brief “breathing space” that emerged in the build-up to 1967 and the Arusha 
Declaration. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has been in the nature of a ground clearing exercise, identifying three 
significant planes of unevenness, progressively grafting one onto the other. First was 
the unevenness of rural and urban society bequeathed by colonial-modernity. The 
second, bringing in the international dimension explicitly, was the disinterest of the 
advanced industrial world in Tanzania and the active aggression of colonial and/or 
racist regimes in nearby Southern Africa. Whilst Tanzania placed all its first bets on 
the industrial world being willing to supply the means of its development, this was in 
effect a gamble that the single basic unevenness identified here would melt away upon 
independence. Having begun independence with the claim that the only enemy now 
was ‘nature’, Nyerere discovered that in fact he had plenty of opponents that were 
social in nature. And that social opposition flowed from the unevenness of industrial-
modernity, including both western powers, those local colonial powers and “domestic” 
urban opposition which was closely attuned to the ‘world market’. In this sense, the 
two planes of unevenness the Chapter developed are an integral whole. 
Yet, alongside this loss of innocence, and with it the “discovery” of international 
relations, Nyerere and TANU found just enough scope to survive through the third 
plane of unevenness. That is, embarking on significant relations with Tanzania’s 																																																								
12 Other, more minor examples, include a Tanzanian-Chinese shipping line (Larkin 1971, p. 95, Yu 1975, 
pp. 82–3) and Ubungo Farm Implements factory (Yu 1975, pp. 78–80). 
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unequal equal, Maoist China. In encountering this third plane of unevenness two 
things have been discovered. First, the general unevenness has been clarified as 
including this distinctive feature. Second, upon that discovery, the narrative seems to 
have been propelled forward toward combined development. For the consequences of 
interaction across this plane of unevenness are so significant that their rehearsal 
quickly lead in that direction. All that has been said so far in terms of combined 
development is that the interaction of ‘unequal equals’ was crucial to a sort of 
“breathing space” from crisis that enabled Nyerere to embark on the Arusha 
Declaration. 
Recall that three forms of combined development were discussed in Chapter 3; the 
level of events, structures of social life and thirdly, hybridity. Combination in the 
“breathing space” sense is at the level of events and structures of social life. Yet, as was 
made clear in that Chapter, the real labour of this thesis must be to identify the third 
level of hybridity in order to resolve the problem of peasant difference or 
incommensurability. 
With three dimensions of a single pattern of unevenness now specified, matters 
can now proceed to Chapter 5, where that core labour can be performed. With the 
Arusha Declaration the process of substitution, the origins of the political market and 
the identification of the citizen-peasant as the hybrid social form that resolves the 
incommensurability of peasant and modernity can be specified. 
		
94	
Chapter 5: Siasa ni kilimo: socialism, failure and 
the emergence of the citizen-peasant 1967-1975 
‘In 1967 a group of Youth who were marching in support of the Arusha Declaration 
asked me how long it would take Tanzania to become socialist. I thought 30 years. I 
was wrong…I am now sure that it will take us much longer!’ 
Julius K Nyerere (Nyerere 1977, p. 1) 
‘[Nyerere] began bridging the chasm between the logic of the peasant household and 
that of the nation state’ 
Deborah Bryceson (Bryceson, 1988, p. 47). 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter returns to the Arusha Declaration of 1967, first encountered at the 
outset of Chapter 1. With that Declaration Tanzania fully committed itself to its 
experiment with ‘African Socialism’. A slogan of the era, ‘siasa ni kilimo’ [agriculture is 
politics], is the quintessential spirit of the time. Peasant agriculture was not just a 
technocratic issue of development economics; it was at the heart of the nation’s 
politics. Tracing exactly how and why the peasant was political is the key task here. 
Building on the understanding of Arusha gleaned in Chapter 1, this endeavour is 
pursued as follows. First, Arusha is analysed as a response to the unevenness discussed 
in Chapter 4. The key work of this Chapter then begins, identifying how the Arusha 
Declaration was a signal moment, initiating an historical process of substitution in the 
broadened sense specified in Chapter 3. Drawing on the significance of Sino-Tanzanian 
relations, it becomes possible to trace the specific patterns that introduced elements of 
modernity into Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s.1 To complete the discussion of such 
transfers as substitution, the analysis proceeds and culminates in tracing how that 																																																								
1 Which is not to say that there were no elements of modernity in Tanzania beforehand. 
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both reinforced and altered  the social logic of peasant reproduction in Tanzania. Thus, 
the political market and citizen-peasant emerge as the products of the historical 
process initiated by the Arusha Declaration.  
This logical sequence is developed over three Sections. In the first the Arusha 
Declaration is seen as a considered, and radical, response to unevenness. In order to do 
so, it must also address some related points. One is to explain that the Arusha 
Declaration depended, in part, on the “breathing space” point in the previous Chapter. 
Second, the steps of the Arusha Declaration are retraced, emphasising its nature as a 
vision of agrarian-modernity. It is this vision which also captures it as a response to 
unevenness, which has been specified as ultimately being between industrial-
modernity and peasant societies. Finally, widespread understandings of the Arusha 
Declaration as a “failed” socialist policy are also addressed. Indeed, the first epigraph to 
the current Chapter alludes to something along these lines. In it Nyerere says that 
‘socialism’ would take far longer than he had first realised; the best interpretation of 
this is to regard the Arusha Declaration as something that initiated a process of social 
change over the long-term, and that is the approach this Chapter adopts. 
The remaining two Sections proceed on that basis. Following the logic of U&CD, 
they together generate the analysis of a historical process of combined development 
and substitution in particular. Section II specifies the elements of modernity that were 
part of a process of fission in large part due to Sino-Tanzanian interaction. In revisiting 
relations with China, it elaborates on the unequal equals argument as interactivity 
whose most significant manifestation was the TAZARA Railway project. Both this 
project and burgeoning western-aid by the 1970s, which was itself provoked and 
facilitated by China’s presence on the scene, were vital to what followed. 
Section III is, on these bases, able to show the historical genesis of the key 
concepts of political market and citizen-peasant. It demonstrates how Arusha as a 
historical process, consisting in necessary part in interaction across unevenness 
(TAZARA etc.), gives rise to this dual phenomenon. Reflecting on the suggestiveness of 
the siasa ni kilimo [agriculture is politics] slogan, it shows precisely how elements of 
modernity intersected with the Tanzanian peasant to both reinforce the peasant as a 
logic of reproduction and simultaneously push it toward citizen-peasant hybridity. 
Accordingly, this amounted to siasa ni kilimo culminating in what Bryceson refers to, 
in the second epigraph, as ‘bridging the chasm’ between peasant and nation-state. 
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I. The Arusha Declaration: confronting peasant-modernity 
unevenness 
Having carved out “breathing space” in the mid-1960s, TANU and Nyerere moved 
toward a radical programme set out in a series of documents and announcements, 
most clearly in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 (Nyerere 1968, pp. 231–50). Harried by 
the pressures imposed by the unevenness of a peasant society amidst a “modern world”, 
which included the demands of urban classes, the pressing requirements of the world 
market to produce cash crops, and the specifically geopolitical pressures all seen in 
chapter 4, this was Nyerere’s answer.2 
It is true that much of the Declaration consisted of familiar enough policies of a 
socialistic developmental state. The ‘commanding heights’ of the economy were to be 
brought under state control, the vogue for import substitution industrialisation was 
evident, and a widespread programme of nationalisation followed (Pratt and 
Mwansasu 1979, p. 12). Nevertheless, what was dramatic, distinctive and central to it 
was its emphasis on the peasant as per Chapter 1. Statements to this effect multiplied. 
Pressed, for example, by a mass student demonstration seeking improved student 
grants Nyerere angrily dismissed them en masse. Declaring them, and himself, to be 
exploiters of the peasant Nyerere emphasised that everything from urban development 
to student grants ultimately had to be paid for by the labour of the peasant; and on 
that basis refused to meet the students’ demands (Nyerere 1968, pp. 337–66). 
Nyerere had developed a ‘sophisticated awareness...of the “rural-urban” dichotomy’ 
and Arusha amounted to a resolution ‘to use the surplus more productively and in 
ways that benefit the vast majority of the population’ (Arrighi and Saul 1968, p. 166). 
Amongst others things, this meant limiting wages of urban workers and state 
employees as far as possible whilst also shifting away from expensive capital-intensive 
programmes (Lofchie 1976, p. 482). 
Not only did it contain a negative invocation against exploitation of the peasant. 
Indeed, it was for the most part an attempt to discover the positive means to develop a 
peasant society. And in doing so, it necessarily meant confronting the unevenness 
captured in Chapter 4.  
Whilst a significant minority of peasants were involved in the production of cash 
crops, the majority of Tanzanian peasants were both physically and socially remote 																																																								
2 For a good summary of this period see (Nugent 2012, pp. 144–9) whilst a lengthier account can be 
found in (Pratt 1976). 
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from cash-cropping. Not only loosely connected to the rest of the country, and the 
“world market”, this majority lived remotely from each other. Few even lived in villages, 
hamlets and disparate settlements of a handful of households being far more common 
in non-cash crop regions; in these cases, the peasantry reproduced itself through 
subsistence farming. The native authority, as the means of indirect rule, was the basis 
of government and the only firmly rooted connection between state and rural society. 
On the other side stood a limited, but unstable and demanding urban society. Arusha 
aimed at nothing less than the reversal of this unevenness. 
This was not just ‘developmental’ in the narrow sense, it also amounted to building 
a nation or ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) in the sense that it would bring the 
peasantry into national life. Thus the Arusha Declaration also evaded the language of 
class struggle. Whilst a robust idea of unjust exploitation was at its forefront, it was a 
call for ‘national justice’ not ‘class based justice’ (Mamdani 2012, p. 118). It was, in these 
terms, a call for the radical extension of formal political equality (citizenship) to all.  
Politically, this meant elimination of the ‘native authority’ and ‘subject’.3 That is, 
political equality would break down the division – which was functional to exploitation 
too – of town and country. That, thought Nyerere, was the basic condition for the 
establishment of Tanzania as a viable political community. And, not coincidentally, 
that ought to also furnish Nyerere and TANU with the largest possible constituency; no 
longer would a handful of soldiers and urban residents be able to threaten the state 
with the ease they had in 1964. This corresponds to moves in scholarship ‘Beyond 
Developmentalism’ (Sundet 1994) that recognises that Arusha not just a drive at 
material development (Aminzade 2003, 2013a, 2013b, Pallotti 2009, Bjerk 2010, Lal 2012, 
Mamdani 2012, pp. 109–25). 
Nonetheless, to understand it as such the resources of historical sociology are 
called for. Although the aims of Arusha can be captured, in part, in the register of 
political philosophy - nation building, community, justice and formal equality – the 
programmatic content of Arusha is another matter. This is so because its ultimate 
objective was reform of sociological unevenness as it has been described. 
The heart of its programme was rural collectivisation, initiated in the late 1960s 
and gathering momentum into the early 1970s. It had two aims. One was ‘villagisation’ 
or ‘nucleation’, aspiring to gather peasant-farmers into larger communities (villages). 																																																								
3 Cranford Pratt's detailed observations (1976, pp. 11–42) that the colonial government of the 1940s and 
50s was trying deepen the use of Native Authorities is instructive of the deep difference between 
colonial and post-colonial eras that the Arusha Declaration marked. 
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Membership of a community at this level would also facilitate active membership of 
the national community. Furthermore, it was reasonably supposed that nucleation 
would make the provision of social services in the countryside on a mass scale possible. 
Those villages could be linked through infrastructure, allowing the state to offer 
villagers both fertiliser and other agricultural inputs as well as health and education 
services (Mascarenhas 1979). Furthermore, went the hope, that would have benefits in 
terms of production and wider human development. This is an early sign of the 
content of the aspiration Bryceson described as ‘bridging the chasm’ between nation-
state and peasant; by enabling itself to make provision to the peasantry, the state 
would be able to bind that group closely to itself. The benefits that would accrue upon 
such nucleation are obvious enough; so much so that it had long been a colonial 
ambition (Aminzade 2013a, chap. 2).4 
It was the second arm, explicit collectivisation of production, which gave Arusha 
its socialist nature. The idea was that whilst each household would maintain a small 
private plot, a large proportion of the work time of each person would be given over to 
collective plots. Out that various economies of scale were expected to accrue, and with 
it gains in productivity. It is this second aim that has been the focus5 of critical 
attention, seen by James Scott as utopian ‘modernism’ (Scott 1998). And there is no 
shortage of material in support of such criticism; collectivisation ran into considerable 
difficulties and generated major problems. Indeed, the peasant population it was 
supposed to benefit met the collectivisation ambition with real hostility. 
What should be borne in mind, however, is that whilst the Arusha Declaration 
aspired to both villagisation and collectivisation they were also distinguishable ideas. 
As it would turn out, these ambitions would be separated out from one another, 
allowing pursuit of villagisation and abandonment of collectivisation. This, as Section 
III argues, was crucial to the emergence of the citizen-peasant. 
Collectivisation was deeply impracticable for a straightforward reason; there was 
no support base in Tanzanian society for it. Aimed at the peasantry, it was not a 																																																								
4 The disparate pattern of the population was a major reason why the colonial state had found it 
difficult to fully extend its power throughout its territory, even with the innovation of indirect rule. 
Moreover, there is some suggestion that this pattern was a response to colonialism, an attempt to evade 
colonial authority (Kjekshus 1977). 
5 But not exclusively so. Villagisation or nucleation has been extensively criticized in its own right, both 
the plans for the villages themselves, whilst it has also been suggested that locations chosen for new 
villages were often less than ideal. Often, goes the argument, villagers found themselves relocated to 
worse agricultural land, whilst fertile land was suddenly abandoned (Kjekshus 1977, Freyhold 1979, 
Schneider 2007). 
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militant-revolutionary peasantry in the Chinese fashion that had been forged in 
guerrilla war. In fact, opposition to the Arusha programme amongst the peasantry is 
one of the most notable features of ujamaa. Likewise, there were very few Tanzanians 
that Nyerere could draw upon on an ideological basis for support. Only a tiny minority 
of Tanzanians identified as 'socialist' even at the peak of ujamaa, ‘there were very, very 
few socialists in Tanzania in 1967’ commented Nyerere (Pratt 1976, p. 228). 
The eventual abandonment of collectivisation will be traced in subsequent 
Sections. The point for now is that whilst there were key elements of the Arusha 
Declaration that were impracticable and other elements which simply failed, it should 
be understood as a general historical process. Some elements survived intact, others 
were modified and others abandoned. 
For the Marxist left the Arusha Declaration was little more than radical clothing 
for an attempt to turn the state into the primary exploiter of the peasant. The 
bureaucratic (formerly petty) bourgeoisie, having captured the state, argued Shivji 
(1976, p. 71) looked to ‘further [the] integration of peasants in the cash economy’. In 
this view Arusha is nothing more than another ‘stage’6 of exploitative modernity – 
anchored in ‘international capitalism’ – striving to achieve the ambition of subjugating 
the peasantry to the (capitalist) market. 
The merits of this interpretation in all its particulars7 need not be considered 
beyond the core claim. The exigencies of modernity, capitalist or otherwise, are widely 
seen as operative in ujamaa and the Arusha Declaration, and Shivji’s interpretation is 
typical in this sense. They boil down to the suggestion that in pursuit of (implicitly 
singular) modernity the only choice was to expand and deepen the exploitation 
(“development” as a euphemism) of the peasantry. 
This much was Goran Hydén’s point, save that he viewed that choice as necessary 
in order to achieve modernisation. Initially he thought that the explicitly socialist 
programme of collectivisation might be able to ‘capture’ the peasant to this end 
(Hydén 1980) but was later driven by the ‘failure’ of Arusha to the conclusion that 
there is no substitute for the classical path of modernity. The peasant must be 
subjected to dispossession in order for capital-wage-labour relations to do their 
developmental work (Hydén 1983). A variant of this idea is hinted at by scholars that 																																																								
6 Shivji(1976, pp. 76–7) explains the necessity for a different stage as being conditioned by the 
exigencies of class struggle between commercial and petty/bureaucratic bourgeoisies. 
7 Such as the debate (Barker 1979) between ‘democratic socialists’ (Pratt 1976, Pratt and Mwansasu 1979, 
Pratt 1979) and ‘Marxists’ (Shivji 1976, Mueller 1980, 1981).  
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emphasise the continuities between the colonial and post-colonial states. Frederick 
Cooper (1981, p. 52) has suggested that ‘socialist states, notably Tanzania, have cajoled 
and ordered around peasants in the manner of the colonial state’. 
In service of the suggestion that Arusha was in the same mould as colonial-
modernity (Cooper), or else just simply an unorthodox attempt to capture the peasant 
as a fundamental pre-condition of modernity (Hydén), these claims are generally 
supported by reference to that increasingly coercive nature of the Arusha programme. 
In the early years after the Declaration, the state sought to secure villagisation and 
collectivisation by ideological cajolement of the peasantry. When this did not work it 
attempted to offer material inducements. When this too failed, active coercion 
commenced and ultimately the state forcibly transported peasants that refused to the 
new villages. In 1974 villagisation had become compulsory, and those not already living 
in villages were moved. Whilst this was undoubtedly coercive, it was achieved without 
widespread physical violence as such. True as the narratives of coercion are, it is 
important not to miss that at the very point at which coercion began collectivisation 
was abandoned. Ultimately, what was forced upon the Tanzanian peasant was living in 
villages, not collective production. 
The scale of that which was achieved was tremendous: whereas only 5% of the 
population of the country lived in villages (and up to 90% of the population was rural) 
in 1970, by 1977 79% lived in villages. This amounted to ‘an extreme centralization that 
extended the state apparatus’ and ‘did away with native authorities, and subordinated 
the party to the state’ (Mamdani 2012, pp. 121–2). Plainly this reorganisation facilitated 
the extension of government authority throughout rural Tanzania, as well growth in 
social services that tied the population to the state more closely (Bjerk 2010, p. 299). 
The gains in mortality, literacy and so on of the 1970s plainly owes a great deal to this 
too. 
The abandonment of collectivisation, however, disturbs analyses of Arusha as in 
service of exploitation and the capture of the peasant toward ‘modern’ ends. The very 
mechanism by which surplus extraction was to be done, if at all, had been abandoned. 
Moreover, it is sobering for those views that at the very moment of peak coercion the 
production of cash-crops in particular plummeted (Ponte 2002, pp. 44–47) and would 
not recover. That might have been entirely destructive, but it certainly did not enhance 
surplus extraction. The best that can be said, if that is so, is that Arusha had failed to 
capture the peasant to exploitative ends. 
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The facts of the matter are more suggestive still. Production did not fall uniformly 
across all categories. Excepting 1974-5, the year of the greatest disruption brought 
about by relocations combined with a drought, food production actually increased 
rapidly following villagisation (Ponte 2002, pp. 42–43). As a response to unevenness as 
described the Arusha Declaration had significantly changed Tanzania. Most of the 
country now lived in villages, service provision to those populations had been 
enhanced and food production had climbed whilst cash-crop production had dropped 
precipitously. Arusha had not achieved modernity in anything like the sense that 
Hydén would recognise; the peasant had not been captured to developmental ends, 
and Tanzania had fewer commodities it could realise on the world market. 
Only two things then can be said for now. First, the Arusha Declaration was 
conceived as a means to confront the problems imposed by unevenness. But, secondly, 
it did not result (for whatever reason) in development according to conventional 
criteria. It is a mixed picture. To make sense of them, a second review of this historical 
process will be required in Section III; therein the political market as a logic of 
reproduction, and the citizen-peasant as its social form, will enable a coherent analysis. 
Before that step can be taken, however, the process of substitution that is hidden in all 
this must be ascertained. 
II. Unequal Equals: the TAZARA Railway as means of substitution 
Various features of the first years of Sino-Tanzanian were noted in chapter 3. Military 
aid, for instance, was seen given particular significance in identifying the origins of 
“breathing space”. In this Section a much more fundamental feature of these relations 
is identified. The TAZARA Railway was, in this argument, the central social artefact of 
industrial modernity that transferred from its social setting in China, through a process 
of fission, to Tanzania. It is this transfer that is the first point in developing the 
analysis of Tanzanian combined development. And it is so fundamental because it 
directly interrupted and intervened in the general pattern of unevenness confronting 
Tanzania. Thus, whilst there were other substantial projects such as attempts to assist 
Tanzania’s industrialisation, these have little causal significance.8 
As a vast and well-known undertaking, TAZARA has attracted a prodigious 
literature (Yu 1975, chap. 6, Bailey 1976, Hall and Peyman 1976, Monson 2011, Coulson 
2013, pp. 277–9). Whilst Cecil Rhodes, imperial personality par excellence, had 																																																								
8 Such as the Friendship Textile Mill, as discussed in chapter 4. 
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conceived something along these lines as an offshoot of his Cape to Cairo railway (Yu 
1975, p. 126, Monson 2011, pp. 17–20), TAZARA was the germ of an explicitly anti and 
post-colonial ambition. Even having been conceived in the colonial era, the project had 
never been taken seriously by colonial governments or potential donors. Nonetheless 
the post-colonial governments of Tanzania and Zambia revived it with especial urgency 
upon the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia (1965). It was to be a 
railway between Dar es Salaam on the Tanzanian coast to the interior copperbelt of 
landlocked Zambia. Its primary objective being to secure the means to transport 
Zambian copper for export without reliance on existing routes that ran through 
Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique. The geopolitics of the region were, from the its 
inception, central to the TAZARA project. 
Tanzanian interest in the Railway is often seen as being principled, a means to 
make good on the anti-colonial and anti-racist principles it was becoming known for. 
And this was true, though as suggested in Chapter 4, such principles were not without 
geopolitical significance for Tanzania in a more self-interested sense. Even so, there are 
a further set of even more prosaic considerations around TAZARA, which was also seen 
as a development project for Tanzania itself. Although this was not the primary 
consideration in the earliest planning stages of the project, it became increasing 
central; indeed, it is at the core of the significance of TAZARA for the current 
argument. 
The route that the TAZARA Railway took through Tanzania is of great significance. 
Running through what are known as the Southern Highlands of Tanzania on the route 
from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border, TAZARA opened up that entire region of 
the country to infrastructure whereas it had been almost entirely neglected in that 
sense by the colonial state. In opening up this region the political geography of 
Tanzania was profoundly altered, and with it the trajectory of the Arusha process. 
Suddenly this region, in a basic physical as well as social sense, was opened to the 
transfer of elements of modernity. In particular, the provision of social services that 
villagisation was meant to facilitate was especially enhanced by this Railway. In short, 
the transfer of the Railway to Tanzania as an initial modern technology facilitated 
further such transfers. Those transfers, as Section III explores more fully, did not 
simply accelerate development in a unilinear pattern. Rather they had profoundly 
differentiating social consequences, reinforcing and diverting the logic of reproduction 
in a process of substitution. 
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The circumstances of that transfer, however, must first be understood. For whilst 
both the Zambian and Tanzanian governments  were eagerly pursuing it, the project 
seemed no less doomed than their other development projects. In particular, western 
disinterestedness meant that neither the financial nor technical wherewithal it 
required were not forthcoming. Tanzania and Zambia looked to the west and its 
Bretton Woods institutions in the first instance, and were quickly dismissed. The 
World Bank and the UN Seers Report both regarded the railway as an irrational and 
uneconomic exuberance;9 because alternative routes through Mozambique and South 
Africa via Rhodesia for Zambian copper already existed there was no rationale for it 
(ignoring, of course, the ‘anti-colonial’ features of the project) (Seers 1964, Coulson 
2013, p. 277). The Soviet Union exhibited a similar disinterestedness (Okoko 1987, p. 
192) and the geopolitics of Cold War did not offer Tanzania (and Zambia) the leverage 
it did, for example, for the Egyptian Aswan Dam project. 
Turning to China, Nyerere mentioned the project to the Chinese in 1963, and 
began discussions in earnest upon his 1965 visit to Beijing. Very much in line with the 
logic of unequal equals set out in Chapter $, he found a receptive audience where the 
project was seen as excellent opportunity to promote China as an agent ‘freedom from 
the neo-colonial and neo-imperialist hegemony’ (Monson 2011, pp. 217–8). At the time 
the isolation of China was, if anything, at its peak. Not only was it isolated from the 
west, the Sino-Soviet split was now out in the open. Alleviating that, still less 
admission to the UN, seemed remote. It can be little wonder, then, that the offer of an 
avowedly anti-colonial development project in East Africa seemed like one of the best 
options available to Beijing. 
Thus it was possible to quickly conclude a deal by 1967 (Coulson 2013, p. 278). 
Chinese technology, expertise, and labour, alongside plenty of Tanzanian and Zambian 
labour too, would be contributed to the project. It would be paid for through an 
interest-free loan and the sale of Chinese goods in both countries. Following this, 
‘construction work was incredibly quick’. Ground surveys were conducted in 1968-9, 
with full construction begun in 1970. The first 500 kilometres, beginning from Dar es 
Salaam, were completed in the first year. The most difficult part of the project, and also 
the most significant for current purposes, was the 160km section ascending into the 
Southern Highlands. This required the construction of 19 tunnels, 80 million cubic-
metres of earth moving and involved punishing working conditions under which many 																																																								
9 One other possibility was a British-Canadian consortium, but on far less favourable terms in 1966 
(Coulson 2013, pp. 277–8). 
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workers perished (Coulson 2013, p. 278). This stage took several years and after the 
completion of this portion, the remainder of the line was quickly completed and the 
line was fully operational by 1975.10 
The achievement of this feat of engineering was a boon to the prestige of both of 
the local governments; but it was an especially important boost to China’s standing in 
the African continent. Without making a simplistic claim on this basis, it is worth 
reflecting that China finally secured its entry to the UN whilst TAZARA was being 
constructed. Equally important, it was only by virtue of the great unevenness between 
Tanzania (and Zambia) and China that the project could be undertaken. As a vast 
power with industry it had both the resources, technology and ability to realise the 
project. And the immensity of the undertaking must not be underestimated. It 
required the construction of 1800 kilometres of railway track, stations and ancillary 
projects in under 5 years in difficult conditions and virtually no existing infrastructure. 
It was impossible for Tanzania and Zambia to have undertaken this alone. Lacking the 
ability themselves, it had likewise proven impossible to raise finance and pay for it 
privately. Moreover, even had that been possible, the financial cost would have been 
prohibitive. It is not an exaggeration to say that without China the project would not 
have happened. 
TAZARA also had profound, but indirect consequences. Provoked into competition 
(Mushi 1981, pp. 63–4) by the high visibility and propaganda value of TAZARA to China 
and radical ‘Third Worldism’, the USA and Sweden agreed to construct a comparable 
highway project, running along broadly the same route (Yu 1975, p. 156, Monson 2011). 
That project was also of major importance for the opening of the Southern Highlands. 
But it is reasonable to conclude that it too was an indirect consequence of Chinese 
assistance. Indeed, this was part of a more general shift in Tanzania’s international 
relations; it had moved from being a minor, uninteresting and occasionally recalcitrant 
country to being, by the 1970s, a donor darling (Edwards 2014). 
Nevertheless, the direct consequences of TAZARA are the most telling. The 
colonial era had left Tanzania with two main rail lines, one leading to the north and 
another central line (Monson 2011, pp. 17–8). Both were conspicuously in their service 
of the export driven cash-crop system. The northern line ran through sisal plantations 
before reaching the coffee plantations of Arusha and Moshi in the Mount Kilimanjaro 
area. Meanwhile, the central line ran through semi-arid Tanzania until it reached the 																																																								
10 But, notably, the Railway had begun operating into the Southern Highlands earlier. 
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tobacco-growing Tabora region and the cotton-growers around Lake Victoria (Berry 
1971, Coulson 2013, p. 29). In service of the cash-crop system, this infrastructure also 
tended to buttress the bifurcated state and the privileges of urban power that sat atop 
the system. In this sense these were railways in the quintessentially colonial vein of 
modernity; technology and social relations all revolved around export trade.  
This Railway was different, but not by reason of geography alone. Imagine, for the 
sake of argument, that TAZARA had been financed by the World Bank or a fully 
commercial source instead of the Chinese. As noted above, this would have been 
significantly more expensive. Even if it had been affordable, it would have generated 
real pressures to increase cash-crop production in order to repay those more expensive 
loans. 
Even so, both geography and history were significant too. The Southern Highlands, 
even though no major infrastructure existed prior to TAZARA, was a region that was 
climatologically ideal for arable farming. It enjoyed the heaviest rainfall in the country 
and given that almost all Tanzanian agriculture – both subsistence and export driven – 
was rain fed this had tremendous significance. Likewise, the Highlands also enjoyed 
rich soil. Due to the failure, for various historical reasons,11 of colonial-settler farming 
to take root the region had been more or less ignored save for the implementation of 
the native authority and some limited attempts to encourage agriculture. Another 
reason for this neglect and isolation, of course, was the expense and difficulty involved 
in constructing a railway into the region, as already observed. 
Needless to say, TAZARA had developmental potential for the region was clear at 
the time. So dramatic was it that engendered many high hopes, many of which were 
frustrated. On a far greater scale than the Friendship Textile Mill, the TAZARA Railway 
was supposed to generate industrialisation by opening up large coal and iron-ore 
deposits in the Southern Highlands. It was hoped to become ‘the industrial heartland 
of Tanzania’ (Coulson 2013, p. 279) on that basis. Indeed, Nyerere himself spoke on 
several occasions hopefully about this prospect; in fact, he hoped that Chinese 
assistance would be forthcoming to that end in the late 1970s. Neither the assistance, 
nor the project, ever came to fruition.12 Along with wider plans for industrialisation in 
																																																								
11 Including the ‘early’ termination of German colonialism, and its replacement with British government 
whose priority in the region was– and remained – on Kenya. 
12 Curiously, however, the project seems to have been taken up by a Chinese company in 2014, see 
Chapter 7. 
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Tanzania, this seemed to end in failure; Tanzania’s future seemed to remain rooted in 
agriculture. 
Whilst agricultural development was anticipated to some extent to flow from 
TAZARA, its most significant aspect was not. Its most profound impact would not be 
developmental so much as to form the basis for combined development. This is 
missing link to understanding the trajectory of the Arusha programme discussed in 
Section I. Section III takes up the challenge of capturing this, drawing together the 
threads of Sections I and II to cast the overall process as one of substitution. 
 
III. Combined Development in Tanzania: Substitution, the 
political market and citizen-peasant 
Taking a second look at the Arusha process, with the benefit of the discussion of 
TAZARA in section II, now allows the fully-fledged analysis of the process as one of 
combined development and substitution in particular. Section I established that the 
Arusha Declaration was an attempt to confront and overcome the unevenness that 
Tanzania faced. In doing so it also provided an account of what followed the Arusha 
Declaration, pointing to two key objectives in that attempt to reform rural society: 
villagisation and collectivisation. The former was eventually achieved, whilst the latter 
had to be abandoned. 
Likewise, Section II discussed a major instance of Sino-Tanzanian interaction. It 
suggested that the TAZARA Railway was a geopolitically inspired (from both the 
Tanzanian and Chinese sides) instance of fissile modernity. One social artefact of 
modernity had been transplanted in Tanzania by virtue this interaction. Taking a 
second look at some of these conclusions, this Section combines these two threads to 
make sense of them as a patterned, theorisable process. 
Villagisation and the abandonment of collectivism 
At the time of the Arusha Declaration, in 1967, nucleated settlements were ‘the 
basis of existence for a majority of the population’ (Pratt and Mwansasu 1979, p. 7). 
Whilst the Arusha Declaration aimed to replace this pattern with ujamaa vijijini 
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(socialist villages) the ultimate outcome was villagisation but without socialism (Barker 
1979, pp. 109–115).13 
Putting the abandonment of collectivisation to one side for the moment, 
villagisation is an achievement that calls for further consideration. The rarity of village-
size dwellings in Tanzania was, as noted in Section I, partly an attempt to evade 
colonial authority; it was, to that extent, a reflection of the contentious social relations 
of the colonial bifurcated state. However, this was not the only reason for the dispersed 
patterns of habitation. It was also a ‘basic fact that over large parts of Tanzania the 
ecology of the country would not permit permanent settlement to grow to a large size 
without major additional government expenditures’ (Mascarenhas 1979, p. 147). Living 
in substantially sized villages was not just confronted by the restrain of colonial social 
relations, in many areas the land simply could not support large numbers of 
subsistence farmers without substantial inputs. Villagisation in such instances required 
fertiliser and health care, railways, roads and, perhaps, education too. Even where not 
a strict ecological necessity, the provision of inputs such as these would be socially 
necessary to convince Tanzanians of the rationale for villagisation at all. 
The process of 'villagisation' ran from 1967-76. Broadly speaking 1967-73 was the 
period in which that aim was pursued via voluntary means. The state attempted to 
cajole the populace through ‘education and administrative inducement’ (Barker 1979, 
pp. 97–9) to move to socialist villages. Regional Development Funds were also made 
available for small projects chosen by those villagers. Yet these efforts met with very 
little success, and the relative few that were taking up these offers were mostly in the 
ecologically poorest areas and where the limited inducements offered made more 
difference. In all other areas peasants preferred the existing state of affairs to the 
relatively paltry offerings of the state. The government was not able to offer the ‘major 
additional government expenditures’ it would require to decisively tip the balance; but, 
decisively, the continued demand that these villages be collectivised was critical to that 
low uptake. 
Official frustration with the peasantry grew. From 1969, with the adoption of a 
second 5-year-plan, coercive operations began to be carried out in certain localities. 
																																																								
13 Barker elaborates the rural reorganisation as having 5 ambitions. 1) ‘Living together’, 2) ‘owning 
together’, 3) ‘working together for the good of all’, 4) building ‘democratic communities’ and 5) 
‘integrating agriculture into the national economy’. In this sense 1, 4 and 5 might be considered the 
most successful; meanwhile it might ultimately be said 2 and 3 were achieved in a non-socialistic sense, 
a point that emerges later in this Section and again in subsequent Chapters. 
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The two largest instances, Operation Rufiji and Operation Dodoma, though officially 
for local ecological reasons (flooding and semi-aridity respectively) (Barker 1979, p. 98), 
were in many ways the blueprint for the coercive national programme that would 
follow. 
In 1972 the Iringa14 Declaration, a supplement to Arusha, was issued - bearing the 
siasa ni kilimo slogan - stressing ‘the importance of good farming techniques’ and 
government’s willingness to support ‘more effective and modern practices’ (Barker 1979, 
p. 99). That language is sometimes understood as an ambition for large-scale farming, 
especially the capital-intensive use of tractors and so on. But in actual fact the 
techniques that Iringa emphasised as ‘effective…modern practices’ were ‘the use of 
oxen, early planting and spacing, use of manure and fertilizer’ (Coulson 2013, p. 295). 
No paean to the tractor here, save for some collective uses. The invocation of ‘modern 
practices’ was very much intended to be conversant with small-scale peasant 
techniques, and attractive to them as such. Thus the Iringa Declaration is best 
understood as part of a shift in emphasis away from collective production and the 
supposed benefits of scale (which the tractor implied) and toward an emphasis on the 
means by which the state could assist existing small-scale farming of the peasant sort.  
How is this shift to be interpreted? Coulson suggests that reluctance to press for 
collective production signifies reluctance to confront large-scale 'capitalist' farmers. On 
Christmas day 1972 a TANU Regional Commissioner in Iringa, Dr Kleurruu, was 
infamously murdered by one such disgruntled 'capitalist' farmer (Coulson 2013, pp. 
294–5). This, however, is an over-interpretation of limited evidence. ‘Capitalism’ in 
farming, especially in a region like Iringa, was not only rare it was becoming rarer as 
the coming analysis will show. Even that aside, this was capitalism in a very limited 
sense. Such wage-labour as was employed was a very marginal activity for those 
labourers, whose principal occupation and source of reproduction was farming their 
own (household’s) plots. Even a relatively successful farmer, producing substantial 
surpluses and marketing them was not so much a capitalist farmer as a well-off peasant 
farmer. This being so the Iringa Declaration did not signal reluctance to confront 
capitalist farmers, but rather reluctance to confront peasant farmers in general over 
the issue of collectivisation. 
The endgame began in 1973 and continued to 1976, with a TANU resolution that 
living in villages was now compulsory for all rural citizens. With it the period of 																																																								
14 It was not coincidental that this was a town in the Southern Highlands. 
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systematic and coercive villagisation had begun. At the same time all requirements 
that those villages engage in collective production were dropped (Barker 1979, p. 99), 
That coincidence in time alone has prompted Bryceson to conclude, as well as 
Mamdani (2012, pp. 109–121), that ‘villagisation was a nationalist rather than a socialist 
solution’ that simply aimed ‘to facilitate infrastructure delivery’ (Bryceson 1988, p. 44). 
To this conclusion it need only be added that elemental to the ‘nationalist’ goal was 
formal political equality.  
Dropping collectivisation did not mean that ‘capitalist’ relations would begin to 
emerge. Nor would it mean that social relations in the countryside would continue in 
‘traditional’ fashion. Whilst much of the literature on this process in Tanzania 
nonetheless proceeds along one of these lines, thereby producing yet another iteration 
of the Lenin-Chayanov debate discussed in Chapter 3, debating whether Tanzania thus 
manifests as fundamentally a capitalist or peasant mode of production. Lofchie (1976, 
pp. 497–8), for instance, argued that whereas the ujamaa vijijini programme had ‘bet 
on the weak’ via collectivisation and failed the ‘only viable remaining alternative is to 
“bet on the strong” or...”let the kulaks run”’.15 Rather than casting around for an 
appropriate analogy (‘kulaks’), sense must be made of this by reference to 
methodological resources prepared beforehand; for the debate around villagisation 
otherwise revolves around the same incommensurability of peasant and modernity as 
observed repeatedly. 
The political market: substitution and the peasant logic of 
reproduction 
In resiling from collectivisation, and satisfying itself with villagisation alone, the 
government was in fact recognising that a different logic of reproduction was emerging 
from the Arusha process. Rather than moving toward socialist collectivism, this was a 
form of peasant logic; government concession to this makes sense as a basis for 
achieving some of the aims of the Arusha Declaration and achieving stability too. 
Significantly though, in developing this argument, that logic of reproduction is shown 
to be the political market emerging from a process of substitution. 
Hydén's(1980) ‘uncaptured peasantry’ thesis provides a starting point for that claim. 
Effectively articulating a form of modernisation theory, he posits 'underdevelopment' 
																																																								
15 Meanwhile many on the Marxist left took the failure/retreat from collectivisation as an indication of 
the disingenuousness of Tanzanian socialism (Shivji 1976). 
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as a result of ‘the inability of capitalism’ to ‘break down the pre-capitalist barriers that 
still exist’ (Hydén 1980, pp. 3–4). This inability of capitalism is due to a still 
‘uncaptured peasantry’ which might be involved in commodity production up to a 
point but by virtue of its possession of land – i.e. the unity of labour and property – is 
not subsumed by and dependent on the capitalist market. By now this sort of argument 
is familiar enough as a feature of debates on modernity and the peasant. 
In Hydén's hands this becomes an argument of erasures, pointing to all the things 
the (Tanzanian) peasant is not and concluding ‘they do not lend themselves to an 
adequate interpretation...based on the premise of the predominance of capital or any 
other modernizing agent’ [my emphasis] (Hydén 1980, p. 4). Instead, somewhat 
reminiscently of Chayanov (Durrenberger 1984, Chayanov 1986, Shanin 2009),  Hydén 
urges analysis of the peasantry ‘in the context of their own mode of production’ which 
is separate from ‘the capitalist mode’ (1980, p. 6). Like Chayanov, this is described as a 
mode of production dictated by a ‘domestically oriented’ logic, wherein the 'law of 
subsistence' very much trumps the 'law of value'. Causing the peasant to be reluctant to 
work ‘too’ hard, risk-averse and resistant to innovation (Hydén 1980, p. 14), the 
conclusion is that the route to modernity runs through capture of the peasantry to 
enforce a developmental logic of reproduction. Otherwise, Tanzania would remain 
rooted in a trap of ‘underdevelopment’ in which the peasant continued to operate on 
the basis of an ‘economy of affection’16 rather than the market. 
Formidable data is amassed in support of this claim. In the early years of 
independence village level development plans tended to circumvent or ignore 
production targets as being too costly in labour terms. However, production targets 
were generally better tolerated where they were specifically food rather than 
'exportable' cash-crops targets. Their own priorities, meanwhile, were overwhelmingly 
for local infrastructure: schools, roads, dispensaries, clinics and wells (Bienen 1967, p. 
426, Hydén 1980, p. 87). For Hydén both TANU and Nyerere himself were blameworthy 
for the underdevelopment this allowed; simply speaking, they were too responsive to 
peasant demands due to their ‘democratic nature’. Neither could make the hard 
decisions necessary to capture the peasant and let development ensue. Thus, rather 
than developmental, post-colonial politics were more a reflection of ‘the social 
formations of the peasant mode of production’ (Hydén 1980, p. 88). 
																																																								
16 Based on kinship and other communal ties, in which patronage plays a leading role (Hydén 1980, pp. 
18–9). 
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Thus he reaches the opposite view to Coulson on the question of ‘capitalist 
farming’. Writing about the 1970s and the period after Dr Klerruu’s murder, he regards 
the politics of the time as systematically anti-capitalist. He points to the villagisation of 
the few large maize farms in Ismani, part of the Iringa region in the Southern 
Highlands. Far from encouraging them, and any other process that might have 
encouraged capturing the peasant, in fact non-peasant (whether ‘capitalist’ or not) 
farmers that were being dispossessed. Likewise, in that period most European farmers 
left Tanzania. ‘During these years of intensified ujamaa campaigns, most of Tanzania's 
capitalist farming came to an end’ (Hydén 1980, pp. 102–4).  
The socialist programme therefore failed to prosper because this social structure 
was development averse. In consequence, ‘the party or state bureaucrat always has very 
little to offer the peasant which he really needs for his own immediate [my emphases] 
reproduction’ (Hydén 1980, p. 105). Capitalism, Hydén  thought, had been extinguished 
and socialism in Tanzania had been revealed to be unwilling or unable to capture the 
peasant through offering inducements (Hydén 1980, p. 122). Nevertheless, the resort to 
coercion (Hydén 1980, p. 124) and compulsory villagisation is explicable as a final 
attempt to capture the peasantry (Hydén 1980, chap. 5). 
For Hydén that this form of capture would not be especially developmental; but 
out of his pessimism comes a vital clue to the analysis in question. If the peasant is 
captured in this limited sense, all it can do is replace ‘the capitalist market with the 
political market place as the principal forum for interaction with the peasants’ (Hydén 
1980, p. 131). This political market consists in reorganisation of party and state 
structures in the rural areas to allow peasants to make effective demands on the state. 
Most especially, the abolition of poll taxes and primary school fees, the expansion of 
rural health care and village-level democratic governance (Hydén 1980, p. 131). 
There were considerable advantages to this arrangement to the peasant. Therefore, 
in spite of ‘bureaucratic high-handedness and other excesses’, peasants ‘have by and 
large accepted their new locations of domicile and production’ (Hydén 1980, p. 152). 
Although he accepts that production increased, he remains pessimistic since resistance 
to ‘new production techniques’ remained stubborn and the ‘constraints of the peasant 
mode are still in operation’ whilst most of the increase in production is attributable to 
extensive growth (Hydén 1980, pp. 151–152).17 
																																																								
17 In this sense the claim overlaps theoretically with the debate over ‘involution’ in Chinese studies 
(Huang 1990, Wong 1997, Brenner and Isett 2002, Allen 2009). 
		
112	
Yet Hydén’s approach remains rooted in the incommensurability of peasant and 
modernity, feeling impelled to allocate any patterns to either peasant and capitalist 
modes of production which depends on his binary captured/uncaptured. This is all the 
more surprising since he himself notes in pointing to a political market that this had 
bound the peasant to both the new villages, and therefore the state to a considerable 
degree. His approach, therefore, is unable to deal adequately with this notion excepted 
as an untheorised intermediary category (Hydén 1980, p. 153). 
The point now is to reclaim his insight into the political market and expand it so as 
to identify the logic of reproduction it contains. First, the political market is precisely 
the medium through which negotiation between state and peasant takes place; it was 
this mechanism which allowed the compromise between state and peasant in 
accepting villagisation. Villagisation in turn reinforces the political market, both 
strengthening a community which could make demands and by facilitating the delivery 
of health and education services and agricultural inputs. Thus the first arm of the 
political market as logic of reproduction was that politically equal citizens were able to 
make demands on the state for service provision. Rather than ‘captured’, it might be 
more accurate to say that such peasants were much more closely bound to the state. 
But there is a second aspect of the political market which Hydén did not recognize. 
For him it was anti-developmental due to its ‘democratic’ demands for social services 
and so on (the first arm of the political market). Its second feature is due to the first. 
With the realization of this mechanism and the flow of social services and agricultural 
inputs into peasant social relations, production is boosted. Not on the basis of market 
dependence, but rather because of what are, in market terms, subsidies. Acquisition of 
these benefits does not depend on market behaviour but rather political equality. Yet 
this inserts itself directly into the reproductive logic of the peasant and production 
decisions are made on the basis of the boost they give to subsistence agriculture. 
Unsurprisingly, as Hydén recognised, food production grew on this basis. 
But, to complete the point around the second aspect, this was meaningful in 
market terms. Surpluses had grown, to a great extent extensively but also through 
productivity gains, and these were capable of being marketed after subsistence needs 
were accounted for. Furthermore, due to the extension of infrastructure which was also 
a feature of demands made through the political market, getting that surplus to market 
(whether literally or figuratively) was significantly faster and cheaper than before. 
With this two-pronged conception of the political market in place, its utility can be 
established by showing that in this form it is able to account for some of the most 
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salient criticisms of Hydén’s work. Kasfir, for instance, suggests that Hydén ‘overstates 
peasant self-sufficiency’ and ‘blocks understanding of complex relations, partly 
dependent and partly self-sufficient, that connect peasants to the larger political 
economy’ (Kasfir 1986, p. 340). The seemingly odd combination of dependence and 
self-sufficiency is at the heart of the political market. 
What advantage does the political market confer though? Peasants cannot be self-
sufficient, says Kasfir (1986, pp. 345–6), because they enter the monetary economy for 
some consumer goods, school fees, to purchase land and hoes, ploughs and fertilizer 
and to pay taxes. But entry to the market of this sort does not establish dependency in 
the conventional sense. A crucial feature of the political market is, through its first arm, 
that entry to markets for social services and so on are often not monetary or 
commercial but rather political. Furthermore, even where those goods are purchased 
on the market in a more conventional sense, that still does not establish strict 
dependency. The point is that Kasfir’s terms of reference also obscure the working of 
the political market but fudging the issue of how exactly the peasantry can be both 
‘partly dependent’ and ‘partly self-sufficient’; without the political market such a 
formulation looks more like a contradiction in terms than helpful.  
The political market began to emerge on the basis of increasing capacity of the 
state to make provision to the peasant alongside careful clarification that villagisation 
did not entail collectivisation. Recall the point made earlier about the ecological 
limitations that obstructed villagisation. Because the state had severely limited 
capacity to offer inputs that would rectify those limitations, villagisation – to say 
nothing of collectivisation – had been unattractive on balance. Indeed, the distinction 
between villagisation and collectivisation was itself one that the peasantry needed to 
be convinced of. Even the early experiments with coercion (Operation Rufiji in 
particular) failed to firmly establish villages as the basic pattern of life because they 
feared it was all in aid of their dispossession (Kjekshus 1977, pp. 278–279, Nursey-Bray 
1980, p. 67).18 And, given all the coercion, cajolement and repeated issuing of edicts, 
production targets and so on, these were hardly irrational fears. 
																																																								
18 It was what Kjekshus calls the ‘lingering legal uncertainty’ over ownership, the seeming fluidity in 
property relations, that was ‘a major obstacle to early peasant compliance with the plans’. It ‘exposed 
the ujamaa plans to much popular speculation and harmed its status in the masses. Rumours that 
villagisation was a means to collectivize family life as well as property, or that it was a first step in the 
reintroduction of local taxes has repeatedly been mentioned in the reports about the various 
“operations”’ (Kjekshus 1977, pp. 278–9). 
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It was not until 1975 that comprehensive legislation was introduced dealing with 
the ownership situation in these villages, making it clear that collectivisation was off 
the table in every sense. That clarification, several years after collectivisation had in 
practice been put on the backburner, was coincident in time with the nation-wide 
coercive effort at villagisation. On this basis fears of a kind of capture, whether socialist 
or capitalist in nature, could be put to rest. 
Another key point is around the issue of ecological constraint and state provision. 
So pressing were they that even after nationwide villagisation had been accomplished a 
key commentator issued a dire warning. This new settlement pattern could, he said, be 
‘destructive of the ecological balance maintained under the traditional settlement 
pattern...Without major inputs...the ghost of British concentration will haunt the 
ujamaa movements and the parallels between their outcome will become more obvious’ 
(Kjekshus 1977, p. 282). Yet, which was not yet entirely clear at the time Kjekshus was 
writing, the basis for those major inputs had been established alongside villagisation. 
This is important because identifying how that had been established moves the 
analysis toward identifying where the political market had come from. 
This achievement, then, required both very clear signalling that collectivisation 
(‘capture’) had been entirely abandoned and the means to provide social services and 
agricultural inputs on a nationwide level. Put another way, Nyerere’s government 
needed to show both that it had no designs on the peasants’ land and that they would 
sweeten the villagisation ‘deal’ with a range of inputs. The first condition underlines 
why the political market remained an essentially peasant logic of reproduction. Each 
household would maintain its land, constituted as their own property and apply their 
labour to it. 
As for inputs, fertilisers and agricultural subsidies, village dispensaries and schools, 
roads and rail, the benefits were substantial. Adult literacy had increased from 10% in 
1960 to 73% in 1978, primary school enrolment increased from 25% at independence to 
95% in 1980 and life expectancy increased from 34 to 51 between independence and 
1980. Health provision had improved, though less dramatically, 35% of villages having 
clinics in 1980 whereas such provision was virtually non-existent level at independence. 
40% had clean running water, again from an essentially standing start in 1961 (Weaver 
and Kronemer 1981, p. 840). It is only by turning to express consideration of the 
process of substitution that the ability to realise these improvements can be properly 
ascertained. Indeed, the political market as a logic of reproduction will then be 
explicable as combined development. 
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TAZARA, and the transfer (fission) of an aspect of modernity which it stands for, is 
especially crucial to the ability to provide inputs in sufficient quantity. The imbalance 
in the political geography prior to TAZARA has been noted, broadly going to the 
distinction between cash-crop and subsistence regions: the ‘prevalence of a cash 
economy in the north contrasted with the largely peasant subsistence character of 
production in the south’ (Bryceson 1992, p. 83).19 In achieving this rebalancing TAZARA, 
and the other aid projects it provoked, the political market became viable as a logic of 
reproduction in the Southern Highlands. This infrastructure meant that villagisation in 
this particular region, as well as others, could be credibly backed with the promise of 
‘inputs’. Furthermore, the region began to experience something of a ‘mini-green 
revolution’ on the back of these developments becoming the breadbasket of the nation 
(Rasmussen 1986). 
Over the course of a few years ‘the Southern Highlands [were] on the “economic 
map” of the country after almost a century of neglect’ (Ponte 2002, p. 49). Road and 
rail made the provision of the services that were key to the political market deliverable. 
Additional innovations arose too. Amongst these were the National Maize Programme, 
pan-territorial pricing which further facilitated the marketability of surpluses beyond 
the physical ability to transport goods that were now available (Bryceson 1992). 
Together with the provision of subsidised inputs (particularly fertilizer) and social 
services all these factors were vital to that mini-green revolution. 
The ability to market surpluses beyond the immediate confines of the locales of 
peasant-farmers in the Southern Highlands was no less significant than these 
programmes. Not only could crops be sold to Dar es Salaam, many other smaller (and 
nearer) conurbations were also in reach (Bryceson 1992, p. 96). That ability, along with 
ample fertiliser subsidies, encouraged the growth in food production that followed 
villagisation. Whilst it is true that much of this growth was extensive that risks missing 
the point. First it was only partially so, productivity was boosted by fertiliser subsidies 
and so on. Second, the ecological limitations Kjekshus pointed to likewise suggest that 
even extensive growth should not be taken for granted. Finally, that extensive growth 
was the extension of production that had elements of both subsistence and surplus. All 
this taken into account, the last major food crisis Tanzania experience, to date, was in 
																																																								
19 It is worth further noting, recalling the discussion of nation-state formation issues in the previous 
chapter, that Bryceson regards this ‘north-south divide’ as posing a real ‘danger of regional conflict’ 
(Bryceson 1992, p. 83). 
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1974-5. The boom in food production, centred on the Southern Highlands was both 
real and of deep political significance as a point of food security (Ponte 2002, pp. 42–3). 
What is beginning to become apparent is that these developments in the Southern 
Highlands are the epicentre of the political market as a whole; indeed, it was also the 
most substantial region by population aside from cash-crop regions. Thus in opening 
up the Southern Highlands TAZARA did not only make service provision to a large 
region possible; it allowed the state to reach the one region with a favourable enough 
environment for production to be substantially boosted. 
This all had significance beyond the immediate conditions of the Southern 
Highlands. With good reason ‘most national policy-makers...especially those from the 
southern regions’ believed that ‘the integration’ of the Southern Highlands ‘into the 
national economy to be a major achievement of the post-independence government’ 
(Bryceson 1992, pp. 86–8). Here was both the constituency that TANU and Nyerere 
needed, a centre of political gravity that was neither urban nor cash-crop dependent. 
‘Tanzania's future’, wrote Deborah Bryceson, ‘is very hard to predict. One thing 
however is fairly certain: Nyerere will go down in history as the initiator of Tanzanian 
peasants' agricultural transformation. He began bridging the chasm between the logic 
of the peasant household and that of the nation state’ (Bryceson 1988, p. 47). By 
opening up the Southern Highlands, establishing villagisation there and throughout 
the rest of the nation by making the political market viable, that ‘bridging’ was 
fundamental to the nature and success of Tanzanian nationalism. 
The sheer weight of the Southern Highlands, by population, food production and 
political significance goes a long way toward establishing that TAZARA was significant 
for Tanzania as a whole and not just that region. TAZARA also had nationwide 
significance in the sense that it had provoked other countries to be far more 
forthcoming with aid projects for Tanzania. The National Maize Programme is a typical 
example, and was very significant to establishing the political market as national logic 
of reproduction. Thus in both direct and indirect senses, TAZARA was crucial to the 
establishment of the political market. It made it possible to extend its operation into 
the Southern Highlands, a crucial region to it nationwide viability and it provoked a 
series of other projects which further entrenched its operation throughout the country. 
The citizen-peasant, finally, is the social form which stands on this political market. 
It represents the hybrid social form of that logic of reproduction. On the one hand 
politically equal citizens enter into the political market in its first sense, making 
demands on the state. Second, those demands fundamentally reinforce their status as 
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peasants. That is because it sustains the unity of labour and property, but with the 
substantial insertion of the political market those peasants are now explicable only by 
simultaneous reference to their citizenship. Furthermore, the citizen-peasant is 
essence of Bryceson’s ‘bridge’ between nation-state and the peasant; that bridge, as it 
turns out, is contained within that single social form. 
Before proceeding, there is a tangential issue to address. There is a complex and 
technical debate over whether Tanzania exhibited ‘urban bias’ in this era, a term that 
gained much currency in the 1980s with intellectual trends influenced by (Bates 1983) 
and the Berg Report. Because of the operation of the political market and the citizen-
peasant form the issue in Tanzania does not admit of simple application of Bates’ 
thesis. Bryceson highlights that complexity, suggesting that once a distinction is made 
between food and cash-crops, policy appears relatively favourable to food producers 
(Bryceson 1992). Yet attributions of urban bias to socialist-era Tanzania are frequently 
premised on evidence that is specific to cash crop production. Ponte (2002, p. 52), for 
example, suggests that agriculture was neglected and that urban-bias was present 
citing in support (Johnston 1989, pp. 49–50). Yet Johnston’s argument is wholly based 
on the ratio of receipts by producers of export crops - coffee, cotton, and tobacco – 
which suggests that perhaps a more promising distinction is bias between food and 
cash crop production. This is one issue which will be revisited in Chapter 6. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has brought the argument, in one sense, to completion. Beginning 
with the Arusha Declaration, it was identified as being both a diagnosis and response 
to unevenness between peasant and modernity. Proceeding from there, Section II 
established the content of the most significant feature of Sino-Tanzania interaction, 
TAZARA. Reconciling the discussion of Arusha with TAZARA in Section III it finally 
became possible to both establish the nature of the political market and citizen-
peasant and that its origins lay in the transfer of technologies that TAZARA achieved 
directly and indirectly. 
Accordingly, the process was one of combined development, and substitution, 
because the (fissile) transfer was crucial to strengthening the peasant logic of 
reproduction but also differentiating it as a political market logic. In this sense, it is 
possible to say that the citizen-peasant is a hybrid social form of peasant and 
modernity which is, in empirical form, the resolution of the incommensurability 
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problem. But, equally, it can also be said that it is a theoretical contribution to that 
issue since that social form has been traced as an emergent property of a process of 
U&CD. 
That said, further work is nonetheless called for. For widespread readings of the 
Arusha Declaration as a “failed” socialism imply that its social innovations as identified 
here were only temporary. Indeed, those views are only further strengthened by the 
perception that the subsequent era was defined by neoliberalism and structural 
adjustment. Chapter 6 proceeds to show how it was that the political market and 
citizen-peasant became entrenched features of Tanzanian modernity long after the 
formal abandonment of the Arusha programme, surviving throughout the so-called 
neoliberal era. 
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Chapter 6: ‘I thank God I have never been 
employed!’: the entrenchment of the citizen-
peasant, 1975-2000 
 ‘Nashukuru mungu sijaajirwa!’ [‘I thank God I have never been employed!’] 
A common phrase amongst Tanzanian villagers (Mueller 2011, p. 33). 
Introduction 
Whilst Chapter 5 was able to establish the citizen-peasant’s origins in the historical 
process initiated by the Arusha Declaration, understood via U&CD, this Chapter 
extends the argument in two ways by proceeding forward in time. First, by showing 
that it has become an entrenched and central feature of Tanzanian social relations 
rather than melting away in a “neoliberal” era. A second is that in doing so the Chapter 
is also able to take the opportunity to point to potential expansion in the nature of the 
political market as a logic of reproduction and the citizen-peasant as its representative 
social form. In tracing this form across the period 1975-2000 the unfolding 
development of the citizen-peasant further reveals its distinctive character and 
analytical utility. One particular feature of which gives the Chapter its title. For it had 
become common amongst Tanzanian villagers, that is citizen-peasants, to celebrate 
that they were not employees; this further affords the opportunity to highlight the 
citizen-peasant as a distinctive (non-wage labour) social formation rather than a 
pathological sign of underdevelopment. 
Recognition and elaboration of this has important consequences, recasting and 
shedding light on the crisis-prone years associated with neoliberalism (Gibbon 1995a, 
Harrison 2010, Harvey 2005). This crisis had plenty to do with both the socialist 
heritage of the Arusha Declaration, thus giving rise to a raft of failure narratives,1 and 
‘neoliberalism’. However, the persistence, indeed entrenchment, of the citizen-peasant 
establishes that Tanzania had not ‘slowly returned to being a conventional 																																																								
1 A typical judgment of Tanzanian socialism is: ‘never was there a more noble social experiment; and 
never was there a more miserable failure’ (Weaver and Kronemer 1981, p. 839). 
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impoverished country’ (Cooper 2002, p. 180) and in turn crisis was not a consequence 
of the things Tanzania is not – i.e. to commit Mamdani’s ‘history by analogy’ – but of 
what it is. Thus the peculiar and contradictory qualities of the citizen-peasant are 
themselves major features of the crisis.  
This is important because it allows explanation of the agency of the Tanzanian 
state in engaging with its donors (Brown 2013). 2  It is particularly notable that 
engagement with ‘reforms’ was selective, the agency of the state in this sense best 
exemplified by the Helleiner Report in the mid-1990s (Helleiner 1995, Brown 2013). 
This was not the only agency at play that might seem surprising. Within Tanzanian 
society, the reaction to ‘market reforms’ was quite different than was expected by its 
advocates. This consisted not just of ‘resistance’ and oppositional movements, these 
reactions were an aspect of the logic of the political market which generated a sense of 
public ownership of assets amongst citizen-peasants. In addition, neoliberal policies 
geared toward ‘getting the prices right’ did not result in a society of evincing a 
straightforward market rationality as was anticipated. Peasants, often dubbed 
‘smallholder farmers’ by that literature, would not act as abstractly ‘rational’ actors in 
the world market by maximising production of cash-crops. Rather, in a continuation of 
the pattern observed in Chapter 5, food crops produced primarily for subsistence and 
local or national markets continued to grow instead.3 
All of this is shown to be fundamentally related to the citizen-peasant having been 
entrenched in Tanzanian social relations, outliving the immediate context of its birth 
in the socialistic politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Neoliberalism did not result in a shift 
back toward ‘conventional’ modernity and in particular market dependency continued 
to be absent from these relations in any general sense. Instead the political market 
remains a fundamental explanatory feature. With the unity of labour and property not 
only still in place, but buttressed by political modernity in this way, wage labour 
continues to be a marginal activity in rural Tanzania. 
In showing the utility of the twin explanatory concepts of political market and 
citizen-peasant, and underlining the difficulties of approaches to Tanzania that neglect 
this hybridity, the value of the thesis’ overall argument is reinforced. Without it 
debates around Tanzania once again tend to fall prey to the incommensurability of 
peasant and modernity problem. This manifests in narratives of failure which have 																																																								
2 Recognition of African agency being a much wider issue of concern (Harman and Brown 2013). 
3 For the data that shows the upward trend in food production beginning in earnest in the mid-1970s 
see (Ponte 2002, pp. 43, 48–50). 
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already been alluded too, and problematic terminology such as ‘smallholder farmer’ or 
‘proletarianisation’ (Mueller 2011, p. 33).  
Section I begins by sketching the broad contours of the period under consideration. 
It shows how existing approaches tend to be afflicted by the incommensurability of 
peasant and modernity; then, showing that the citizen-peasant was an entrenched 
feature by now, it proceeds to demonstrate how it can resolve the problems of those 
existing approaches. Section II further specifies how the citizen-peasant enhances 
analysis of the particular moments of agency identified above as the narrative moves 
toward the 1990s. Furthermore, this begins to point toward a significant extension in 
the logic of the political market toward a more strategic, nationwide notion of public 
(citizen-peasant) ownership of national assets. Sketching the contentious politics of 
the 1990s that arose on that basis, the Section concludes by pointing to how the 
analysis offered by this thesis sets the stage for further study of contemporary, 21st 
century Tanzania. 
Finally, for completeness, Section III returns to ‘the international’. Whilst Chapter 
5 showed the centrality of interactivity to the genesis of the citizen-peasant, it did so 
by reference to Sino-Tanzanian relations most especially. This Section specifies the 
nature of these relations during the neoliberal era. It explains both the reason that for 
much of the 1980s those relations were somewhat muted, before suggesting that their 
resurgence by the 1990s is actually of more interest. In this additional sense, then, it 
sets the stage for further study of Tanzania given the substantial attention now being 
given to ‘China in Africa’ in the 21st century. 
I. Citizen-peasant and crisis: the peasant-modernity problem 
redux 
Accounts of the crisis, and the putative neoliberal aftermath, of the 1970s and 1980s 
generate the peasant-modernity problem in their construction of ‘the market’ and its 
application to Tanzania. Following a sketch of the crisis to establish bearings, it is 
shown how the peasant-modernity problem arises and, likewise, how the citizen-
peasant can be brought to bear on it in this particular historical context. Allowing 
explanation of the crisis, which explains the actual pattern of peasant engagement with 
the market rather than a false presumption of dependency, is the initial point. But this 
soon yields a further proposition that the political market first observed in Chapter 5 
also emerged as a specific market of opportunities. There is, of course, an irony in this 
inasmuch as the market has long been thought of as a site of opportunity rather than 
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compulsion; in this case it is the politicisation of these relations that makes it possible, 
rather than its contrary, the doctrine of laissez-faire. 
The crisis was, at its core, fiscal. A major element was the precipitous decline in 
the production of profitable, foreign-exchange generating, cash-crops; this was 
exacerbated by the unhelpful coincidence of a fall in the price of those commodities on 
the world market. Given the deep and wide increase in the fiscal liabilities of the 
Tanzanian state during the 1970s, central to the narrative of Chapter 5, it became 
increasingly difficult for the Tanzanian state to pay for its service provision to citizen-
peasants, maintain itself and meet debt obligations arising from those development 
projects. Like the fall in commodity prices, once again this was deeply aggravated by 
the increase in interest rates at a global scale (Harvey 2005, chap. 1). Combined with 
the impact on exchange rates, consumables became both scarce and vastly more 
expensive to Tanzanian consumers of all types in the early years of the 1980s. All this 
rendered Tanzania’s protestations of 'self-reliance' increasingly hollow, and the World 
Bank and IMF began to shift their attitude toward Tanzania between the 1970s and 
1980s, becoming increasingly assertive in their insistence that Nyerere abandon the 
flagship policies of his African socialism.4  
Nyerere retired from the Presidency in 1985,5 unwilling to personally concede to 
demands for 'reform' that were seen as the death-knell of the Arusha era. Thus crisis 
gave way to the era of structural adjustment policies. The new President, Ali Mwinyi, 
was more willing to make concessions to IFIs for the sake of securing sorely needed 
finance in the face of the crisis conditions described above. Those adjustments aimed 
at economic 'stabilisation', privatisation, and a reorientation of policy toward ‘market-
led’ solutions all of which had very real consequences for state capacity (Mkandawire 
2004, p. 311).6 
The intellectual impetus, aside from anything else, for the push for structural 
adjustment was Bates’ (1983) approach to urban bias noted toward the end of Chapter 5. 
Bias here is conceived as an obstacle to cash-crop producers accessing the world 
market, having the particular effect of distorting prices, the upshot being that rational 																																																								
4 This much is a conventional enough sketch (Ponte 2002, pp. 47–51, Aminzade 2013a, pp. 245–256, 
Campbell and Stein 1992). The main elements of the crisis are not hotly contested; its upshots, 
historical and intellectual, are both more controversial and of more interest in this chapter.  
5 Though he continued to play a leading role in public life as ‘Founding Father’, ‘Mwalimu’ [Teacher] 
and elder statesman until his death in 1999. 
6 There is a formidable literature examining structural adjustment and subsequent liberalisation in 
Tanzania (Kiondo 1995, Raikes and Gibbon 1996). 
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small-holders reduced their production of cash-crops. As such the solution to crisis lay 
in ‘getting the prices right’ so as to enable farmers to produce efficiently for the market. 
Doing so meant in particular removing those obstacles, that is the parasitic effects of 
urban bias, and restoring a far greater share of surplus to the producers themselves. 
Straightforwardly enough, went the idea, upon those changes cash crop production 
would be restored to adequate levels and fiscal crisis would be resolved with the 
generation of sufficient foreign exchange (Wuyts 2004, pp. 368–9). 
Because this view is deeply influential, in the academy and policy circles, it is 
worth pressing a basic problem with it. Aside from anything else, the difficulty is that 
even with the (admittedly partial) implementation of these reforms it is conspicuous 
that there was no boom in cash-crop production. On the contrary, the decline of cash 
crops continued whilst in an important sense food production continued to boom. (In 
another sense food production would be negatively impacted, an issue dealt with in 
due course.) Proceeding to drill down to the core of the matter, this is explained as an 
emanation from the logic of the political market. 
Meanwhile, this engages the peasant-modernity incommensurability problem in 
the sense that, if the argument of Bates et al. is an example of insistence on the 
applicability of a generic institution of modernity, the market, to Tanzania then a 
further literature has arisen to emphasise Tanzanian difference in critique of the same. 
The most common gambit is to contradict the starkest of failure narratives and insist 
that the ‘socialist’ inheritance of Arusha is critical to Tanzania even into the neoliberal 
era (Osafo-Kwaako 2012, chap. 2, Gray 2012). To the extent that these are path 
dependency arguments (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 368–370), the argument in this Chapter 
differs somewhat inasmuch as the citizen-peasant, whilst having its genesis in the 
politics of Arusha (siasa ni kilimo), was itself a mutation of the socialist intentions of 
Arusha. 
The political market as a site of opportunity 
At this point in time rural society was essentially a peasant one – that is, whatever 
one makes of the specific citizen-peasant claim – and almost all rural households ‘still’ 
produced primarily through their own labour on their own land. Likewise, systematic 
employment of wage-labour was correspondingly rare (Collier et al. 1986, pp. 132–4). 
Those households ‘invariably’ chose to work on their own land (Collier et al. 1986, chap. 
3) and significant diseconomies of scale applied to those farms beyond the size at which 
		
124	
a individual household’s labour would be sufficient (Collier et al. 1986, chap. 4). On 
this basis it was difficult to see, even without the arguments of the previous Chapters, 
that any significant capitalist farmers could emerge. 
Stefano Ponte's (2002) analysis of the historical reality of rural Tanzania’s 
experience of neoliberalism is particularly useful here. Carefully scrutinising local 
patterns during liberalisation his work allows real insight, beyond the realm of policy 
prescriptions, into the realities on the ground. He describes his own work as an 
attempt to understand ‘changing relations between farmers and markets during policy 
reforms in Africa’ and the increasing substitution of ‘contractual relations’ for ‘social 
relations’ (Ponte 2002, chap. 1). A key element to this is the notion of 
‘commercialisation’ which anticipates that the removal of obstacles (state-generated 
urban bias) should allow a resumption of natural market behaviour. What Ponte’s data 
will reveal is that even with the removal of those obstacles commercialisation is an 
unreliable notion. Moreover, once the data is scrutinised, relations between ‘farmers 
and markets’ and shifts toward ‘contractual relations’ have a very different set of 
connotations than one might expect. 
Pointing to a divergent pattern between food and cash-crop production already 
noted in Chapter 5, Ponte shows that whilst food production had increased since the 
mid-197os the reaction to state ‘withdrawal’ in the 1980s was a shift between ‘slow’ and 
‘fast’ food crops. Fast crops were attractive because, grown more easily and rapidly, 
they could be quickly marketed locally decreasing risk and reliance on programmes 
that had assisted national marketing but were now vulnerable to withdrawal.7 If, the 
policy intended and theory predicted, prices had been gotten ‘right’ and ‘farmers’ were 
now free to act rationally, then significant numbers ‘ought’ to have decisively shifted 
production toward cotton, coffee, tea and so on.   
How is modern theory and policy to be squared with the divergent reality on the 
peasant/’smallholder’ ground? Again, mirroring the wider problem with peasants vis-à-
vis modernity, there were undoubtedly movements going on which ‘commercialisation’ 
has at least some purchase. Market relations were growing, exchange was increasing 
even before the move to ‘fast’ crops not least because food production had been 
increasing thus allowing the increased surplus to be marketed. Thus, Ponte dryly notes, 
advocates of liberalisation soon discovered that what had they had meant to say all 
																																																								
7 See the discussion of the National Maize Programme in Chapter 5. 
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along was that these policies aimed specifically at encouraging food production (Ponte 
2002, pp. 42–3, 61). 
It was the Southern Highlands, the originating centre of the citizen-peasant, which 
was at the core of this trend. And, in spite of the scrambling of liberalisation advocates, 
in the Southern Highlands ‘food markets had hardly been liberalised at all’ (Ponte 2002, 
p. 61) even as late as 1990. The implication that can be drawn from this is that the 
citizen-peasant is likewise at the heart of this trend, constitutive of the process rather 
than a victim of neoliberal policy-making. Doing so requires a return to the political 
market point, elaborating on it to show how it continued to imposition on the state the 
need to make ‘markets’ attractive opportunities to induce participation in markets 
amongst citizen-peasants. 
The operation of this logic was identified in Chapter 5. The challenge here is to 
demonstrate how this worked during a period in which the state was having to 
withdraw from its socialist policies. As this issue is discussed a further radical variant 
of commercialisation stands to be discussed. That claim is that as a result of the 
withdrawal of the socialist state capitalist social relations began to grow once again; a 
key feature of that argument is that the countryside was becoming proletarianised 
(Mueller 2011). 
Proceeding at a regional level, two locales are examined to these ends. The first is 
Songea, in Ruvuma that is one of the ‘Big Four’ regions of the Southern Highlands. 
Second is Morogoro, in central-eastern Tanzania, proximate to Dar es Salaam, the 
major urban centre of Tanzania. This data is drawn from Ponte (2002, chaps 6–8) and 
supported by key sources such as Collier (1986) the latter of which especially supports 
the claim that the (citizen-) peasant is an adequate starting point. Indeed, even the 
data that is deployed in aid of the proletarianisation thesis (Mueller 2011) is consistent 
with the claims that will be advanced. 
The data is categorised by reference to three broad organisational modes. 1) ‘The 
household’ (peasant labour) 2) ‘hired labour’ (wage-labour, potentially indicative of 
proletarianisation) and 3) ‘exchange labour’ recruited ‘socially’ as opposed to 
commercially.8 In this period there is a shift in weighting across these categories but 
not a shift from household (peasant) labour to hired (wage) labour. Rather the 
principal trend, somewhat more modest than grand claims for proletarianisation 																																																								
8 In which the owner-farmer of the land that was to be worked agreed to perform some other task 
deemed reciprocal, through such means large numbers can work, for example, to quickly harvest a 
time-sensitive crop that the immediate household would struggle to do alone. 
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suggest, is the commodification of category 3, ‘exchange labour’. Whereas additional 
labour that (some) households had employed had been performed in the past on a 
social basis, such as reciprocal arrangements that included offering to perform the 
same task for their neighbour, this was increasingly being done by hiring that labour 
instead. By 1994/5 50% of households in Songea, and 75% of those in Morogoro, were 
hiring either labour or machinery (but in both regions it was overwhelmingly labour) 
for agricultural work. However, because this was the commodification of the third 
category, which was largely residual anyway, there is little reason to suppose that this 
amounts to fundamental proletarianisation (Ponte 2002, pp. 124–8). 
Turning to the principal categories, household (peasant) labour barely changed as 
an overall proportion of the labour process in the 1980s and 1990s, remaining at 
between 80 and 83%. The vast majority of rural labour, itself some 80% of the overall 
population, was being done by peasants on their own land. Few relied primarily, that is 
for their reproduction, on wage-labour. And in any case, little hired labour was being 
used. In Songea only 25 workdays of wage-labour were utilised per hiring household 
each year.9 In Morogoro – nearer Dar es Salaam, not the Southern Highlands - it was 
more significant, but even then only amounted to 88 workdays. In Songea that labour 
was mostly drawn from seasonal migrants from nearby districts with differing 
agricultural seasons, that is, whose primary occupation would almost always be 
farming in their own household. In Morogoro, meanwhile, they were overwhelmingly 
drawn from the same village. Nevertheless in both cases the labourers were mostly 
poorer peasant-farmers supplementing their own household's income (Ponte 2002, pp. 
124–5). 
There were some shifts taking place in the labour process, especially 
commodification of ‘exchange [social or customary] labour’ and some increase in hired 
labour as an income supplement. These can be attributed to a great extent to the 
effects of liberalisation. These included the loss of, or decline in, input subsidies; 
increasing school fees; and other similar consequences of state ‘withdrawal’. All of 
these, of course, indicate in the terms of this thesis some weakening in the provision of 
the political market; a response to which was an elevated need for day-to-day access to 
money and greater resort to private exchange relations to make that money. However, 
what cannot be said is that this provides reason enough to conclude this had the 
makings of a process of proletarianisation. 																																																								
9 In fact this figure is inflated, since it includes some equivalent machinery workdays. 
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In neither region was a large section of society demonstrably primarily reliant on 
'wage-labour'. Nor is there strong evidence that even a small group that was dependent 
on the labour market was growing in size. Amongst those that did sell their labour for 
agrarian production, it overwhelmingly remained the case that their primary 
occupation and the basis of their reproduction lay in farming their households – thus 
much of the scope for exploitation was and remains within, rather than between, 
households10  - whilst selling their labour for only small proportion of the year. A very 
small minority, meanwhile, referred to their primary occupation as a "daily farm 
labourer"; 0% in Songea throughout the period, whilst a figure of 1% in 1987 rose to 3.8% 
in 1995 in Morogoro, which is insufficient to found a trend. Nor does the 
proletarianisation thesis find succour in turning to ‘non-farm employment’. Not only 
was it rare as a primary occupation, it was growing rarer, falling from 4% to 2.2% in 
Songea and 4% to 1.9% in Morogoro in the same period (Ponte 2002, p. 135). 
Additionally, there is no strong evidence of widespread dispossession of citizen-
peasants, whether by commercial or political means. In fact landownership became 
more equal between 1971 and 1996 in Tanzania (World Bank 2007, p. 87).11 This is not to 
say that land was not a prominent concern; (perceived) threats to citizen-peasant 
tenure, both de facto and de jure, was one of the leading political issues around which 
agency is identified in section II. Even then such anxiety could, at most, only go toward 
a tentative and transitional claim of proletarianisation and, furthermore, even then it 
would have to engage with the point that such agency was being exercised not as 
proletarians but rather citizen-peasants striving to avoid that fate. 
At a minimum, based on this data, there is no good reason for leaping toward a 
theoretical premise of market dependency. Neither proletarianisation, nor the simpler 
assumptions of a neo-classical commercialisation thesis, can constitute good reasons to 
move away from the citizen-peasant claim. That aside, the issue is now directly one of 
pointing to how the citizen-peasant argument can positively address the matter at 
hand. 																																																								
10 As noted previously, modes of exploitation are more likely to run through households than between 
employer and employee. Gender is the most obvious instance of which, and Nyerere had long ago 
singled out women as more exploited than any other category, including non-gendered categories of 
'worker' and 'peasant' (Nyerere 1968, p. 245). Meanwhile see (Shivji 1998, chap. 8) for consideration of 
the relationship of gender to land. 
11 It should be noted, however, that the average farm size did decrease from 1.3 hectares to 1.0 in the 
same period, again raising the question of involution which, for all its significance, is somewhat 
tangential to the matter at hand. 
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None of the foregoing entails that the citizen-peasant, as it stood at the end of 
Chapter 5, was undisturbed by ‘neoliberalism’. Engagement in ‘non-farm’ activities 
increased in this period, known to the literature as ‘diversification’. This amounts to an 
important response to the consequences of fiscal crisis for the political market; 
agrarian relations, supported by its provision, undoubtedly encountered difficulties 
upon the (relative) ‘withdrawal’ of the state. But such diversification, rather than being 
a reflection of market dependence and buttressed by questionable notions like ‘semi-
proletariats’ (Mueller 2011),12 actually reflects a diversion of the opportunistic impulse 
in the political market to non-agrarian ends. 
This is because, damaged as it was in some respects, the political market continued 
to operate as a social mechanism. Indeed, without it, the (relative) absence of wage-
labour relations would be more consistent with Hydén’s ‘uncaptured peasant’ thesis 
than the citizen-peasant thesis here. On what basis might the political-market claim be 
maintained? The first point is to start with the fundamental shift, in two steps, 
between cash and food crops and then once again from slow to fast food crops. The 
former shift has already been addressed in part in Chapter 5. In its essence it arises 
from the conjunction of what can be described as a ‘subsistence plus’ logic. Production 
of food, supported by the political market in its first sense, allowed the citizen-peasant 
the protection of a firm foundation in non-market dependence because it could 
literally eat its own product, whilst any surpluses thereof could be marketed (the 
political market in its second sense). 
More pressing, however, is the second shift from slow to fast food crops. First it 
should be noted that the shift, whilst significant, was and could not have been absolute. 
‘Slow’ staple crops remained the principal crops. Significantly demands from IFIs for 
liberalisation of policies that were most important for those slow staples, like fertiliser 
subsidies, were also the arena in which the Tanzanian state exhibited most 
recalcitrance, greatly slowing liberalisation in that respect (Ponte 2002, chap. 3). This 
suggests both the durability, and necessity, of the political market. Without continued 
provision, on the basis of formal political equality, the state could not be confident of 
continued entry to the market by these citizen-peasants; were that to be seriously 
imperilled, the crisis would have both been worse and very possibly destabilising in a 
political sense. 
																																																								
12 The close resemblance of this to terms like ‘worker-peasants’ discussed in Chapter 2 is especially 
noteworthy. 
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Indeed, when, as will be discussed in Section II, fertiliser subsidies were eventually 
withdrawn in the 1990s political contention quickly arose to demand its restoration. In 
an important sense this political agency, alongside the other instances given in that 
Section, is vital to completion the claim that the citizen-peasant was entrenched in this 
period. For now, however, it can be pointed out that very significant state provision 
continued across a range of direct inputs into the production process as well as other 
services even during liberalisation and state ‘withdrawal’. 
As this point emerges, ‘diversification’ as prompted by neoliberalism helpfully 
illustrates a further important point: the citizen-peasant concept is not strictly tied to 
agrarian activity. Said diversification consisted, as noted above, of non-farm labour to a 
much greater degree than farm labour. Whilst households remained rooted in the 
unity of labour and property in the agrarian sphere, some of their members extended 
their activities to non-agrarian work. Rarely, if at all, was this a sign of prosperity on 
their part; nevertheless, it does signal the flexibility of the citizen-peasant form. 
Consider that the typical form of diversification has been artisanal in nature: brewing, 
masonry, carpentry and tailoring, done primarily on a self-employed basis (Ponte 2002, 
pp. 136–7). So, as with farm-labour, 'new' labour was typically not done on a wage-
labour basis either.13 
A further important qualification is that this was not a straightforward 
consequence of liberalisation either. By the mid-1980s in pre-liberalisation Songea, for 
instance, 80% of households were already involved in off-farm activities. Whilst that 
figure did increase as liberalisation policies were instituted, rising to 86.7% by 1995, in 
the Southern Highlands region diversification appears to have been a pre-existing 
feature of the citizen-peasant prior to liberalisation. That said, nearer Dar es Salaam, 
Morogoro’s ‘diversified’ households amounted to some 46.2% prior to liberalisation, 
increasing much more dramatically to 88.3% in 1995 (Ponte 2002, p. 136). 
Whatever the extent of pre-liberalisation diversification, it is substantially 
important as a source of income. Off-farm income in Songea made up 58.1% of incomes 
in the mid-1980s declining slightly to 52.4% in 1995. Morogoro, once again, suggests a 																																																								
13 That said, in Morogoro, proximate to Dar es Salaam, the proportion of households with members 
involved in non-farm wage-labour at all increased slightly from 12.5 in the mid-1980s to 17% in 1994/5, 
but fell slightly in Songea from an already low base in the same period. It seems reasonable to surmise 
that proximity to Dar es Salaam - Tanzania's great metropolis - significantly impinges on the political 
economy of Morogoro. Even so, it remains the case that in both regions, both as a primary occupation 
and as a proportion of income, non-farm wage labour was not only low, but falling (Ponte 2002, pp. 
135–9). 
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more dramatic experience of liberalisation, where off-farm income increased as a 
proportion from 42.8% to 68.9% in the same period. Simultaneously farming income 
was falling in both regions. This is all rather suggestive of a social form under pressure. 
Nonetheless, aside from the simple fact that much diversification pre-dated 
liberalisation, there is still a good reason to suppose that the reproductive logic of the 
political market was a necessary pre-condition to these trends. To the extent that 
diversification was an advancement of the division of labour, it would not have been 
possible in the dispersed pattern of settlements that pre-existed Arusha nor without 
such state provision that was maintained in the face of liberalisation. 
Proceeding to draw these threads together to restate the political market claim, 
Deborah Bryceson’s (2010) work provides a further helpful data point. Examining a 
small town, Katoro-Buseresere, near Lake Victoria - far from both Songea and 
Morogoro - she notes that it emerged as a modestly sized urban area after the Arusha 
process. And it has done so with success, enjoying substantial prosperity in Tanzanian 
terms. Bryceson points to its developed division of labour and broad range of economic 
activity. Whilst it plainly does not exhibit the egalitarian socialist pattern Nyerere had 
wished for, she points out that ‘this settlement owes it origin to Nyerere's villagisation 
campaign’ (Bryceson 2010, p. 88). 
This is so because, in a point that is deeply complementary to this thesis’, it 
‘retains an agrarian foundation with a large proportion of its residents engaged in 
farming for household food provisioning in the nearby fields surrounding the 
settlement’ (Bryceson 2010, p. 88).14 This case study underlines that the citizen-peasant 
formation pointed to here is not only an agrarian phenomenon. Rather, so long as 
effective possession of farming land is retained, there is no reason in the political 
market’s logic why the citizen-peasant’s activities cannot be diverse and flexible. 
Indeed, and as a consequence, it is a logic that impinges on processes of urbanisation, 
artisanal industries and perhaps beyond. This is the beginnings of a wider claim, to be 
developed below, that the core claims of this thesis also constitute an ongoing process. 
From the origins of the political market and villagisation of the 1970s, to diversification 
and urbanisation of the Katoro-Buseresere sort, it is a dynamic process. 
Flexible as it has been, the citizen-peasant has nonetheless also been threatened by 
crisis and liberalisation. What might this reveal about the political market? First, and 
most basically, it did continue to operate, fertiliser subsidies, social services and 																																																								
14 Thus, although in her terminology there is an overall trend toward 'de-peasantisation', her argument 
is supportive of the citizen-peasant claim advanced in this thesis. 
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infrastructure were all maintained to the end of ensuring that ‘the market’ was 
sufficiently attractive to the citizen-peasant not to ‘withdraw’ à la Hydén.  In fact, 
increasingly desperate attempts to maintain these features, with the state fighting 
running battles to defend fertiliser subsidies from the demands of IFIs, suggests the 
importance of the political market more than anything else. 
These rear-guard battles in defence of the political market raise a further point. 
This Section began with a rehearsal of fiscal crisis, but a fundamental cause of that 
crisis was the need to make provision via the political market. Yet the citizen-peasant, 
on which this is based, has not been capable of generating surpluses sufficient to 
reliably pay for that system. For this reason, such a system would inevitably be prone 
to crises of this sort. In order to break out of that tendency there would need to be a 
great deal more ‘diversification’ into more value added activities than ‘subsistence plus’ 
farming. And that, it must be said, had most certainly not come to pass by even the 
end of the 20th century. Unsurprisingly, therefore, ‘development’ remains a much 
sought after prize in Tanzania, and none of the claims made around the citizen-
peasant should be taken to preclude such a point. This is an important issue for further 
reflection in the concluding Chapter. 
Absenting such a breakthrough, the Tanzanian state has sought to resolve its fiscal 
crisis – and the abiding structural issue the political market engenders – by resort to 
other sources of revenue, tourism and (mostly gold) mining in particular. So much so 
that it is has been, as much of the literature readily recognises, an outstanding feature 
of the liberalisation era in Tanzania (Chachage 1995, Gibbon 1995b, Kiondo 1995, Butler 
2004). One consequence of this, especially in mining, has been a degree of 
dispossession – mainly of artisanal miners rather than farmers – and, for a minority, is 
a direct threat in that sense. 
More fundamental, and widespread a threat, however, is not direct dispossession 
of the citizen-peasant but rather the possibility that the mechanism of compromise 
between state and peasant for which the political market stands becomes increasingly 
strained by the state’s resort to alternative sources of finance. The threat, if not yet the 
reality, is that the citizen-peasant becomes isolated as the state turns to benefit itself 
through encouraging the formation of James Ferguson’s 'islands of globalisation' (2006, 
pp. 34–8). Were that to happen the 'bridging' of peasant household and nation-state 
discussed in Chapter 5, and with it the core of the citizen-peasant claim, would have 
suffered terminal damage. Considerations such as these have driven the contentious 
politics in 1990s Tanzania to which Section II now turns. 
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II. Citizen-peasant and the politics of public ownership 
These contentious politics are crucial to establishing the entrenchment of the 
citizen-peasant. The pattern they throw up, in particular a strong politics of public 
ownership, amount to both a defence of the political market and, possibly, to its 
extension beyond the more immediate confines of the agrarian sphere in which it 
emerged in the 1970s. 
These contentious politics, firstly, underline the agency of the Tanzanian state, 
thereby suggesting it is not explicable as a ‘governance state’ (Harrison 2004). In a 
sense that agency is, perhaps, surprising given the raw measures of its power, but real 
nonetheless (Wangwe 2004, Brown 2013). Part of the explanation flows from the 
pressure imposed on it by the agency of the citizen-peasant. Citizenship, the bridging 
of peasant and nation-state, is fundamental to that ability to exert pressure on the state, 
especially so in a way that has not (yet) jeopardised Tanzania’s (romanticised but 
nonetheless real) reputation for stability. And, as has been intimated, it is this agency 
on which the political market continues to rest. It explains, for example, the 
determination of the state to maintain fertiliser subsidies for as long as possible, and 
after their eventual removal, restoration against the protests of donor agencies. 
The increasingly contentious politics that characterises Tanzania is analysed in 
Aminzade's historical sociology of Tanzanian nationalism (2013a, pt. III). He divides 
the neoliberal era chronologically as ‘Structural Adjustment’ (the 1980s) and tracks the 
political reaction to them in what he calls the ‘Neoliberal populism’ of the 1990s and 
then concludes, referring to a well-known literature, by pointing to a nascent 
‘Developmental state’ in 21st century Tanzania. 
Although this periodization has its uses, some criticisms of it will also emerge in 
this section. In particular, this work does not identify a sociological form for the 
bridging of nation and rural society, instead Aminzade resorts to a vague notion of 
‘nationalism’ that, at each analytical stage, is contrasted with the external influence of 
a global capitalism. On one hand it amounts to a useful typology, and plenty of useful 
material too, but on the other this treatment of nationalism and its ‘dialectical’ relation 
to a ‘global capitalism’ raises questions that the citizen-peasant claim can answer. 
The analysis can be resumed where Section I left off, with the potential for 
discontent aroused by the turn to mining as a source of finance, threatening to isolate 
the citizen-peasant in favour of ‘islands of globalisation’ constituted around such 
industries. As this analysis builds the reaction that Aminzade tracks as ‘neoliberal 
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populism’ can be recast as a contradictory attempt to sustain the political market. Yet 
in turning to mining and other such sources of finance, the state increasingly seemed 
to its citizens to be willing to resile from the agrarian-developmentalism that the 
‘political market’ amounted to. 
In constructing this argument, two central areas of contention are taken into 
account: land and corruption. President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005), the third 
president of Tanzania, took over from Ali Mwinyi (Nyerere’s immediate successor) 
seeking to tackle corruption whilst land had already forced its way firmly onto the 
national agenda during the Mwinyi era (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, Shivji 1998). 
Allied to this was a return, at least rhetorical if not real, to Nyerere-era 'people-centred 
development' (United Republic of Tanzania 1999). On that basis, went the claim, 
progress would be made in 'poverty reduction' with significant (renewed) investment 
in education and health services. These moves will be interpreted as an expression of 
enduring commitment to the political market. At the same time this was not a 
rejection of liberalisation per se, indeed the ambition was very much to be open and 
capital-friendly (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 256–8). Rather, what Aminzade calls ‘neoliberal 
populism’ and the ‘developmental state’ were at the heart of the attempt to find a site 
of compromise between such openness and the political market. 
What this meant, in particular, was that confrontation with capital could be 
avoided by fostering ‘a sense of ownership in neoliberal economic policies’. This could 
be populist nonetheless because its fruits were supposed ‘to stem the erosion of the 
social rights of citizenship by investing more in the provision of social services’ 
(Aminzade 2013a, pp. 261–2). In the terms of the thesis, its fruits were supposed to 
sustain the provision of the political market.  
This gesture at compromise would turn out to be mostly wishful thinking on the 
state’s part. Nonetheless the attempt to compromise is revealing. Whilst there is plenty 
of scope for critiquing ‘neoliberal populism’ as more rhetorical than real (Aminzade 
2013a, pp. 264–7) the gesture at compromise between these goals is a recurrent feature 
of these contentious politics. This same point emerges out of consideration of both the 
politics around land and, subsequently, the issue of corruption. And in both cases the 
attempt at compromise provoked further claims of public ownership. 
Land and citizen-peasant agency 
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Land, clearly foundational to the citizen-peasant, was subject to two central 
anxieties in this period. One was the looming threat of a breakdown in the political 
market, more plainly the services that had been provided systematically from the 1970s 
onward. Since, as Section I observed, farming incomes were declining and such vital 
things as fertiliser subsidy were in doubt, this concern is readily understandable. The 
reason it goes toward the issue of land is that without the assistance of the political 
market matters could well return to subsistence farming and/or an “involutionary” 
pattern of continued subdivision of plots might take hold. Second was the perception 
that ‘openness’ to capital also entailed their vulnerability to “land grabbing”. 
Not only was the period of the active extension and encouragement of peasant-led 
farming – which TAZARA was so central to – seemingly over, openness to capital 
amounted to an attitude on the part of (many) within the state that still 'unused'15 
areas could be offered for outside investment (Aminzade 2013a, p. 291). The prospect of 
openness to large-scale capital-intensive farming and, somewhat more often, non-
agrarian but land hungry enterprises such as mining (Chachage 1995, Butler 2004) and 
'wildlife' tourism/conservation(Neumann 2001) seemed to encapsulate both issues. 
First, it brooked the prospect of the isolation of the citizen-peasant from the efforts of 
the state, in which case how durable would promises of service provision prove? 
Second, it actively threatened land grabbing (Hall 2013, McMichael 2014b, Shivji 2000).  
These tensions run through 'neoliberal populism', whose allusions to ‘participatory 
development’ (United Republic of Tanzania 1999) in particular seemed to be honoured 
only in their breach (Aminzade 2013a, p. 267). This is best evidenced in the state’s 
rejection of many of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
on Land Matters (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, Rwegasira 2012, pp. 88–91) chaired 
by Issa Shivji.16 Indeed his book, reflecting on that process in the aftermath, illustrates 
the deeply political constitution of that issue: Not Yet Democracy: reforming land 
tenure in Tanzania (1998).17 
The Land Commission was appointed due to an increasingly widespread and 
deeply-felt concern for increasing land disputes (Rwegasira 2012, p. 89), reflecting the 
concerns of the citizen-peasant as outlined here. Taking its work very seriously indeed, 																																																								
15 This is, of course, an often-questionable categorisation, not least in the sense that land might not be 
used for arable farming but less ‘visibly’ for pastoral ends. 
16 Who was last seen critiquing Tanzanian socialism from a strong Marxist position in Chapter 5 (Shivji 
1976). 
17 Shivji further reflects there on an earlier era in which much of the Tanzanian left denied that there 
was a 'land question' (1998, p. vii). 
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the Commission gathered an enormous range of evidence, visiting all but two districts 
of Tanzania and interviewing a wide range of villagers. Out of that process they 
developed a set of proposals that came very close to formal codification of the social 
relations that have been described as the citizen-peasant by this thesis. 
There were two wings to these proposals. The first concerned 'uncultivated' spaces. 
Whilst all land was already vested in the state, held by the President as Trustee, 
uncultivated space would be categorised as 'national lands' and placed under the 
control of a National Lands Commission specifically accountable to Parliament. This 
would more closely subject the disposal of land to investors to democratic control, an 
innovation that went directly toward assuaging anxiety about the connection between 
government land policy and citizen-peasant interests. Secondly 'cultivated' land, that 
which was clearly occupied and used by farmers (citizen-peasants), would be 
categorised as ‘village land’. In turn that would vest the ultimate political power of the 
President over that land in local democratic institutions, village assemblies in 
particular (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, pt. II, Shivji 1998, pt. II). 
Aside from the significance of these proposals to codify the property relations of 
the citizen-peasant in law, the Commission’s report also constitutes an immense 
wealth of evidence in support of the suggestion that Tanzania was witnessing a wave of 
anxiety over land. Over two volumes, only one of which is widely available in the 
interests of confidentiality, the Commission brings a weight of evidence to bear that 
supports this view. 
The government's response, however, is equally instructive. It responded hastily 
with a National Land Policy in 1995, followed by a second (United Republic of Tanzania 
1997) which appeared to reject key aspects of these proposals, hence Issa Shivji’s 
evident dissatisfaction (Shivji 1998). Two new statutes followed those policy statements, 
the Land Act 1999 and Village Land Act 1999 (Rwegasira 2012, pp. 90–92). Whilst 
strongly reasserting the principle that all land was fundamentally public in ownership 
and that land rights flowed from use and occupancy, it eschewed the more democratic 
aspects of the Commission's recommendations. Political control over village land, in 
particular, would not be devolved to village assemblies but would remain a matter 
reserved for the President. That said, it did evince a protective stance as regards 
villages, in this sense conceiving the land issue as fundamentally one of conservation. 
The government was much more robust as regards National Land, outright 
rejecting proposals for democratic control over National Land and its disposal. The 
reason for this can only be that this proposal would, as the Commission intended, 
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directly curtail the ability of the state to make land ‘open’ to investors. Instead the 
Land Act 1999 allowed the President to allocate land to large-scale investors in 
amounts over 250 hectares. Moreover, even village land was defined to the exclusion of 
underground mineral rights, which could likewise be disposed of. Indeed, in 2002 the 
government would go on to establish a Land Bank specifically for the purpose of 
marketing 100,000 plots, amounting to 3.1 million hectares of land (Aminzade 2013a, p. 
267). 
Whilst this underlines land’s centrality to contentious politics, by the end of the 
century there was little reason for citizen-peasants to feel more optimistic than before 
the Land Commission. Although the state continued to evince a commitment to the 
political market and support for land rights that were currently in use, that seemed to 
extend no further than a doctrine of preservation. An inference that could be drawn 
from state policy was that the future of development in Tanzania lay in capital-
intensive, investor driven agriculture, mining, tourism and anything else the dictates of 
the world market might suggest. 
Corruption as a threat to the political market 
If land policy gave reason to fear isolation and encroaching land grabbing, growing 
corruption, which had become a major problem, seemed to threaten privatisation – in 
both legal and illegal senses – of the political market. Given the already severe 
limitation of resources available to the political market, even a small degree of 
corruption might have been troubling. Yet it was actually very substantial, increasingly 
recognised as a salient issue in Tanzania (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 264–267, 281–282, 281–
282, 337–349, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7, Coulson 2013, Edwards 2014). The overwhelmingly 
weight of evidence points, with differing emphases, to widespread discontent amongst 
both the Tanzanian public and aid donors.  
At root though it is the political market that conditions citizens’ objection to 
‘corruption’, perceiving it as a loss of resources that would otherwise be theirs. 
Threatened thus, an active sense of public ownership began to emerge in response. 
Corruption was objectionable as a particularly pernicious instance of privatisation 
(Ghanadan 2008, Aminzade 2013a, pp. 278–84). The movement against corruption, 
therefore, is part of a wider reassertion of ‘citizen ownership of public assets’ 
(Aminzade 2013a, p. 319) and anti-privatisation sentiment. Why, though, should 
Tanzania not evidence attitudes that evince a more straightforwardly ‘neo-patrimonial’ 
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approach in which corruption is more functional than dysfunctional, evidence par 
excellence of the politics of the belly (Bayart 2009, Bayart et al. 1999)? 
The answer lies in the specificities of the social form identified as the political 
market and citizen-peasant. The political nature of that market, and its allocation on 
the basis of formal equality (citizenship), militated against a patrimonial norm taking 
precedence. Clearly this cannot mean that corruption has been rare in Tanzania, but it 
does explain why it is so widely derided and very much a central feature of Tanzanian 
politics. And, if nothing else, it was continued corruption that suggests that Mkapa’s 
‘neoliberal populism’ was somewhat disingenuous. By the end of his tenure corruption 
had become an even greater concern than before, and discontent grew to so high a 
level that anti-corruption became the central pledge of the election campaign of his 
successor, Jakaya Kikwete in 2005 (Nyang’oro 2006). 
The mechanisms of contentious politics and public ownership 
Proceeding now to examine how these contentious politics manifested, the norm 
of public ownership becomes progressively clearer. This was primarily electoral in form, 
the citizen-peasant expressing its interests through the ballot box. In this sense the 
political constitution of Tanzanian modernity does conform to a key precept of liberal 
political theory but in a less recognised peasant context. Even so, there have also been 
important social movements that express related sentiments; but for the time being 
they have fed into, rather than contradicted, the formal electoral politics of the nation. 
Up until this point in the Chapter reference has been made to the Tanzanian state in 
general, but the primary means through which citizen-peasant discontent has 
manifested has been through the sensitivity of the ruling party, CCM (formerly TANU) 
to electoral politics (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 276–7). 
Since the socialist era’s single party democracy had given way, by the early 1990s, 
to multi-party democracy (Cranenburgh 1996) CCM as an institution became 
increasingly concerned at the prospect of losing power. In the face of dwindling 
support throughout the 1980s and 90s in the Mwinyi-era, CCM politicians looked to 
become more responsive to the electorate. Although under President Mwinyi CCM 
became increasingly associated with corruption, the party would subsequently try to 
reassert its close historical association with Nyerere, whose credentials on this point 
were impeccable. That said, CCM had reached such a low ebb in this regard that many, 
including senior members of CCM, saw multiparty politics as an opportunity for auto-
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critique and redemption. Foremost amongst this group was Nyerere himself, believing 
CCM would restore its reputation as popular movement for development in response 
to competitive pressure (Aminzade 2013a, p. 248). 
CCM’s difficulties, however, ought not to be exaggerated. Particularly in electoral 
terms, the danger was more prospective than current. At the time that multi-party 
democracy was adopted a survey showed 77% support for one-party democracy, many 
respondents voicing concerns that multiparty democracy might promote racial, 
religious and regional divisions (Cranenburgh 1996, Hydén 1999). And, in due course, 
support for CCM at the ballot box would continue to be robust (O’Gorman 2012, Morse 
2014). But it was Parliament, rather than Presidential elections, that was the epicentre 
of contentious politics; individual MPs were far more vulnerable to electoral losses 
than nationwide Presidential elections, though CCM did retain at all relevant times a 
healthy majority in Parliament too. Indeed, such has been the electoral strength of 
CCM that it has puzzled several writers (O’Gorman 2012, Morse 2014). 
Contentious politics’ impact at the ballot box emerged in stages. At first primarily 
expressed by a limited amount of protest at state’s refusal to budge from its basic 
‘compromise’ position of conserving the citizen-peasant whilst maintaining ‘openness’ 
to capital for the future. This reluctance, meanwhile, is understandable as the state was, 
at the time, enjoying real success as Tanzania became one of the top destinations for 
Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, which had been under $2m between 1986-91 rising 
to $1bn 1995-2000 (Aminzade 2013a, p. 257). 
What had begun to develop were factions within CCM, divided on the issue of 
corruption in particular. One was seen as ‘dirty’ and for corruption, the other anti-
corruption and driven by deep concern for CCM’s electoral prospects in the longer 
term if corruption continued unabated (Aminzade 2013a, p. 347). Since the emergence 
of these factions a great deal of the contentious politics found expression within CCM 
and between these sorts of groupings. Nyerere had been right up to a point though, 
multiparty politics had renewed CCM to that extent, electoral competition driving the 
emergence of the anti-corruption faction. 
Close attention to voting patterns illustrates the way this worked. Deploying 
quantitative methods, O’Gorman (2012) articulates this as a basic challenge for 
democratisation literature. CCM has, she notes, remained persistently dominant even 
with the establishment of multiparty politics. Whilst criticisms have been made of the 
quality of Tanzania’s democratic processes, they are not so great as to explain away 
CCM’s dominance which is built on a genuine and substantial rural support base. 
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Whereas other parties have made real progress in attracting support in Tanzania’s 
large cities, the countryside has essentially remained a single party state (Aminzade 
2013a, p. 277, O’Gorman 2012, n. 3, Morse 2014, p. 663). 
This is deeply ‘puzzling’ O'Gorman (2012, p. 318, Lofchie 2014, p. 215), suggests 
because liberalisation has harmed those rural areas and CCM is, she suggests, the party 
of liberalisation. That premise in place, she casts around for an explanation for the 
attachment of 'subsistence farmers' to CCM. Yet the equation of CCM with 
liberalisation is flawed, neglecting the internal divisions within the party and the 
significance of its earlier history under Nyerere. Voters tend to cast their vote for CCM 
on the basis of that longer historical memory, and on that basis CCM’s reputation as 
‘pro-rural’ is both more durable and reasonable than O’Gorman allows (Morse 2014). 
More significantly still, policy was more responsive to rural interests – the imperative 
to maintain the political market - even at the height of liberalisation, as has been noted 
at various points above. Foremost amongst these is the long rear-guard battle to retain 
fertiliser subsidies and, latterly, the restoration of fertiliser subsidies (Kjær and 
Therkildsen 2013, pp. 600–1). 
Regional voting patterns further encourage the impression that not only is CCM 
the party of the countryside; it is the party most closely associated with the heartland 
of the citizen-peasant. Whilst rural areas in general strongly support CCM, its greatest 
strongholds are in southern and central Tanzania, and the Southern Highlands most 
especially of all. Meanwhile its weakest rural areas are the Lake regions, in the North-
West of Tanzania, where export crops remain paramount (Morse 2014, pp. 663–4). This 
is surely no coincidence, given the great significance of CCM/TANU’s historical 
activities in these regions. And that history, alongside a degree of continued 
responsiveness to citizen-peasant demands, has maintained its electability for the time 
being. But this has not been a foregone conclusion; rather it is a position that has been 
reinforced by making some concessions and engaging in robust intra-party debate on 
the issues that are most sorely contested. 
All of which had generated pressure on the Tanzanian state to try and respond to 
concerns over land and corruption. Indeed ‘neoliberal populism’, as noted at the outset, 
at the least tried to pay lip service to them. Meanwhile the appointment of the Land 
Commission and partial acceptance of its recommendations do show effective agency, 
via electoral politics, of the citizen-peasant. That agency was, in turn, a major driving 
force behind the Tanzanian state’s search for a greater scope of action in its dealings 
with IFIs and the ‘donor community’ in general as the 1990s wore on. Far from being 
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simply a responsive conduit to ‘Western demands for...liberalisation’ (Pinkney 2001, p. 
139) it was, at minimum trying to strike a balance between them and the political 
market. 
Given this, the citizen-peasant is an irreducible sociological basis for the agency 
the Tanzanian state increasingly exercised in its international relations. In this sense it 
is supplemental to recent work looking to revise readings such as the ‘governance state’ 
(Harrison 2004), distinguishing between 'autonomy', which has been hampered and 
'sovereignty' which is far from extinguished in the case of Tanzania (Wangwe 2004, 
Brown 2013, pp. 276–7). This argument runs even amidst the consequences of fiscal 
crisis and stark inequality between the Tanzanian state and the donors with which it 
was negotiating. Whilst the late 1980s and early 1990s might have been a ‘period of 
defeat’, a quite different reading of the following years seems to emerge which is seen 
as a period of reclamation or recovery from those defeats (Wangwe 2004, p. 387). This 
period of recovery can be dated to the mid-1990s, beginning with the Helleiner Report 
(Helleiner 1995) which was commissioned by the Tanzanian government and seminal 
to a shift to 'partnership' in aid and development rhetoric (Brown 2013, pp. 276–7).18 
All of this raises the question of international relations. Whilst interactivity, 
derived from the international dimension of social life, was central to the previous 
Chapter’s argument, it has so far received little direct attention, an issue which is 
addressed in section III. Before doing so, the politics of public ownership that arises 
from these contentious politics must be fully specified. 
In 1999, protesters against a South African company’s plans to restructure 
TANESCO, the state owned electricity company, did so whilst clutching pictures of 
Nyerere and slogans stating ‘TANESCO, its dams, and electricity are the hard efforts of 
Nyerere and Tanzanian citizens!’ (Aminzade 2013a, p. 242). No mere ‘nostalgia’ for the 
socialist past, or mere ‘rhetoric’, this was part of a growing sense of public – that is, 
citizens’ – ownership of Tanzania’s infrastructure and resources. First, whilst this was 
primarily a workers’ protest these were not expressed as particularly workers’ interests, 
but those of the nation as a whole. 
This highlights an intriguing possibility that the political market as it pertains to 
specifically rural concerns might grow into a much broader claim. That is it might 
grow from specific concerns for the agrarian sphere but a conception of all land and 
resources of the nation as the patrimony of the entire nation, and subject to the 																																																								
18 See (Brown 2009) for a wider argument around the role of aid in African International relations, itself 
deploying a U&CD method. 
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political market in that sense. It must be conceded that the point is speculative, but it 
is not baseless; moreover, it serves to highlight the possibilities involved in the citizen-
peasant social form. 
Related to this is the strong anti-privatisation movement in Tanzania. Sometime 
later, after the defeat of those 1999 protests, the Tanzanian government backtracked, 
reversing the South African company’s contract in 2006 (Aminzade 2013a, p. 282, 
Ghanadan 2008). This was not an isolated case, but one of many that, Aminzade (2013a, 
chaps 8–10) deploys over the course of several chapters. He explains discontent with 
privatisations by reference to nationalism. By deploying the citizen-peasant as a 
sociological basis for nationalism and a specific norm of public ownership, can be given 
a stronger foundation. 
Further speculation on this point can be reserved for the concluding Chapter. 
Notwithstanding these points, a more modest claim can be advanced. The politics of 
public ownership, in the form of the established claim around the political market, do 
hold sway in rural Tanzania. Furthermore, as the majority of the population and 
empowered through electoral politics, Tanzanian politics can be expected to remain 
deeply under their influence. Having pressed for vindication of their rights through the 
Land Commission of the 1990s, the citizen-peasant was very much an entrenched and 
pervasive feature of Tanzanian society at the end of the 20th century. Finally, it might 
also be added that the attempt to entrench democratic political control of land, for 
which the Report of the Commission so strongly came out, would have a claim to be a 
leading edge of progressive politics in virtually any nation in the world. In this sense, 
Tanzania is very much a participant in modern world history. 
III. Wither Third Worldism? Tanzania, China and the 
international in the late 20th century 
If the citizen-peasant was an entrenched feature in Tanzania long after Arusha 
what of the significance, empirical and theoretical, for interactivity and international 
relations? China has been a clear feature of the argument through Chapters 4 and 5, so 
some comments on Sino-Tanzanian relations since the era of TAZARA are necessary. 
 Prima facie it is tempting to conclude that, in fact, there is little to say. ‘It is hard’, 
wrote Gerald Segal ‘to make a case that Africa matters very much to China’ (1992, p. 
116). In saying so he typifies a then common view borne of the contrast between 
China’s relations with African countries during the Maoist era, of which TAZARA is the 
most renowned, and the 1980s when relations became more muted. There were no new 
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large scale projects like TAZARA (Yu 1988, pp. 857–8). Indeed, some Chinese officials 
began to regard TAZARA as a white elephant that typified the excesses of an overly 
romantic Maoist internationalism. 
Coincident in time with the turn to ‘the market’ in China, as well as Tanzania’s 
crisis and later liberalisation, the bare facts seem to encourage the conclusion that the 
‘heroic age’ of relations between ‘unequal equals’ is little more than a footnote to the 
wider failure of Third Worldism and the dominance of liberalism since the end of the 
Cold War (Rosenberg 1994, pp. 132–3). Failure in Third Worldism is, like failure as an 
analysis of Arusha, not so much wrong as unnecessarily limited. Restricting this to the 
unequal equals issue for now, the first point to make is that to a great extent those 
interactive relations became more muted because their work had been completed. This 
was especially so in China’s case, its immediate aims having been accomplished with 
entry to the UN and rapprochement with the US, the geopolitical imperatives 
propelling Third Worldism were far less urgent. 
Tanzania, for its part, remained eager for further projects in the vein of TAZARA 
that were not to materialise; nonetheless those earlier relations, TAZARA in particular, 
had been deeply consequential in the manner described. Not only had the citizen-
peasant become an entrenched form; Tanzania had gone from being a particularly 
vulnerable and insignificant (from the donor states’ perspective) nation in the 1960s to, 
a donor darling in the 1970s; more significant still is the establishment of sovereignty 
as the last redoubt for a Tanzanian state faced with both fiscal crisis and financially 
powerful donors by the 1980s and 1990s (Brown 2013). The contrast with the 1960s 
(when upon disagreement donors simply left Nyerere to his own devices) and the 1990s 
is too strong to ignore. Even for all its difficulties, the Tanzanian state was able to bring 
to bear sufficient diplomatic weight to exercise real agency and command (a significant 
degree of) respect for its sovereignty through the Helleiner Report. The supportive role 
that Third Worldism, and Sino-Tanzanian relations particularly, had played in 
establishing these principles were considerable. 
The principal focus of this thesis has been on the citizen-peasant as an emergent 
property of an interactive process, and in this regard that claim has been made out. 
Taking the point on sovereignty too far would soon find itself in difficult waters which 
are not central to this thesis which has been primarily concerned with the 
incommensurability problem. That said, it does seem reasonable to conclude that 
those relations play some significant part in the extension and entrenchment of 
sovereignty as a principle that holds for nations such as Tanzania that lack the 
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‘traditional variables of power’.19 It is at least arguable that Sino-Tanzanian relations, 
and Third Worldism in general, had not just provoked those donor countries into pro-
active aid policies; they were likewise provoked to closer adherence to sovereignty as a 
principle for all, “even” Tanzania and other weak nations in Great Power terms.20 
In this light, a few clarifications of Segal’s views can be registered. First, though the 
decline between the 1970s and 1980s was precipitous it was not abandonment. The 
Chinese were instead content to simply maintain their relations with Tanzania, having 
secured their immediate key goals (Yu 1988, p. 855), but were not willing to give up on 
the diplomatic advantages residual Third Worldism conferred. To this end aid 
relations with Tanzania actually continued at a relatively substantial level (Ai 1999). 
Indeed, TAZARA is something of a bellwether: by the 1980s the Chinese were 
restricting themselves to maintaining the railway during the years of fiscal crisis. 
Nonetheless, the calculation was that the continued symbolic value of the project 
outweighed the continued cost. Thus Segal was perhaps a little too negative in his 
conclusion. 
A further point, and writing from the vantage point of 2015 it is almost banal to say 
so, the more notable thing about the decline in Chinese interest in Africa is its brevity. 
Beginning with the end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square protests, Chinese 
interest in Africa began to pick up pace and soon became a headlong rush after the 
mid-1990s (Taylor 1998). Since that point trade and aid have both risen at exponential 
rates, a phenomenon that to a great extent had a political impetus with Jiang Zemin's 
'going out' policy (Alden and Large 2011). The significance of such a move is not only 
vast and much contested, it is both ongoing and fast-paced; even so, the term ‘unequal 
equals’ has been taken up by many working on the topic (Alden and Large 2011, pp. 22, 
30, Large 2008) indicating its continued suggestiveness nearly 50 years after Nyerere 
used the phrase.21 																																																								
19 An issue that IR theory too is not necessarily alive to, which is often focussed on Great Power politics 
to the exclusion of others (Mearsheimer 2014). 
20 Sovereignty as a principle remained at the core of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric too. At the 12th 
National Congress of the CCP in 1982 the strong articulation of sovereignty for all was advanced, 
making it clear that it must take within its ambit not just the Great Powers but also Tanzania or, one  
might add, Costa Rica or Malaysia (Waltz 1979, p. 73). China, it was declared, would hold fast to the 
‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’, reiterating that ‘imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism’ 
remained ‘the main source of instability and turmoil in the world’ and therefore ‘national independence 
and state sovereignty’ remained indispensable (Yu 1988, p. 856). 
21 For a lengthier claim that ‘unequal equals’ could be a useful problématique for contemporary studies 
of ‘China in Africa’ see (A’Zami 2015). It might be the case that ‘unequal equals’ stands for little more 
than the principle of sovereignty between “Great Powers” and minor ones; but if so, it is part of (causal 
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Conclusion 
Over the course of Chapters 4 to 6, the methodology proffered in Chapter 3 has 
been fleshed out to offer the citizen-peasant as a historically realised form of U&CD. 
This Chapter completes the argument by pointing the entrenchment of this form 
beyond the Arusha Declaration era up to the cusp of the 21st century. Long since 
socialism had been abandoned, in practice and rhetoric, the citizen-peasant has 
remained a central feature of Tanzanian society. 
This has been an important to establish because, in the face of a literature that 
posits Arusha as a failure and then proceeds to reproduce (aspects of) the peasant-
modernity problem once again, the citizen-peasant continues to provide an analytical 
basis for supplanting that problem. These problems manifest in the insistence on 
applying an abstract theory of the market and rationality (Bates) and/or in repeated 
predictions of incipient proletarianisation. In other words, a return to the exaggeration 
that attend erasure of the (citizen-)peasant witnessed in Chapter 2. Instead this 
realised form of combined development, fissile modernity and protean peasant, better 
explains features those exaggerations struggle with.  
Furthermore, the pattern of political contention detected in Tanzania in this 
period is elemental too. These patterns have been related, in substantial part, to the 
citizen-peasant form. Protests against privatisation and corruption revolve around 
defence of the political market and the opportunities it generates; meanwhile, through 
the Land Commission episode, land continues to be the centre of national life and an 
object of sometimes innovative policy debate. In both ways, this Chapter suggests that 
the processes examined throughout this thesis are still ongoing and might yet yield 
continued social innovation. 
Whilst these features complete the argument, offering a reconciliation of Marx and 
Arusha through a reading post-colonial Tanzania in the 2oth century, these 
speculations obviously also pertain to what the prospects of this social form might be 
in the 21st century. Beyond the question of public ownership this also includes possible 
implications the citizen-peasant might have beyond ‘the village’, in particular whether 
and how the citizen-peasant could impinge on urbanisation and perhaps even 
industrialisation, the latter of which is still far more an aspiration than reality in 
																																																																																																																																																																		
or not) a clear extension of sovereignty as opposed to the 19th and early 20th centuries. In other words, 
the USA and UK might also be ‘unequal equals’, but from the vantage point of that earlier time China 
and Tanzania being instances of the same surely has the ring of significance. 
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contemporary Tanzania. Finally, in discussion of the international dimension, the 
resurgence in relations between China and Tanzania (actually, Africa in general) in 
recent years was noted. In all these senses, there is a great of deal of unfinished and 
ongoing business in the 21st century. Thus in the final Chapter, by way of conclusion, 
some reflections are offered as to whether and how the citizen-peasant might continue 
in its career as a protean subject of modernity; and, if so, what preliminary 
observations that might yield for the wider historical conjuncture. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Citizen-peasants in the 
21st century? 
‘At the World Bank the first question they asked me was ‘how did you fail?’ I 
responded that we took over a country with 85 per cent of its adult population 
illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were 2 trained 
engineers and 12 doctors…When I stepped down there was 91-per-cent literacy and 
nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands of engineers and doctors 
and teachers. 
In 1988 Tanzania’s per-capita income was $280. Now, in 1998, it is $140. So I asked the 
World Bank people what went wrong…Enrolment in school has plummeted to 63 per 
cent and conditions in health and other social services have deteriorated. I asked them 
again: ‘what went wrong?’ These people just sat there looking at me. Then they asked 
what could they do? I told them have some humility. Humility – they are so arrogant!’ 
Julius K. Nyerere (Bunting 1999). 
Introduction 
What are the prospects for the citizen-peasant in the 21st century? In drawing out 
the implications of the theoretical and methodological (Chapters 2 and 3) and 
empirical (Chapter 4-6) propositions of the thesis, three sets of comments are offered 
here. Each illustrates the implications and limitations of those arguments, using them 
to, in effect, point out how further research might proceed. 
The first considers the world historical ‘liberal’ moment since the end of the Cold 
War. ‘Liberal internationalism stands triumphant’ John Ikenberry concludes, ‘but also 
more alone and vulnerable’ (2010, p. 556). Prompted by that intriguing combination of 
self-confidence and vulnerability, the proffered comments lift the bonnet on the liberal 
moment – treating ‘liberal’ in the broadest sense possible - of markets and civil society 
to show how stubborn difference, as exemplified but hardly exhausted by Tanzania and 
the citizen-peasant, is as a contributory factor to that liberal anxiety. 
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It is a particular irony of this conjuncture that difference has become more rather 
than less intellectually troubling in the era of liberal triumph. Even if it ever was 
defensible to restrict analysis to a liberal core, and the premises of U&CD perhaps cast 
doubt on this, justifying such a move in the present would be particularly difficult. 
Amongst other things, what must be explained is the participation in this liberal order 
of societies that do not conform to liberalism’s sociological premises and prescriptions. 
Yet difference has long been a problem for liberal approaches. Just as often as 
liberalism, and those drawn into its intellectual orbit such as the early Marx, begins to 
regard itself as triumphant, its corresponding failure to create a world in its own image, 
thereby eradicating difference, soon rises to the surface.1 
This is the significance of the epigraph, again drawn from Nyerere, reflecting on 
the idea of failure in an interview toward the end of his life. Whilst his own political 
programme had failed there is, he points out, plenty of failure to go around. In 
particular, that spearhead of liberalisation, the World Bank, ought to recognise its own. 
For the most part this is expressed as self-vindication suggesting that for all his 
problems Nyerere’s leadership had seen Tanzania advance by reference to various 
developmental metrics, whereas those same metrics had plummeted when 
liberalisation had taken hold. Beneath this is a more important point still: starting with 
British colonialism, and then pivoting to the World Bank, his point serves to highlight 
the failure of both to procure anything resembling convergence on liberal modernity. 
Those ‘World Bank people’, taken aback – at root, by difference or non-
convergence in spite of their efforts – asked Nyerere what their response should be. 
‘Humility’, went his reply; his prescription is, Section I argues, no less apposite for 
liberalism in general. Pointing to difference, and the citizen-peasant in particular, it 
might be helpful to approach the liberal moment as a set of interactions across 
difference rather than waiting for a moment of convergence which never quite arrives. 																																																								
1 In the current conjuncture witness, for example, all the energetic discussion of supposedly convergent 
BRICs (Mahbubani 2013). Whilst in any case ‘convergence’ is more a prediction based on forward 
projections, they evince a tendency to neglect, say, the profound sociological differences between 
present-day China and India and the US and UK. This is no small difficulty, witness just one example. 
Is the rise of China explicable in liberal terms? And, in any case, what is its trajectory? Its emergence, 
Perry Anderson points out (2007, p. 6), ‘as the new workshop of the world’ is ‘not just the rapid 
expansion of one outsize national economy, but a structural alteration of the world market, with a 
global impact closer to Victorian England than the more parochial settings of Gilded Age—perhaps 
even Post-War—America’. Yet, and the failing is not his but a reflection of the topic’s great difficulty, 
Anderson is reluctant to commit himself to a clear analysis, instead issuing a ‘suspended judgement’ 
(Wang 2015, p. 37). Thus, Anderson concludes ‘[t]owards what horizon the mega-junk of the PRC is 
moving resists calculation, at least of any current astrolabe’ (Anderson 2010, p. 96). 
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Turning from that point, Section II proceeds to revisit some of those threads that 
arose in discussing the citizen-peasant in Chapter 6. Revisiting questions of rural 
development and political market, the potential implications for urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the wider possibility of public ownership and finally the dramatic 
acceleration of ‘China in Africa’ in recent years, the terrain is sketched. Upon doing so, 
this reveals significant limitations, not just empirical but at a methodological level. 
Whilst this points toward an agenda for further research, it also leads to Section III, 
which concludes by reflecting on what this research has, and has not, been able to say 
about difference, modernity and international relations. 
I. Difference as interaction in the liberal conjuncture? 
Liberalism advances a formidable set of claims in the contemporary conjuncture. 
Pointing to both a tremendous extension of ‘markets’ and a powerful political zeitgeist 
of civil society, democracy and universal rights (the ‘liberal state’). Especially when 
compared to the obvious ideological cleavages and deep unevenness of the ‘short 20th 
century’ (Hobsbawm 1995) that preceded this liberal moment, its claim to 
predominance is powerful indeed, ‘the empire of civil society had struck back’ 
(Rosenberg 2005, p. 57). 
Furthermore, and despite the claims for its difference up to now, contemporary 
Tanzania seems to be no exception at first glance. Having already observed its 
‘abandonment’ of socialism and the onset of liberalisation, as well as the emergence of 
multi-party politics in Chapter 6, the urge to cast Tanzania in liberal terms has some 
purchase. And this only becomes more pressing upon proceeding to the 21st century. 
Tanzania has become an ever more quiescent participant in the world market, remains 
deeply engaged with the Bretton Woods institutions and no less susceptible to the 
liberal zeitgeist of democratisation. Finally, as if to refute the humility point Nyerere 
makes, as Tanzania is seen as shifting from ‘state-’ to ‘market-led’ development it has 
come to be narrated as an economic ‘success story’, exhibiting one of the highest GDP 
growth rates in the world at around 7% (Nord 2009, Robinson et al. 2011).2 
As such, much of the literature on Tanzania proceeds along the parallel lines of 
liberal ontology: state, civil society and market, divided between politics and 
economics. In the political dimension emphasis rests on stability, democracy and ‘civil 																																																								
2 The pitfalls of boosterism await the unwary. Not only due to the limitations of GDP growth as an 
analytical tool, but also concerns regarding data quality (Jerven 2013) and the low base from which 
these growth figures start in Tanzania. 
		
149	
peace’ by which is meant the absence of sectarian politics of racial, ethnic or religious 
stripe (Lofchie 2014, pp. 1–18, 199–201, Green 2011, Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333, 2014b, 
pp. 10–11). For the most part this is represented as continuity with the past – ‘Nyerere’s 
legacy’ – sometimes verging on a degree of romantic ‘Tanzaphilia’ (Mazrui 1997). 
The economic dimension is also represented as successful, contrasted with the 
record of socialist ‘failure’ and crisis (Nord 2009, Robinson et al. 2011), emphasising a 
break with that past. Although some of these accounts are celebratory in tone, most 
deploy critical nuance, introduced by pointing to the limited (at best) correlation 
between growth and living standards, widening inequality and corruption (Aminzade 
2013a, pt. III, Coulson 2013, pp. 1–20, Edwards 2014, chap. 11, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7). 
Nonetheless the paradigm shift, from state to market, is a well-established proposition.  
The concern that will nonetheless be expressed around this outline of the liberal 
moment aligns, again, with the peasant-modernity problem. For all the importance of 
this body of scholarship, and at root its indubitable proposition that Tanzania (along 
with so many other nations) is now an active participant in the ‘liberal order’, its 
premises are mistaken. Difference, in the form of the sociological figure that is the 
citizen-peasant, remains in place. As such, the presumption that ‘state’ and ‘market’ are 
separable categories is problematic. 
As has been shown this does not entail the absence of markets, but it does entail 
the absence of dependence in an economic sense; therefore, as both a theoretical 
proposition and a concrete one in Tanzania, these markets are political markets. Due 
to this basic non-convergence, sweeping away the foundational premise for ‘states and 
markets’ analysis, the call for liberal analysis is something of a siren-call; in its pursuit 
the attempt to square it with sociological difference flounders. And this is so both for 
accounts of political stability and economic success, each contributing to a 
mystification of their objects of explanation: ‘stability’ and ‘success’.  
The political stability theme can be briefly addressed. Largely playing up 
continuity with the socialist era (Green 2011, Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333), it can only 
be incorporated alongside a broader attachment to liberal premises via a sociologically 
thin reading of nationalism in which Tanzanian citizens are posited without reference 
to any foundational social form they might have (Aminzade 2013a).3 
This matters because it is this very thinness that serves to erase significant 
difference. If one inquires into those foundations, the core elements of the citizen-																																																								
3 This is not to suggest that this work evinces no sociological analysis, only that it does not provide a 
foundation for the otherwise insightful and careful account of Tanzanian nationalism. 
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peasant claim would emerge. In particular, the unity of labour and property combined 
with the formal equality of citizenship that, in turn, is founded in the political market. 
These, it has been argued, are central to the bridging of nation-state and peasant 
household. Without it explanations of ‘civil peace’ and so on are thin, but with it the 
difficulty around the separation of states and markets would have to be addressed. In 
this sense this claim is similar to Chatterjee’s analysis of post-colonial Indian politics 
(2004, 2011) encountered in Chapter 2, except that the peasant is placed at the centre of 
the account of Tanzanian politics rather than marginal thereto. A particular difficulty 
that can arise without this point is overemphasis on stability to the exclusion or 
diminution of the contentious politics discovered in Chapter 6.4 
Greater difficulties still occur in respect of the economic theme. Presuming the 
market as a standing category, there is no less sociological thinness here. Accounts for 
the shift, to say nothing of their definition, from state-led to market-led economics are 
limited to a policy shift. In turn that shift is often seen as an external imposition of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, thereafter presuming convergence on market dependency 
and sharply delineated from the political theme.5 The success story that is Tanzania’s 
‘economy’ is then seen as explicable in terms of self-sustaining growth, with politics 
intervening either to foster or impede it rather than constitute it (Lofchie 2014, chap. 7). 
When Lofchie then comes to actually develop a ‘political economy’ of Tanzania in this 
period, it conceives politics in precisely this vein; an intrusion into an otherwise 
autonomous economy. That intervention, in his view, is mostly in the nature of a 
corrupt elite parasitically attaching itself to a market-economy. 
This, he says, is ‘crony capitalism…in which political power and economic wealth 
are inextricably intertwined’. Nevertheless, it is ‘unimportant to consider the direction 
of causality since…wealth is a source of political power’ and ‘power is the gateway to 
wealth’. Thus reuniting politics and economics at a later conceptual point, his political 
economy is limited to distributional questions; corruption is seen as a sort of skimming 
the top off from the products of a set of market relations that themselves remain 																																																								
4 Aminzade does not do this, but does attribute significance to nationalism as being founded in 
opposition to outsiders, racial and national. Whilst this is so, I think it is somewhat overplayed; more 
importantly though, it does not explain why difference along ethnic lines should not arise once again 
alongside those constructed ‘others’? 
5 Tanzania may be exceptional as an African nation that has eschewed ethnic politics, says Michael 
Lofchie (2014, p. 18) underlining the presumption of separation: whilst Tanzania may have ‘little in 
common’ with the rest of Africa in political terms, he continues, its ‘economic trajectory…has almost 
everything in common’. 
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mysterious. His interest is not in ‘how the system operates from day to day’ but rather 
its long term prospects (Lofchie 2014, p. 201). Neglecting ‘day to day’ operation 
highlights the elision since, if the current argument holds, ‘day to day’ operations 
require at least some reference to the citizen-peasant and political market. 
Of course this does not suggest that corruption is not a central category for inquiry, 
already looked at in Chapter 6. But it does suggest that this approach does not reveal 
anything about ‘the mechanisms through which grand corruption influences economic 
development’ (Gray 2015, p. 3). That would require working out the day-to-day 
operation of the system. Corruption in Tanzania, instead, should be seen as one 
(leading) aspect of the deeply political constitution of productive activity to which the 
citizen-peasant pertains to (at least in rural areas) and perhaps further, a point 
considered in Section II. 
Returning directly to the question of participation in the liberal order this issue is 
often addressed by reference to an ‘islands of globalisation’ approach (Ferguson 2006, 
pp. 34–38). The suggestion is that the only sites of importance in Tanzania (to the 
globalised world) are particular islands whilst ‘capital’ skips the rest. One point made 
in Chapter 6 was the possibility, and fear, that the Tanzanian state was moving toward 
precisely such an orientation. ‘The economy was already growing [in 2005]’ writes 
Coulson, which was ‘led by mining and tourism, and manufacturing exports to other 
African countries’ (2013, p. 7). Emphasis on these industries, which is a common 
feature, is instructive. 
Recognition of the potential for movement in that direction on one hand, and 
presuming its realisation on the other, are two quite different propositions though. 
Moreover, these industries, or ‘islands’ do not ‘lead’ to the extent suggested. The 
contribution to the overall growth rate of each of these sectors, mining especially, is 
modest relative to the attention they receive. Between 2000-5 mining contributed only 
0.4% of average growth, whilst manufacturing amounted to 0.6% of an approximate 
total of 7%. Meanwhile, services contributed 2.1% and the agricultural sector 2.3% (Utz 
2008, p. 21). Simply put ‘success’ even in the relatively narrow terms of GDP growth is 
not reducible to the export of raw materials and tourism, therefore in neither respect is 
an ‘islands of globalisation’ method sufficient. 
It is the states and markets approach, or rather its presumption, which threatens to 
mislead here. Mining, for example, gets so much attention due to its visibility to that 
approach. It is an industry that is increasingly dominated by large-scale, capital-
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intensive enterprises,6 dependent on FDI and outward oriented, contributing 32% of 
Tanzania’s exports (Ferguson 2006). Requiring little wage-labour in situ in any case, 
the sparseness of anything like a proletariat is obscured from view, whilst the 
domination of the sector by foreign corporations seems to vindicate a premise of 
market dependency by supposing that it applies to those corporations and their 
immersion in wider global capitalism. 
None of this means that analyses of these particular sites are wrong within the 
particular purview of outward-oriented mining. What it does mean is that when those 
terms of reference are taken as given for Tanzania as a whole, problems emerge. If 
those islands of globalisation were an established reality, that would not be so 
objectionable since it would substantially justify the approach to Tanzania’s 
participation in the world market. Yet even the bare facts of the success story suggest 
something more broadly based is required. Moreover, increasing political agitation 
around the politics of ownership amounts to a direct challenge to the emergence of 
said ‘islands’. 
To appreciate the significance of this a backward step is helpful. Even when these 
problems are recognised, they do no dissolve away. Just as both the general problems – 
modernity-difference and peasant-modernity – do not melt away upon recognition of 
difference, neither does the impulse to liberal analysis in this conjuncture dissolve 
upon simple specification of the citizen-peasant. The reason is its seductive power, 
pointing to the powerful upsurge in ‘globalisation’ following the Cold War, of which 
Tanzania seems just one small part, whilst offering a powerful set of interpretive claims. 
Thus, quite rightly impressed by the world historical significance of the liberal moment, 
many proceed to take refuge in a liberal analysis, for all its problems. 
Again, this threatens to reproduce the modernity end of the problem that was 
addressed in Chapter 2. The world market is, usually, the mechanism that is seen as 
generating a convergent effect, and supplies a particularly powerful worldview alone. 
Indeed this was the view of both Adam Smith and early, Manifesto Marx (Brenner 1977, 
pp. 25–26, 90) and similar notions can be found in (many) ideas of globalisation as well 
as many neo-Marxist accounts of imperialism, perhaps even David Harvey’s(2003, chap. 
																																																								
6 But see (Bryceson 2013) for an argument that even in mining this is, at best, a simplification. To the 
extent that ‘artisanal miners’ continue to be a major factor, this is actually supportive of the wider 
point about citizen-peasants since the former can fit in this category mutatis mutandis. 
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4, 2009).7 Yet, which is the ‘irony’ point made earlier, if nothing else the expansion of 
the liberal system cannot be construed in terms of the economic logic of the market 
alone because of difference. As such, the expansion of capitalist-/liberal-modernity 
itself must be a political, and therefore a geopolitical/international process (Teschke 
2003, pp. 264–265). 
The way out of this difficulty has been seen to lie in reference to unevenness 
(difference) and international relations/geopolitics in particular (Rosenberg 1994, chap. 
6, 2005, Teschke 2003, pp. 263–268). U&CD has elaborated on those ideas, starting 
with unevenness but with key adaptations to generate combined development. This 
thesis has likewise followed that pathway, seeking to take both modernity and the 
stubborn reality of peasant difference and unevenness seriously. 
Yet the power of the post-1989 conjuncture is such that the balance between 
liberal-modernity and the challenges unevenness/difference is supposed to impose can 
appear to have decisively shifted in favour of the former. Indeed, the very common 
resort to ‘globalisation’ underlines this. The institution(s) of globalisation/ liberal 
modernity are so powerful that a powerful is that now, at long last, the work of history 
is complete and difference immersed within globalisation. Fukuyama’s ‘End of 
History’(1992) is only the most famous example of the broad intellectual trend. Even 
Benno Teschke (2003, p. 268), otherwise engaged in a historical critique of many of 
these ideas, seems unable to resist speculating that the contemporary conjuncture 
might amount to a shift from international order to one of ‘globalisation and global 
governance’. And, alongside this shift, references to the explanatory power of ‘global 
capitalism’ (Shivji 2009, Aminzade 2013a, p. 11) have become correspondingly popular 
in the Tanzania literature. 
In an earlier work, focussing on modernity and before engaging with U&CD, Justin 
Rosenberg carefully discusses the division of politics and economics/ the states and 
market approach. In doing so he remarks that starting with a presumption of that 																																																								
7 Harvey’s attempt to identify ‘territorial’ as well ‘capital’ logics of accumulation, in some senses aspires 
to go beyond this. But see Brenner’s (2006) careful suggestion that Harvey’s  ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ privileges capital’s logic(2006, p. 86) – in spite of himself – and (2006, pp. 96–102) 
further pointing to the possibility that Harvey’s concept is closer to Smith than late Marx. Indeed, 
Brenner argues, if ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is supposed to show that ‘capital accumulation is 
strictly limited in the extent to which it can create the sociopolitical conditions for its own expansion 
and to call attention to the political conflicts and social struggles’ then ‘they need to be grasped not 
just in the global context of the long downturn and core governments’ efforts to restore the 
profitability of core capitals, but also in their own terms, by reference to domestic economic 
developments and internal political conflicts’ (2006, p. 100). 
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separation ‘is not a theoretically innocent assumption’. Continuing, he notes that to a 
large extent the social relations that justify the view do not obtain across the world; but 
more importantly still ‘because even where they do obtain, they are continually being 
contested’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 132). Amongst other things, a consequence of the 
current thesis’ claims around the citizen-peasant, along with political market, is not 
just to emphasise how consequential that contestation is, but also that it disturbs a 
wide range of assumptions including many around the liberal moment. 
The significance of this is underlined by considering Philip McMichael’s (1999, 
2000, pp. 682–686) suggestion that the current conjuncture is witnessing a crisis, or 
‘decomposition of wage labour’. This does not mean that the liberal moment 
(howsoever labelled) is an illusion. Rather it is to highlight how much participation in 
the world market is not premised on wage-labour in the sense that classical ideas of 
modernity did so much with. In the current case the political market, the institution 
attendant on the citizen-peasant, is a central mechanism of peasant difference in this 
process. But either way, difference holds as a disruptive feature vis-à-vis liberal analysis 
of the current conjuncture. 
On this basis it can be suggested that the liberal moment cannot be understood 
through presumptions of convergence. Difference, and peasant difference in particular, 
are not just abiding features of the liberal moment: they are proliferating. This is so 
even with reference to the very core of modernity, wage-labour, as McMichael points 
out. It is further suggested that this is in line with the broad vision of fissile modernity 
proposed in Chapter 3. If this is so then this thesis points to an avenue that might be 
fruitful. 
This is, based on the theoretical stance adopted in Chapters 2 and 3, the suggestion 
that the world historical liberal moment of our times should itself be understood as 
involving interaction across difference. Beginning with a pattern of unevenness, and 
thereafter proceeding to identify how that generates ‘liberal’ interactions of these sorts. 
In the absence of such a move, the alternative appears to be persistent difficulties with 
difference, and the exaggerations and erasures that risks. Down that path, it seems, lies 
yet more ‘humility’ of the kind Nyerere taxed those ‘World Bank people’ with. It is also 
worth noting, however, that such an interpretation would also involve re-connecting 
the notion of fissile modernity offered in this thesis with a notion of modernity as 
fusion as well. This would plainly be a very valuable innovation which, whilst it can be 
anticipated here, requires more work than is within the scope of this thesis. 
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II. Tanzania in the 21st century  
Revisiting some of the empirical queries raised in Chapter 6 in this second Section, 
questions of rural development and the political market can be considered with 
reference to a recent policy initiative. Thereafter, it looks at the wider possibility of 
public ownership that the political market might yield. Along the way this touches 
upon the potential implications of the thesis’ arguments for urbanisation and 
industrialisation in Tanzania. Finally, it considers the dramatic acceleration of ‘China 
in Africa’ in recent years. Sketching the terrain in this way some future research 
possibilities arise; in doing so, however, several limitations to the research presented in 
the thesis also arise, the methodological implications of which lead toward Section III 
and a final conclusion. 
Kilimo Kwanza and the Politics of Land 
If the narrative of economic success has been limited to ‘islands of globalisation’, 
the recent kilimo kwanza [agriculture first] policy initiative appears to be a promising 
starting point for getting at the ‘day to day’ life of the citizen-peasant and, therefore, 
the majority of Tanzanians. Rural poverty in Tanzania remains substantial, with 38.8% 
below the poverty line in 2000, falling to around 33% by 2012. Whilst this is 
significantly lower than comparators, including those with higher GDP per capita, such 
as Kenya (49.1% in 2005) or Malawi (55.9% in 2004,) this is a considerable source of 
political pressure (Poulton 2012, p. 8). Whilst the lower rate of poverty offers some 
support to the propositions advanced in this thesis, the focus here shall be on the 
political pressure that poverty generates. In fact, this supports the broad claim around 
the political market, part of a set of structural imperatives pushing the state to 
generate and sustain market opportunities, on pain of what Hydén called ‘withdrawal’. 
Thus, as Chapter 6 saw, the withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies not only curtailed 
production (Skarstein 2010, pp. 116–120) but became a feature of electoral politics. 
Attempting to find a way out of this difficulty, the Tanzanian state continues to 
search for the means to sustain and boost agriculture through the political market 
mechanism. The immediate impulse toward this is electoral politics, in particular 
CCM’s fear of loss of power, but undergirded by the state’s legitimacy resting to a great 
extent on its developmental function. In the early years of the 21st century that pressure 
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has resulted in the restoration of both fertiliser subsidies8 and significant social 
services that had been scaled back at the peak of liberalisation. 
Since then the government has sought to more comprehensively restore and build 
upon the ‘mini-green revolution’ that had been sustained by the political market 
(Chapter 5). The current five year plan, for 2011-2016, Unleashing Tanzania’s Latent 
Growth Potential sets the ambitious target for increasing agricultural growth from 4.1% 
to 6% per annum (United Republic of Tanzania 2012, p. 7). That, alongside a large 
infrastructure programme in both rural and urban areas, is supposed to yield a shift to 
‘an industry-based economy’ and ‘middle income’ status by 2025 built upon a strong, 
relatively prosperous agrarian base (United Republic of Tanzania 2012, p. i). As the 
basis, agriculture had to come first in chronological terms and as a policy priority 
(kilimo kwanza). These ambitions are to be achieved through the implementation of 
‘Ten Pillars’,9 that will transform ‘peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers’ as 
well as promote ‘medium and large scale farmers’. Grist to the mill, so it would seem, 
of the state-to-market-led interpretation of the era of ‘success’.  
The most salient Pillars reinforce that impression. Pillar 2’s (finance) overall thrust, 
whilst also providing for a minimum 10% of budget expenditure for agriculture, is 
unmistakeably directed toward ‘financialising’ agrarian society. Its goals are to 
establish a Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank, encourage ‘private sector’ 
investment and rural savings through ‘community banks’ and an agriculture-specific 
social security fund. Land, Pillar 5, meanwhile is supposed to reinforce land rights, but 
also make land readily alienable – that is, a commodity - in various ways. Similarly, 
more (‘unused’) land is to be allocated to a Land Bank to facilitate investment, an 
aspiration first observed in Chapter 6. Pillar 6, concerned with ‘incentives’, seems to 
strongly confirm its fundamentally market nature. Its focus is on ‘fiscal and other 
incentives’, enhancing ‘competitiveness’ and the removal of ‘market barriers from 
agricultural commodities’. 
																																																								
8 Under the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme and very much against the will of the ‘donor 
community’ (Cooksey 2012, p. 15) a further reminder of the limitations of seeing Tanzania as a 
“governance state” (Harrison 2004) and the significance of sovereignty (Wangwe 2004, Brown 2013). 
9 In full these pillars are, in mostly bland, technocratic register: 1. “A national vision”; 2. “Financing”; 3. 
“Institutional reorganization”; 4. “Paradigm shift to strategic framework”; 5. “Land”; 6. “Incentives”; 
7. “Industrialization”; 8. “Science, technology and human resource”; 9 “Infrastructure development” and 
10. “Mobilization of Tanzanians.”(United Republic of Tanzania 2009) 
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Two other Pillars, meanwhile, evince a clearer role for the state. These are 
industrialisation and infrastructure development, Pillars 7 and 9. The former, echoing 
Nyerere-era ambitions, aspires to increased backward and forward ‘linkages’ between 
agriculture and industry. In particular, the state intends to stimulate fertiliser 
production, and provide further subsidises for the benefit of ‘small farmers’. Indeed, 
similar provisions are intended for other agricultural inputs. Meanwhile agricultural 
produce, it is hoped, will increasingly feed into forward linkages in the form of agro-
processing. Finally, infrastructural improvements are also fundamental, both as a 
general feature of the Five Year Plan and in kilimo kwanza in particular. This involves 
an irrigation scheme, increasing the provision of storage facilities, improvements in 
roads and railways and, finally, the promotion of rural electrification. 
What does this rehearsal of the policy demonstrate? Rhetorically all this is 
conceived in approximately ‘liberal’ terms, and certainly there is little on the face of it 
that contradicts the states to market-led narrative. ‘The market’ is the central 
mechanism to the policy, whilst the aspiration to shift from ‘peasant’ to ‘commercial’ 
farming is hardly encouraging of the prospects of the citizen-peasant in the 21st century. 
The suggestion that kilimo kwanza ‘roots agricultural development firmly in the private 
sector’ (Jenkins 2012, p. 13) is both typical and, prima facie, reasonable. 
Beneath the rhetorical veneers, however, is a deeper vindication of the political 
market reading. The principal thrust of kilimo kwanza is to emphasise the importance 
of state provision to agriculture. In particular, its core rationale is broadly in accord 
with the political market, aimed at encouraging engagement with ‘the market’ by 
creating market opportunities in the sense encountered in Chapter 6. Thus the ‘private 
sector’ in an agricultural context is not, without the political market, otherwise a 
(reliable) market participant; the phrase ‘private sector’ can be harmless or harmful, 
depending on whether this distinction is observed. 
Whilst it is true that kilimo kwanza is aimed at appealing to ‘capital’ and 
encouraging large-scale farming (Coulson 2013, p. 18, Edwards 2014, p. 225), the 
overwhelming majority of land (95%) is held and farmed by smallholders, whilst 90% 
of Tanzania’s food is ‘smallholder’ grown (Aminzade 2013a, p. 378). Thus, whilst kilimo 
kwanza understandably raises concerns (Aminzade 2013a, p. 273) around the wider 
issue of land grabbing (Hall 2013, McMichael 2014b), this remains a prospect not a 
realised phenomenon. Furthermore, attempts to introduce large-scale farming have a 
long and almost entirely unsuccessful history in Tanzania. This is not just due to 
geographical constraints, but also social ones. Above all, due to the absence of 
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dependence on the market, wage-labour is both scarce and expensive (Coulson 2013, p. 
18). Thus, even to the extent that kilimo kwanza favours large-scale enterprises, the 
result is anything but a foregone conclusion of accelerating dispossession. 
Ultimately though, kilimo kwanza is at least as much about rejuvenating the 
political market – that is, encouraging citizen-peasant participation in the market – as 
it is about encouraging large-scale farming. First, continued political and especially 
electoral pressures (in line with Chapter 6’s argument) suggest that the citizen-peasant 
is a major influence on policy (Booth et al. 2014, p. 40, Chaligha et al. 2002). Second, 
the strategy of encouraging large-scale farming is focussed on pursuit of a fiscally 
sustainable means of sustaining the political market. The idea is simple: large-scale 
farming will pay for infrastructure and other service provision to their own farms, 
which smallholders/ citizen-peasants will also be entitled to benefit from. 
This feature is illustrated by a core project that has arisen under the auspices of 
kilimo kwanza, the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2010, 2011, 
Jenkins 2012). This corridor, running from Dar es Salaam on the coast through to the 
Southern Highlands, is a conscious attempt to build upon the earlier ‘mini-green 
revolution’. In technocratic language, it is described as ‘an innovative private 
partnership that can be used to encourage investments in agricultural development to 
the benefit of smallholder farmers’ (Booth et al. 2014, p. 51). Elsewhere its objective is 
expressed in terms that are directly evocative of the political market, aspiring ‘to 
provide opportunities [my emphasis] for smallholder producers to engage in profitable 
agriculture’ (SAGCOT 2011, p. 7). 
Intentions aside, the prospects for rejuvenation of the political market are not 
great. First, investment prospects are not as strong as the glossy marketing 
prospectuses suggest, for obvious reasons. Moreover, land grabbing will remain a 
concern, and given the politically empowered status of the landholders, the proverbial 
‘investor’ of ‘globalisation’ is sure to be anxious. Finally, wage-labour for large farms is, 
as Coulson suggests, likely to remain a substantial problem; whether capitalist-
enterprise can be compatible with the citizen-peasant and political market is a 
fundamental question, and given the argument advanced there are reasons to doubt it. 
Overall, then, the political market seems likely to remain unstable and liable to 
crisis. Whilst the ambition that kilimo kwanza evinces does provide a measure of 
support for the claims advanced in the thesis, it is much more difficult to say much 
with confidence about its current trajectory. Whilst those elements of modernity that 
have been subject to fission in Tanzania (infrastructural technologies such as TAZARA) 
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have been deeply consequential, industry has not been one of them. And, to the 
profound frustration of hopes for ‘development’ in the programmatic sense, the 
material capacities of production premised on the citizen-peasant have proven rather 
limited. This is a curious consequence to arrive at through U&CD, given its original 
conception as a theory of industrialisation in conditions of backwardness (Trotsky 
2008, Gerschenkron 1962). This at least suggests that ‘privileges of backwardness’ do 
not necessarily extend to industrialisation in every case. 
Citizens and the Politics of Ownership 
Might the possibility of a wider politics of ownership yield more results for 
contemporary Tanzania? This can be addressed by resuming with the politics of 
corruption, concern for which has become ever more widespread and deeply felt in 
Tanzania (REPOA 2006, Aminzade 2013a, pt. III, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7, Gray 2015). 
Corruption was one of three major themes advanced by Jakaya Kikwete when first 
standing for president in 2005 (one other theme being agriculture) (Edwards 2014, p. 
225). Yet, by the 2010 election, the situation was markedly different (Lofchie 2014, p. 
217). Increasingly associated with corruption scandals, the Kikwete government had 
lost a great deal of credibility that resulted in both a fall in turnout and reduced vote 
share for CCM. 
What, other than a sense of the intractability of the issue, does this reveal? First it 
highlights the centrality of the issue in electoral politics. If, as suggested in Chapter 6, 
the strength and depth of feeling against corruption is not just a reflection of moral 
sentiment but also closely tied to the political market this is hardly surprising. Political 
sentiment against corruption has come to be conjoined with campaigns against 
privatisation (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 278–284). So successful has it been that by May 
2009 the privatisation process was essentially over, and a substantial amount of 
Tanzanian infrastructure remains in the state’s hands. Thus, whilst few leading 
personalities associated with corruption have been prosecuted, Aminzade suggests that 
corruption attached itself to a great extent to privatisation schemes. 
This amounts to some evidence of a widening in public ownership. A tangential 
issue is also due consideration here. For the fundamental basis of the political market 
lies in its close connection to the lack of market dependence amongst rural, agrarian 
peasant labour. If the politics of ownership was being extended, one could reasonably 
expect to see an extension of that logic to more urban concerns. In Chapter 6 some 
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urban oriented diversification was noted, and Bryceson’s (2010) urban case study was 
deployed to demonstrate not only the logical possibility but its actual realisation too.10 
To advance consideration of this issue further, a great deal more data drawn from the 
present era would be required, looking at patterns of migration and ‘day to day’ 
reproduction. Important work (Tripp 1997) has been done to show the great flexibility 
of urban Tanzania, but it relies upon the particular context of liberalisation.11 Aside 
from there being some limitations to the data available, there is a methodological 
limitation that is of more concern. 
To build toward that, then, another field can be scrutinised that might evidence an 
extension in public or citizen ownership. This is the recent discovery of large natural 
gas deposits and some oil (Coulson 2013, p. 9). Resource nationalism has, as in so many 
other places, arisen around gas (Green 2013), which is not in itself particularly 
remarkable. More interesting is the form it has taken. This has involved protests in 
Mtwara, nearest to the gas finds, over concerns that the benefits will be monopolised 
by Dar es Salaam (BBC 2013). In response, the government has been forced to 
guarantee that the proceeds, financial and infrastructural, would be for the benefit of 
Tanzania as a nation, including Mtwara, not solely Dar es Salaam. Indeed it has gone 
so far as to clarify that the entire project will be oriented toward domestic 
infrastructure and energy generation (including rural electrification) even at the cost 
of reduced profits (Manson 2013, Ng’wanakilala 2015). 
There are real perils in engaging with this issue, very much still in flux and possibly 
subject to further conflict, which has involved some violence. Nevertheless, some 
tentative observations are helpful. Whilst these outbursts of violence in its contentious 
politics might yet damage Tanzania’s reputation for stability, and the possibility that 
government guarantees will not be honoured, at least one possibility is that this is 
suggestive of a widening norm of public ownership as advanced, contentiously, by 
citizens themselves. The government’s quick moves to assuage concerns along these 
lines is suggestive in this respect, even more so is the significance of those claims being 
construed in expressly national terms.12 In spite of its perils, the minimum that can be 																																																								
10 See also (Bah et al. 2003) for an attempt to complicate understandings of rural-urban linkages in 
Tanzania. 
11 Tripp mostly argues that this is done to maintain labourers’ independence from the state, which if 
generalized beyond the context of liberalization and Dar es Salaam would cast some doubt on the 
extension of the political market. 
12 Another possibility, of course, is that discourses of nationalism are deployed to delegitimize local 
protest. 
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said of the speculative suggestion being offered is that it remains within the realm of 
possibilities. 
The final, very visible, aspect of contemporary Tanzania that can be pointed to is 
the dramatic re-entry of China to the stage. Relations between China and Tanzania, to 
say nothing of Africa in general, have been booming since 2000, if not before (Baregu 
2008, Lofchie 2014, pp. 222–227). Trade is a great feature of this, but at least as 
significant is China’s role as a major source of infrastructure development. It is one of 
several major participants in features of the gas project noted above, but there are two 
other projects that are worth noting in addition. 
The first is a deep-water port at Bagamoyo, which will have capacity that will dwarf 
every existing port in East Africa. Aside from its vast capacity, attached thereto will be 
both export and import processing zones, road and rail links connecting the port to 
Tanzania, extending into Zambia (through TAZARA) and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Anthony 2013, p. 136, Lofchie 2014, p. 225). Originally conceived as a private 
project, but unlikely to proceed on that basis (Aminzade 2013a, p. 268) Chinese funding 
of $10 billion at concessional rates seems to have made the project possible. 
A second project revisits the industrial ambitions that Nyerere had once hoped 
would follow TAZARA. A $3 billion agreement is now in place for the construction of a 
coal mine, thermal power station and iron ore mine in the Southern Highlands 
(Anthony 2013, p. 135). This project, also taking advantage of TAZARA,13 is hugely 
ambitious in scale and on some projections will generate as much of 25% of Tanzanian 
GDP once complete. 
Whilst the completion of these projects, let alone the wider claims made for them, 
should not be taken for granted, this does have real bearing on many of the issues 
facing contemporary Tanzania. The abiding problem, since the citizen-peasant 
emerged in Tanzania, has been fiscal; that is, the difficulty in securing resources to 
make the political market ‘work’ in view of the real but all too modest surplus the 
citizen-peasant has been able to generate. This has meant persistent resort to external 
finance, and since the 1970s this has become increasingly problematic as external 
finance became both less available and much more expensive under ‘neoliberalism’ 
(Harvey 2005, chap. 1). These difficulties have pushed the state in the direction of 
embracing mining, or ‘public-private’ schemes like kilimo kwanza with dubious 
prospects, in an attempt to resolve the problem. 																																																								
13 At a more modest financial scale, aid packages have also been agreed to recuperate the TAZARA 
railway and thereafter establish it in a commercial footing (Mumero 2012). 
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China’s interest in infrastructure, and relative financial largesse toward Tanzania, 
suggest this ground might be shifting. Unsurprisingly, the Tanzanian state has, like 
many others, responded to Chinese interest with great enthusiasm. Likewise, this does 
seem prone to once again provoke greater responsiveness to Tanzania amongst other 
powers once too (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 263). However, the content of Chinese 
interaction is not easy to comprehend. Whilst these relations are commercially 
oriented, they are normally attached to deeply concessional loans and premised on a 
range of political and geopolitical calculations (Wang and Zou 2014). 
Without leaping to the conclusion that ‘unequal equals’ might still have analytical 
purchase – which would be a very difficult position to sustain based on the current 
evidence available – it does suggest that a more thoroughgoing analysis of the content 
and potential of the pattern of interaction in the 21st century is worthwhile. 
Furthermore, the potential significance that ‘China in Africa’ holds out for the political 
market as it is currently constituted in Tanzania is simple at one basic level, offering to 
buttress the political market through both finance and infrastructural projects. 
This leads, finally, to an issue of concern for Section III. This is what might be a 
methodological limitation to U&CD, and the claims that have been advanced on the 
basis of it in this thesis. U&CD, beginning with a plane of unevenness, before 
identifying interaction and combination to specify a form of development, is not a 
methodology that is particularly well attuned to very short timescales, least of all in the 
case of ongoing phenomena. It would have been very difficult, for example, to forecast 
the possibilities attached to the TAZARA project in the ways that have been identified 
in this thesis in, say, 1970. Allying U&CD with ancillary theories might alleviate this 
limitation, but that risks subverting the potential of U&CD that lies in the great 
intellectual flexibility derived from its core premises. Alas, it seems, U&CD gives no 
greater mandate than other methodologies to avoid the usual disclaimers: it is simply 
too soon to tell with confidence what the nature and prospects of the contemporary 
citizen-peasant are. 
III. Difference, Modernity and International Relations 
Setting out to tackle the problem of difference encapsulated as Marx and Arusha in 
this work, the focus has been on the need to reconcile modernity and the peasant. The 
first step toward addressing this was theoretical, deploying U&CD in an effort to re-
theorise modernity as a fissile process in Chapter 3. Out of that framework the 
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empirical Chapters identified the citizen-peasant as a concrete social form that 
expressed the possibility of the peasant as a protean subject of fissile modernity. 
Having reflected on the implications and prospects of that research in the 
contemporary conjuncture, Section III concludes with some reflections on the 
concepts which have been deployed and developed here and the methodological 
choices which have been made. 
The integration of difference with modernity can be achieved, in this argument, by 
articulating modernity as a process, theorised through reference to U&CD. With this 
methodology in hand it becomes possible to both recognise the logical possibility of 
difference and track across time elements of modernity breaking off from its original 
foundations and recombining with different elements. As such the peasant can more 
than just ‘survive’ as a marginal feature. Rather, through transmutating and combining 
with elements of modernity, it can be more thoroughly integrated into a theorisation 
of modernity. In these instances, the peasant, in combined form, would have revealed 
itself as a protean subject of modernity. 
In pursuing this argument to its empirical conclusion, the focus has been on 
Tanzania. This was methodologically necessary since the data required to fully flesh 
out the general argument does not easily admit of a ‘world history’ of peasants under 
modernity. That said the standing of this argument would benefit from extension in 
some important directions. Aside from extension to other and wider regions of Africa 
(Boone 2014), the possibilities for extending and testing these notions by reference to 
the peasant are vast. 
Perhaps the most obvious place to turn to though is China.14 Here the peasant has 
plainly been central to its revolutionary history but continues to emerge at the heart of 
debates, most especially in China itself, over the trajectory of its development right up 
to the present day (Wen 2007, Wang 2009, Day 2013). Although it is true that processes 
that could well be thought of as depeasantisation are ongoing there, support for the 
broad positions established in this thesis would not depend on denying that. Instead it 
would “only” (scare quotes intended!) need to establish that such depeasantisation 
could, in fact, be understood as hybridisation in the sense of combined develop 
discussed in Chapter 3. Since the immense world historical significance of the rise of 
China could hardly be doubted, the core claims around peasant and modernity would 																																																								
14 India is another potential site, not least since the post-colonial method has been extensively 
developed there. Accordingly, it also affords an opportunity to further consider the complementary 
and/or competitive intellectual potential of post-colonialism and U&CD. 
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be very substantially advanced if it were possible to link them to this phenomenon, 
showing the Chinese peasant to be a protean subject of its rise. 
Similarly, this thesis has also pursued a temporally limited strategy, developing its 
claims in relation to the post-colonial era alone. There are similar possibilities for 
historical extension as there are for geographic. But without reproducing the same 
thoughts advanced above, another methodological point arises to be made. Having 
relied upon U&CD in developing this argument, political multiplicity has been taken 
for granted both theoretically and empirically by virtue of starting at the point of 
independence. 15  Given the significance of ‘peasantisation’ in the passage to 
independence (Iliffe 1979) the possibility of historical extension of this research might 
also be able to shed light on how political multiplicity is generated. Thus, whilst the 
thesis has focussed on asking what IR (or at least U&CD) can do for the historical 
sociology of peasant and modernity, a temporal extension might offer fruitful 
possibilities in the reverse. Such a move might also guard against the danger of 
reification of political multiplicity (Rosenberg 2009, 2010). Doing so, however, would 
require a great deal further theoretical and empirical excavation beyond that offered 
here. 
Finally, what of the problem of difference in general? It has been suggested that 
attention to international relations, especially through U&CD, offers great potential. 
Indeed difference is, or at least ought to be, a central preoccupation of disciplinary IR 
(Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, Rosenberg 2016). Rather than starting with political 
multiplicity though, the thesis began with a fundamentally social difference, modernity 
and the peasant or Marx and Arusha, then sought to reconcile them by making use of 
‘the international’ as a field of interactivity across a plane of social difference.16 In doing 
so the ambition has been to show that the Tanzanian peasant has been a protean 
subject – a part of history, not outside it à la Sarkozy - of the modern world. Nyerere, 
like Du Bois, thought the moral implications of this sort of possibility are paramount, 
writing: 
‘To the extent that we in Tanzania succeed in the struggle to which we have 
committed ourselves, so we shall be taking our place in the march of humanity 																																																								
15 Work on U&CD itself endeavours to not take this for granted (Rosenberg 2010); the point being made 
here is directed at this thesis insofar as it has not taken a position on this aspect of the theoretical 
framework. 
16 Whilst this does not entail that the argument as relied upon reification of the international, it must 
be accepted that it does nothing in itself to address the issue. 
		
165	
towards peace and human dignity…Now we are beginning to wake up and to join with 
our fellow human beings in deciding the destiny of the human race. By thinking out 
our own problems on the basis of those principles which have universal validity, 
Tanzania will make its contribution to the development of mankind. That is our 
opportunity and responsibility’ (Nyerere 1968, p. 32). 
The ultimate limitation of this thesis, then, is as follows. If the premises of U&CD 
are valid then difference is a fundamental feature of human society; and this might be 
especially true of a modernity that, in this argument, is subject to a process of fission. 
Such premises have allowed this thesis to address a real problem of difference: peasant 
and modernity. However, if historical sociology can ultimately only tell us that 
difference, as far as we can tell and theorise, always has been and will be a feature of 
human societies then one key dimension of the problem of difference must remain 
beyond its ken. For the upshot is this: the challenge that difference poses to humanity 
has an irreducibly moral dimension; upon this thought, though, I can offer no more 
than humility. 
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